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Abstract 
 
This thesis uses ideas from the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein and a 
variety of Wittgensteinian thinkers to shed light on the ways in which 
religious language functions in contemporary British Quakerism. It does this 
by looking in detail at examples from published British Quaker literature. In 
the process of considering genuine modern examples of religious language 
within their community context, I uncover assumptions which enable these 
ways of speaking to make sense within that community. These include ideas 
about how language works, such as an assumption that it follows on from 
(rather than being prior to) religious experience, and beliefs about the 
relationship between other religions and Quakerism.  
 
The complexities of these examples and the multiple relevant contextual 
factors enable me to refine the philosophical and theological claims which I 
draw from Wittgenstein and others. These incude the understanding of 
meaning as use in context and the model of religion as like a language or 
culture. In the first part of the thesis, a series of tools – philosophical 
perspectives which can be applied to examples in order to gain insights – are 
developed, then used to illuminate a set of examples. In the second half of 
the thesis, factors discovered to be underlying the patterns of use found in 
British Quaker religious language are explored in more detail and finally 
considered in relation to some further examples.  
 
As a whole, the thesis explains the community processes which create and 
maintain some central patterns of Quaker speech, and demonstrates the 
usefulness of Wittgensteinian ideas and methods. In particular, it utilises the 
turn towards observing the ways in which religious language is used rather 
than focusing on the truth-value of claims abstracted from their roles in 
religious life. I conclude that patterns of Quaker speech not only make sense 
within a community where certain assumptions are held, but also that they 
fulfil a role in the maintenance of the community as a single theologically 
diverse and inclusive Religious Society. 
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I examine Quaker ways of speaking about "God or whatever 
we may choose to call it"
1
 in order to show how these ways of speaking 
make sense within the community which uses them and for the people who 
struggle with the issues which produced them. This examination is 
undertaken using approaches drawn from Ludwig Wittgenstein and George 
Lindbeck. In the process, some features of the Quaker
2
 case study will 
point to improvements which can be made in the Wittgensteinian and 
Lindbeckian methods. This innovative approach contributes to our 
understanding of religious language as a whole, Quaker religious language 
specifically, and Wittgensteinian methods of investigation. This thesis 
demonstrates that Quaker ways of speaking, despite the internal tensions 
which are visible within them, make sense within the community which 
uses them, so long as members of that community continue to accept the 
relevant premises – but also acknowledges that those premises are in no way 
obvious outside the community, and indeed have received significant 
critiques. The underlying premises receive significant attention in this 
thesis, and in the latter part of the thesis I attend particularly to the 
acceptance of a pluralism about truth in religion and the practices of 
multiple religious belonging and using language from multiple religious 
backgrounds. 
 
By focusing on an 'ordinary' philosophy of religion, in which the actual uses 
of religious language are foregrounded rather than the abstracted versions 
often considered as philosophical claims, this thesis shifts attention from 
truth, which in any case requires what Wittgenstein would call a 
                                                 
1
 Rex Ambler, The End of Words: Issues in Contemporary Quaker Theology  (London: 
Quaker Home Service, 1994). 24. 
2
 A number of technical Quaker terms are of necessity used in this thesis and further 
explanation of them can be found in the glossary. Henceforth, the first appearance of a term 
which appears in the glossary is marked by bold type. 
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grammatical investigation, towards meaning as created in community.
3
 It 
continues a tradition of boundary-pushing which has recently emerged in 
philosophy of religion – in John Cottingham's work on making philosophy 
of religion more 'humane', Mark Wynn's work on religion and the emotions, 
and the perspectives of a number of feminist philosophers of religion, for 
example – by pushing the boundaries which have previously been drawn 
around religious language.
4
 
 
Issues around religious language – how does it work? how should we 
understand it? – have been of interest to many philosophers of religion, and 
more or less Wittgensteinian approaches to them have been considered by 
George Lindbeck, D. Z. Phillips, Rush Rhees, and others. However, the 
method of considering examples drawn from our own experience of 
everyday (non-religious) language, often used in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations and other works from after his return to 
Cambridge in 1929, has an obvious extension which has not been generally 
taken up: the detailed and contextualised consideration of real, specific uses 
of language within particular religious communities. This thesis explores the 
application of broadly Wittgensteinian methods to examples drawn from the 
published literature of a religious group.  
 
In doing so, the thesis draws together material from a wide variety of 
sources, linked by relevance to the method at hand. At the core of the 
method is the Wittgensteinian understanding of how language acquires its 
meaning – that it is continually produced through the uses of words and 
phrases, by speakers in particular contexts – and the resultant acceptance 
that the context of speech or writing and the patterns of use of a specific 
word or phrase are of the utmost importance for our understanding of it. 
                                                 
3
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Chichester: Blackwell, 2009). §90. 
4
 Examples would include: John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, 
Philosophy and Human Value  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). and Mark 
Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding : integrating perception, 
conception and feeling  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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That being so, in order to understand a remark we must attend carefully to 
the context in which it is made by a particular writer or speaker, and the 
previous uses to which the words and phrases in it have been put in 
relevantly similar contexts, since these will point us to the connotations 
terms have for the user and their audience. Taking this method, together 
with the development of it which Lindbeck produced in relation to doctrine 
and called the cultural-linguistic model, and applying it to specific examples 
from within a particular religious community bounds this exercise and 
makes it possible – although many details of the background and context 
will have to be left aside, the size of the literature involved makes it possible 
to detect patterns across the work of a variety of authors, and hence to reach 
specific conclusions.  
 
The use of contemporary British Quaker literature as the source of such a 
case study is motivated partly by the necessity for just this kind of specific 
literature; for such a numerically small group, Quakers have written and 
published much, including a significant number of books and pamphlets 
produced in recent years and aimed principally although not exclusively at 
their own membership. The examples which are considered in detail in this 
thesis (in chapters 4 and 7) date from between 1987 and 2009, and were 
written by Quakers for Quaker, non-Quaker, and Quaker-curious audiences. 
The other motivation for using this literature as a case study is the features 
of interest which it provides. Firstly, British Quakers are not a classic 
church community with a set of central doctrinal statements, of the kind of 
which Lindbeck was thinking in developing his cultural-linguistic model, 
and applying the latter model to this new example will show up both some 
of the model's strengths and some points where the model needs adaption to 
fit. Secondly, the diversity of belief within the contemporary British Quaker 
community produces a need for particular ways of speaking, and the process 
of exploring the mechanisms by which such remarks are made and make 
sense will lead into a consideration of non-Quaker but related material 
10 
 
which puts Quakers in the broader context of some religious trends visible 
in Britain today.
5
 
 
The conclusions which this Wittgensteinian method produces – some 
relating to the underlying assumptions and guidelines on which Quaker 
speakers rely when talking about God, and others relating to the usefulness 
and nuancing of the tools drawn from Lindbeck and Wittgenstein – have 
implications for three main fields of study. Firstly, for Quaker studies, and 
especially the consideration of contemporary British Quakerism, the 
outcomes of the case study itself are significant, in particular for what they 
reveal about the philosophical underpinnings of Quaker God-talk today.  
 
Secondly, for philosophers and theologians concerned with religious 
language, the implications of any case study ought to be of interest, since 
although the Wittgensteinian method is broadly familiar it is rarely applied 
to any specific examples as done in this thesis – and the results of this 
process, especially for the importance of key concepts such as the 
irreplaceability of some religious language, should lead to a reconsideration 
of other examples. Similarly, for theologians and philosophers interested in 
the nature of religion, the detailed application of Lindbeck's religion-as-
language metaphor to a single case study, and the changes which need to be 
made to his understanding of religion as a result, are potentially useful.  
 
Finally, because the underpinnings of current Quaker uses of religious 
language turn out to be supported by a widespread acceptance of a form of 
pluralism and the practice of multiple religious belonging, the reflections on 
these produced by this case study should also be of interest to scholars 
considering pluralism and multiple religious belonging more generally or in 
other contexts. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The extension of these trends beyond Britain, especially to other Anglophone Quaker 
communities, is likely but outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Method 
 
The innovative interdisciplinary method of investigation employed in this 
thesis owes, as said above, much to Wittgenstein – although it does not 
incorporate all of his methods – and also a significant amount to the 
Wittgensteinian theologian George Lindbeck. In the process, it draws on 
philosophical, theological, and sociological approaches alongside the 
primary Quaker literature. It is similar to some other theological methods, 
such as the 'ordinary theology' approach developed and used by Jeff Astley 
(discussed in more detail later in this section).
6
 
 
One method which Wittgenstein employs in the Philosophical 
Investigations (among other places) is to take forms of speech which are 
familiar and often in regular use by his audience, but which seem to be 
opaque when the tools of standard analytical philosophy are turned on them. 
By rejecting those tools, and substituting his own understanding of the way 
language works (to be explored at much greater length in chapter 2), he 
seeks to clarify these familiar terms and phrases in light of their actual use 
in real circumstances. This is the method I use in this thesis – a method 
which is easy for me, since I am located within the Quaker community 
whose language use I want to discuss. However, this thesis also aims to 
speak to an audience who are not (prior to reading this) familiar with this 
'Quaker dialect', and hence requires some adaptations from this 
Wittgensteinian method. 
 
Wittgenstein, when faced with unfamiliar practices such as those described 
in James Frazer's The Golden Bough, turns to an analogical method – 
looking for familiar comparisons to the unfamiliar, so that we can try and 
'get inside' otherwise strange, even barbaric-seeming, practices and see how 
their internal logic may be similar to that of practices which do make sense 
                                                 
6
 Jeff Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology  
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002). 
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to us
7
. Quakers are not the only people who make remarks utilising terms 
drawn from multiple religious traditions, although their style of and 
motivation for doing so may be distinct from those of others.  
 
In discussing Quaker uses of religious language, I have chosen to focus on 
real examples, drawn from published material, which gives a concrete 
dimension to the research. This is not identical with Wittgenstein's method, 
which usually draws on everyday uses which we can all readily imagine, but 
the real example provide a basis of evidence from which even those 
unfamiliar with the 'Quaker dialect' can begin to draw patterns. It would 
have been possible to provide further evidence of these patterns, from other 
published sources and by conducting interviews or focus groups, but this 
would have diluted the focused study of specific examples; in any case, the 
focus of a project of this kind is the existence of a curious or interesting way 
of speaking rather than any statistical observation about how common it is.  
 
Another method found in Wittgenstein's work is the creation of imaginary 
examples with which we can compare our real language. A number of these, 
such as the builders who have a complete language with a very small 
number of words in it,
8
 will be discussed in chapter 2, as the consideration 
of imagined language-games is essential to explaining Wittgenstein's view 
of language; however, I do not create any further such examples in this 
thesis. Rather, I continue to turn to real examples from the published 
literature which functions as my case study. This is not because the 
imaginary examples have no use, but rather because I have fully accepted 
the point which they are designed to make: that our real language, our 
everyday speech and writing, is much richer and more complex than any 
example we create in the abstract. It is in this very richness and complexity 
that I find the most interesting aspects of language – in particular, because 
real language is not created for one use only, as are the words the imaginary 
                                                 
7
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough  (Retford, Nottinghamshire: 
Brynmill Press, 1979). 10e. 
8
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §6.  
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builders use, but is multi-purpose, moving between contexts and uses and 
carrying the weight of previous uses – connotations – with it.  
 
Previous considerations of Wittgenstein's work have tended not to apply it 
directly to real documented examples in this way. Sometimes attention is 
paid to the positions of particular people – either philosophers, as in debates 
between Wittgensteinian and non-Wittgensteinian views, or of individual 
non-philosophers, as in some of Rush Rhees's letters.
9
 Often, however, the 
views of non-philosophers are abstracted from their real contexts – as when 
R. M. Hare fictionalises the characters in a debate in his essay on the 
'Simple Believer'.
10
 These can be very plausible portraits, and they are 
useful for the construction of Hare's argument, but inevitably such 
fictionalised material is removed from the actual context and background 
from which it arises. By using real examples from Quakers, many of them 
writing in a specifically Quaker context, I am able to retain this important 
contextual information. Even where the author is anonymous, the process of 
editing and publication through named channels provides significant 
background information. There is also the suggestion of an acceptance by 
the group as well as the individual writer.  
 
One feature of the complexity of British Quaker thought today which 
becomes visible in the course of this thesis and which has affected the 
methodological approach chosen is the diversity of theological perspectives 
present in the community and hence in the literature. To respond to this, I 
use the word theəlogy, a term designed to capture the diversity of possible 
positions. It is descended from the common word 'theology', from the Greek 
for 'speech about God', but it is also related to two other more recent 
coinages: 'a/theology' and 'thealogy'. A/theology captures the concepts of 
atheism and theism together in the context of discussion, allowing secular, 
humanist, agnostic, and religious positions which do not accept the 
                                                 
9
 D. Z. Phillips, ed. Rush Rhees on religion and philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
10
 R. M. Hare, Essays on Religion and Education  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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existence of God to be represented in the conversation, including those 
which are non-realist, i.e. which speak of 'God' but do not understand this 
term to refer to any external reality howsoever construed. Thealogy is a term 
widely used by feminist thealogians to denote theology done with an 
awareness of the divine feminine. In order to capture these ideas succinctly I 
use the vowel schwa, written ə and pronounced 'uh'; in English, this sound 
when used alone represents hesitation and doubt. By embedding ə in the 
centre of the word theology (thealogy, atheology) to make theəlogy, I avoid 
statements about people's beliefs about God's gender and existence while 
acknowledging that these beliefs are both varied and significant.  
 
When more than one possible theəlogical (theological, thealogical, and/or 
atheological) position seems to be evident within a remark, I call it 'multi-
theəlogical'. The method of investigation I have used always needed to have 
room for the possibility of multiple competing views existing more or less 
comfortably in the same community, and the Wittgensteinian perspective of 
language in which words do not have any core essence or 'real meaning' but 
can change and be used in a variety of flexible ways is particularly 
compatible with this. Perhaps in time the meaning of 'theology' will broaden 
in such a way that the term 'theəlogy' is no longer necessary – indeed, more 
inclusive uses are already in evidence in some places, such as some feminist 
the(o/a)logical writing – but this change does not yet seem to be sufficiently 
widespread or radical to justify using 'theology' in this way in this thesis. 
 
I also use the term 'religion' throughout this thesis. I discuss religions, 
religious traditions (referring to parts of world religions, such as 'the Zen 
Buddhism of Thich Nhat Hahn' or 'Roman Catholic Christianity', as 
'religious traditions'), religious practices, and religious language. I do this on 
the understanding that this is the agreed use of the word and that although 
there will be cases where it is not clear whether the term 'religion' is 
applicable, there is a pattern of application within which it is obvious that 
certain things are correctly called 'religious'. This Wittgensteinian approach 
to language use and definition will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 
2. Some of the compound phrases which contain the term 'religious' have 
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patterns of use of their own: in particular, the phrase 'religious language' 
applies to language used by members of a religious tradition – but not all of 
their language, since many things anyone says will be irrelevant to their 
religious understandings. The boundary is necessarily fuzzy, especially 
since remarks with no obvious theəlogical content may express a religious 
attitude: consider the things said over tea and biscuits. 'Bob's been ill again' 
has no theəlogical content but in some contexts includes an attitude of 
caring which reflects a religiously-motivated desire to, for example, take 
care of members of the community. However, it is not usual to regard this as 
'religious language' for philosophical purposes. That being so, I take the 
interesting kinds of religious language to be those which express, or have 
embedded, theəlogical opinions, and am particularly interested in this thesis 
in the naming of God.
11
 
 
A related method to the Wittgensteinian one is that described by Jeff Astley 
under the label 'ordinary theology'. Although this thesis is not, in and of 
itself, ordinary theology, Astley's category frames as important and useful a 
kind of theology which is by nature tentative and personal, exploratory and 
creative.
12
 The examples which I use can be described as ordinary theology 
– some of them are informed by philosophical and formal theological work, 
but they arise from the needs of Quakers who are thinking through their 
theəlogies in the context of their ordinary worshipping lives. Quakers have 
little or no expectation of successful systematisation and are consequently 
free to think in these ways. Quaker theəlogy in general is already outside the 
"clerical paradigm" (and so akin to Astley's "lay theology", although Quaker 
understanding, together with much other Protestant theology, prefers a 
'priesthood of all believers') and does not consider itself in debt to formal or 
academic theologies even where these are familiar to the authors.
13
 My own 
project, of course, is itself much in debt to several formal and academic 
                                                 
11
 I use the term 'theəlogical opinions' here to distinguish these implicit positions from 
'religious beliefs'; authors may not even agree, at the explicit level, with the theəlogical 
opinions which are embedded in their uses of language. 
12
 Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology: 57. 
13
 Ibid., 62. 
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theologies, although it employs them as ways to understand the background, 
motivations, and possible interpretations of ordinary Quaker theəlogians 
rather than to claim that ordinary speakers are mistaken or misguided.  
 
Overall, the interdisciplinary nature of this project means that it seeks to 
maintain links to a wide variety of secondary literatures. There is, 
obviously, the Wittgensteinian literature, and – after Wittgenstein himself – 
this thesis engages with four groups of writers which might be seen as 
subsections of this literature: philosophers working on Wittgenstein's 
linguistic approach to philosophy generally, including Saul Kripke and Cora 
Diamond; philosophers working with Wittgensteinian approaches to 
religion, such as Norman Malcolm, D. Z. Phillips and Brian Clack; 
theologians directly influenced by Wittgenstein, such as George Lindbeck 
and Don Cupitt; and theologians, mainly in the post-liberal tradition, who 
have been influenced by Wittgensteinians – Stanley Hauerwas and Kathryn 
Tanner, for example. Beyond this, I also engage with a handful of non-
Wittgensteinian theologians whose work is particularly helpful in explaining 
Quaker stances, of whom John Hick is discussed in most detail, and with the 
sociological literature on multiple religious belonging, where Rose Drew 
and Gideon Goosen are the biggest names. It is in this process, especially in 
chapters 5 and 6, that I explore the premises on which Quaker uses of 
religious language are based and consider some of the critiques made of 
those premises. 
 
Besides these scholars whose work I draw on to help understand the Quaker 
examples, there is also the Quaker literature itself. On the one hand, there is 
the primary Quaker literature, from which I draw my examples – a diverse 
literature, some written by individuals and some edited by groups, some in 
conventional books and others in cheaply produced or even homemade 
pamphlets
14
 – but with enough commonalities that patterns can be detected 
and typical examples selected for detailed analysis, as I do in chapters 4 and 
                                                 
14
 I stuck mainly to printed material since there was such an abundance of it; blogs and 
other internet postings would be another rich source. 
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7. On the other hand, there is also a secondary literature about Quakers – 
much of it, actually, produced by Quakers, some of whom have also written 
material which should be considered in the 'primary' category, making this a 
somewhat artificial distinction. Sociological and historical studies by Pink 
Dandelion, Klaus Huber, John Punshon, and Martin Davie among others 
would all fit into this category. Within the small literature of Quakerism, a 
number of people – Rex Ambler, for example – have thought it worthwhile 
to explore the relationship of Wittgensteinian ideas to Quakerism, which 
suggests that, although they have not been able to expand this theme at 
length, this is a line of inquiry worth pursuing from the Quaker perspective 
as well as the Wittgensteinian one.  
 
 
Location 
 
"Knowledge is socially situated."
15
  
 
This, described by Tracy Bowell as the first of three central claims made by 
feminist standpoint theory, is a reasonable one to make within the 
Wittgensteinian context – the intimate relationship between knowledge and 
language, and the Wittgensteinian view of the social and changeable nature 
of language, make it a plausible claim. It is also a methodologically 
significant one, both within sociology and within feminist work, since it 
points out that the producers of 'knowledge' – the authors of theses, for 
example – are located within particular social structures, and those 
structures will have important effects on the knowledge which is produced. 
This thesis does not mostly work from a feminist perspective, foregrounding 
philosophical material and the words of Quakers rather than the experiences 
of women in particular. However, the ways in which the location of an 
author can affect the work which they do are important – I assume 
throughout this thesis that knowing (at least some of) the context from 
                                                 
15
 Tracy Bowell, "Feminist Standpoint Theory,"  http://www.iep.utm.edu/fem-stan/. 
Accessed 8
th
 May 2014. 
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which someone writes or speaks is vital to understanding their remarks as 
fully as possible, and it would be hypocritical and methodologically 
unsound to ignore the effect that my own context has on the things I am 
about to say in this thesis. That being so, this section provides some 
personal background which is relevant to my approach to the topics raised 
by this work. 
 
I began this project with the observation that people in my religious 
community, including myself, were saying things which seemed bizarre or 
nonsensical to people outside that community. In one sense, I had always 
had that knowledge – I was raised as a Quaker, and while I was at school a 
series of encounters with peers and Religious Education teachers showed 
that talk of 'silent worship' or 'being led to speak' would be met with 
bafflement. The more specific observation came later, though, with a wider 
exposure to ecumenical contexts and undergraduate study of Theology. In 
the Philosophy department my teachers and fellow students were rather 
inclined to view religious talk as nonsensical talk, or at least talk which 
could not be adequately verified for the purposes of a seminar discussion, 
but in Theology people were happy with much of it: 'I was led to give a 
message from the Spirit' and 'we enter into communion with God through 
waiting worship' were fine; perhaps not mainstream, but not out of the 
ordinary order of things, either. Some kinds of claim, not unusual or 
challenged within my Quaker community, remained out-of-bounds, 
however, and it is those to which I began to turn my attention. There is, 
therefore, a very personal question at the core of this thesis: what am I doing 
when I talk about God, goddess(es) and bodhisattvas, et al.? 
 
To be a cradle Quaker, to attend Children's Meeting most weeks 
throughout childhood, to make the transition to sitting right through an hour 
of Meeting for Worship, to first serve on a Meeting committee at the age 
of seventeen, to come into formal membership, to find oneself led to speak 
to the Yearly Meeting, to be accepted to receive two Quaker bursaries, to 
serve as an Elder and a representative to Meeting for Sufferings – all these 
are ways to be thoroughly embedded within the community of the Religious 
19 
 
Society of Friends. I begin from this background and I have continued in 
this commitment throughout my studies.  
 
It should be said, though – especially in light of what I will say about 
multiple religious belonging in chapter 6 – that the Religious Society of 
Friends is not the only religious community to which I belong. I became 
interested in neo-Paganism as a teenager, following my nose through the 
public library and looking for material on archaeology, history, and religion. 
The language of Goddess worship spoke to my condition as a budding 
feminist, unnourished by a Quaker community (who were not ready for me 
to be so well-read so young) and dismayed by the Christianity which I 
encountered among Anglicans and Methodists when attending Church 
Parade with Brownies and Guides. I have retained this interest and over the 
years come to participate actively in the Pagan community, by, for example, 
attending open rituals for the seasonal cycle and studying the distance 
learning course offered by the Order of Bards, Ovates, and Druids.
16
 This 
gives me an especial sympathy for those who wish to use the language of 
polytheism, Goddess worship, and the inherent value of nature, because I 
am inclined to speak in this way too. 
 
In chapter 6 I also note that many Westerners who are expanding their 
religious horizons experiment with Buddhism, and I must count myself 
among their number. Although I have no commitment to any particular 
Buddhist group, and some philosophical and some practical difficulties with 
various Buddhist teachings and practices, I have attended meditation, 
worship, and retreats with Soka Gakkai International's British branch (SGI-
UK), the New Kadampa tradition, the Foundation for Preservation of 
Mahayana Tradition, and the Community of Interbeing, the Vietnamese Zen 
tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh. In 2012, I received the Five Mindfulness 
Trainings from the latter – this does not technically include the Three 
Refuges, but does in practice mark a certain level of sympathy with the aims 
                                                 
16
 OBOD, "The Order of Bards, Ovates and Druids,"  http://www.druidry.org/. (Accessed 
2
nd
 September 2014.) 
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of the community.
17
 It is also relevant that my first exposure to Buddhism 
outside books and the art collection of the British Museum was a course 
offered by Jim Pym and Andrew Burnham in 2005 called 'Quakers and 
Buddhists'.
18
 Multiple belonging has been a consistent feature of my Quaker 
landscape, with family members and some others in the Meeting in which I 
grew up also practising in this way. 
 
Throughout my work on this project, I continued to find myself in Quaker 
settings saying things which, in my academic work, I was on the verge of 
discounting as nonsensical or condemning as offensive. I might talk, for 
example, about being led by 'Light, Spirit, Goddess, whatever we're calling 
it this week', or about there being in everyone 'that of God, or the holy, or 
the eternal' – and then I would often catch myself, and say or think 
something like 'if we can make any sense of that'. As it turns out, I have 
stopped short of either ridicule or condemnation, working instead to 
understand why and how Quakers come to make multi-theəlogy remarks 
which may seem utterly bizarre to the outsider. In doing so, I have needed to 
step outside the Society of Friends, and view Quaker language and practices 
from other perspectives. 
 
Contents 
 
This thesis falls into two parts. The first half, comprising chapters 1 to 4, is 
more theoretical and – having introduced the Quaker material in chapter 1, 
Wittgenstein in chapter 2, and Wittgensteinian theologians in chapter 3 – 
                                                 
17
 The Five Mindfulness Trainings are a version of five basic Buddhist principles for moral 
living, commonly known in English as the Five Precepts – the major change is a rewriting 
into positive language, e.g. 'Loving Speech and Deep Listening' replaces 'Do not lie'. 
Declaration of taking the Three Refuges – refuge in Buddha, Dharma (roughly, teaching), 
and Sangha (community) – has traditionally been considered the method by which one 
'becomes a Buddhist'. They can be read in full at Plum Village, "The Five Mindfulness 
Trainings,"  http://plumvillage.org/mindfulness-practice/the-5-mindfulness-trainings/. 
(Accessed 2
nd
 September 2014.) 
18
 At Charney Manor, a Quaker-run conference and retreat centre in Oxfordshire.  
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provides the key tools which I use. They are given their first outing in 
chapter 4, the first set of worked examples.  
 
The second half, chapters 5 to 7 and the conclusion, delves into the 
underpinnings of the Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks following the method 
laid out in the first half. It seeks to explore the assumptions which allow 
Quakers to speak coherently in the characteristic patterns identified so far. 
This involves a consideration of pluralism (chapter 5), multiple religious 
belonging (chapter 6), and is wrapped up with a second set of worked 
examples (chapter 7) which shows all the findings in action. 
 
Before the philosophical work can begin, a clear view of the material to 
which the tools are to be applied is necessary, and so in chapter 1 I provide 
an introduction to the Quaker literature which provides my examples. I 
begin with a description of Quakers today, using both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence, and provide a brief history which places the remarks to 
be discussed in the broader context of the Quaker tradition. Having done 
this, I introduce a number of typical examples – several of which will be 
examined in more detail later in the thesis – and investigate in more detail 
the history of an organisation which sheds particular light on Quakers as a 
multi-theəlogy community, the Quaker Universalist Group (to whose 
philosophical claims I return in chapter 5). I also show how several 
assumptions about the nature of language and (religious) experience are 
embedded in Quaker remarks, and make these assumptions visible so that 
they can be discussed and challenged. Finally, I open the key questions 
which this thesis will address, showing how they arise from the Quaker 
material.   
 
In chapter 2 I introduce the three key tools which I draw from Wittgenstein 
and which will inform my later analysis of real examples of religious 
language drawn from the Quaker tradition. The concept of meaning as 
produced by use in context is central to these and is discussed at length as 
the first tool, followed by the related 'private language argument', which 
provides significant insights into the way that language works and also 
22 
 
challenges some of the Quaker assumptions about language and experience 
which were described in chapter 1. The resultant understanding of language 
constitutes the second tool. The third tool relates to the irreplaceability of 
certain words or 'pictures' in our understandings, and is refined from 
comments made by Wittgenstein about religious language. Overall, this 
chapter is interested in establishing some useful principles which will be 
applied to real examples later, rather than in exegesis of Wittgenstein's 
positions – some of which, especially in relation to the third tool, are in any 
case quite obscure. 
 
The main focus of chapter 3 is the work of George Lindbeck, especially in 
relation to the cultural-linguistic understanding of doctrine. Two main 
things are accomplished in the consideration of his work: a clarification of 
the 'experiential-expressivist' approach to religion, which on examination 
bears significant resemblance to the Quaker assumptions identified in 
chapter 1 (especially about the primacy of experience and the simultaneous 
accuracy and inadequacy of language), and also the establishment of two 
further tools. These – the metaphor of religion-as-language, and the concept 
of the 'fluent elite' who are competent to judge new developments in 
religious language – are discussed in detail so that they are ready for use in 
the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 puts the tools established in chapters 2 and 3 to work on the kinds 
of real uses of religious language described in chapter 1. In three detailed 
considerations of quotations from the Quaker literature, I show how the 
tools can illuminate the remarks and their underlying assumptions, while 
also allowing the tools themselves to be challenged by the examples. All 
five tools are shown to be useful, although some make use of assumptions 
which contradict assumptions commonly made by Quakers. For example, 
the Wittgensteinian concept of irreplaceability might stand in direct 
opposition to the usual Quaker assumption that all linguistic expressions can 
be 'translated' into other terms. It becomes clear in the course of these 
explorations that some require further nuancing or careful use (the religion-
as-language metaphor needs to be taken in conjunction with the 
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Wittgensteinian view of language, for example). At the end of this chapter, 
the basic tools of this thesis have been established and tested, and a certain 
amount of progress has been made on understanding the central puzzle, the 
Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks. In order to deepen this understanding, 
however, further background on the form of life and accompanying 
assumptions from which they arise will be needed, and chapters 5 and 6 aim 
to provide this. 
 
Moving into the second half and looking more deeply at the assumptions 
which support Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks, chapter 5 turns to pluralism 
as a philosophical position, considering the perspectives of theologians 
widely read by Quakers: mainly John Hick and Don Cupitt, but also Karen 
Armstrong. It holds the positions of these thinkers in tension with the 
position which can be generalised from documents produced by Quaker 
universalists, showing what they have in common but also where their 
differences lie. The similarities are strong enough that the academic work of 
the theologians can be used to explain and sometimes to support the Quaker 
universalist position, although the differences also introduce new ways of 
responding to the challenges faced by other pluralist positions. The chapter 
concludes that, although pluralism as a perspective has a number of flaws, 
only some of which have been satisfactorily addressed, it nevertheless 
makes sense within the context of the Quaker community and Quakers have 
a number of good reasons for accepting it. 
 
Chapter 6 then goes on to attend to a form of practice within which 
pluralism is frequently embraced and which is visibly present within the 
British Quaker community, namely dual or multiple religious belonging. 
Using sociological material and what theological work on multiple religious 
belonging has been done to date, this chapter explores the situation of 
people who seek to belong to more than one religious tradition, considers 
some of the potential problems arising from the occupation of this location, 
and suggests that the presence of some practitioners of multiple religious 
belonging within the Quaker community may be an important factor in the 
movement of terminology from non-Quaker traditions into Quaker speech, 
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and the trend towards the use of list-format and multi-theəlogy remarks. 
Although a direct causal link cannot be proved from the evidence available, 
seeing multiple religious belonging as a significant part of the context helps 
to make sense of the Quaker uses of religious language described in this 
thesis. 
 
Having explored the themes of pluralism and multiple religious belonging, 
in chapter 7 I return to the format of chapter 4 and examine in detail three 
further examples of Quaker uses of religious language. Each of these three 
examples offers a further list of apparent synonyms, and the terms used and 
the surrounding contexts in which they are given provide more evidence 
about the forces which shape such remarks – including the desire to be 
inclusive, a pluralist approach to religious experience, and some struggles 
with the limits of what can acceptably be included. The chapter concludes 
that the factors identified in the thesis combine to make list-format remarks, 
which will often (although not always) be multi-theəlogy in nature, seem 
natural and obvious within the British Quaker community. 
 
Finally, my conclusion reviews questions about Quaker uses of religious 
language which were raised in chapter 1, and considers the implications of 
this thesis for future uses of the tools derived from Wittgenstein and 
Lindbeck, and hence for the disciplines of theology philosophy of religion. 
It also seeks to position the thesis within the broader context of Quaker 
Studies.  
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Chapter 1: Quakers and their Theəlogies 
 
 
This chapter undertakes to provide, firstly, a general background concerning 
Quakerism in terms of history, theology, politics, and development; and 
secondly, plenty of contextualised examples of the more problematic 
language, leading into some lines of critique. These will not be developed 
here, because a full discussion requires use of the tools which will be 
considered in the following chapters, but the themes raised here will return 
especially in chapters 4 and 7 which discuss particular examples. 
 
The tabular statement,
19
 a yearly report on the membership of the Society, 
reveals that at the end of 2012 there were 13,906 members of the Religious 
Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain.
20
 Some further 8681 people are 
recorded as 'attenders', people who attend Meeting for Worship, are known 
to the community, and may think of themselves as Quakers, but who for 
whatever reason are not in formal membership. This gives us a total of 
22,587 people in England, Scotland and Wales who can reasonably be 
called Quakers.
21
 
 
This numerical approach to the description has some important weaknesses. 
Some people may have associations with Quakerism – having grown up in 
Quaker families, for example, or having been members or attenders at some 
point in the past – but no longer be formally associated with a Meeting, even 
if they think of themselves as Quakers. This latter group is, for obvious 
reasons, almost impossible to quantify. Another feature of Quakers today 
which makes it difficult to count them is the practice of multiple religious 
belonging, to be discussed in detail in chapter 6 – for now, it is sufficient to 
note that any survey which allows respondents to tick only one box under 
                                                 
19
 Britain Yearly Meeting, "Tabular Statament," (2013), 
http://www.quaker.org.uk/files/Tabular-statement-2013-web.pdf. Accessed 12
th
 May 2014. 
20
 Which for the purposes of Quakers comprises England, Scotland and Wales, as Northern 
Ireland is part of Ireland Yearly Meeting. Ireland Yearly Meeting currently has around 
1,500 members. 
21
 Or Friends; following ordinary Quaker speech, I use the terms interchangeably.  
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'religion' is unable to capture the complexity of many people's religious 
lives, since someone practising both Christianity and Buddhism (to pick a 
common example) will not be able to express all aspects of their religious 
identity in such a setting. Furthermore, the general habit of folding 
Quakerism into the broader label of 'Christianity' makes it invisible on many 
surveys, and since a significant number of British Quakers today do not 
identify as Christians this also introduces a certain amount of inaccuracy.  
 
Within the Quaker community, some surveys have been done which try to 
capture the beliefs of British Quakers. These reveal considerable diversity – 
at least, in comparison with other churches. In a survey by Dandelion in 
1989 (repeated in a modified form in 2003), roughly a quarter of British 
Quakers answer 'no' or 'not sure' to the direct question "Do you believe in 
God?"
22
 A more detailed follow-up question in the same survey reveals that 
Quakers prefer to describe God as "the inward light",
23
 with "a spirit" and 
"love" nearly as popular. In some ways, their convergence on these terms 
produces quite a high form of agreement – somewhat different from the 
other Christian groups with whom Dandelion compares them, and 
distinctive in their use of the phrase 'the inward light', but clear that, of the 
limited set of terms on offer, those three are preferable to others. For the 
purposes of this thesis, these data are of limited use, because the examples 
in which I am interested use so many other terms: 'Buddha/Inner Buddha 
                                                 
22
 Dandelion's comparative samples in Roman Catholic and Church of England 
congregations both scored 100% in the 'yes' column, and even in the non-religious control 
group, some undergraduate students, 54% said 'yes'. Pink Dandelion, A Sociological 
Analysis of the Theology of Quakers: The Silent Revolution  (Lewiston, Queenston and 
Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996). 167. 
23
 On being asked "Which of the following best describes God for you?" and being invited 
to tick multiple boxes if necessary. The complete list offers: "Father/mother/person/figure", 
"a spirit", "a process", "a being", "a principle", "the inward light", "best not described", 
"love", "creative force" and "friend/companion". The other options in the list were 
significantly less popular. Roman Catholics favoured 'love', the charismatic church 
preferred the 'father/mother' list with 'love' second and 'a spirit' third, and the Church of 
England group liked 'love' and 'a spirit' equally. It can be said, then, that Quakers are not 
unique in a certain fondness for these terms. Ibid., 168. 
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nature', 'the Tao', and personal names such as 'Krishna' or 'Jesus' were not 
included on Dandelion's list for this question.
24
 In any case, I am not mainly 
concerned with the statistical prevalence of particular ways of speaking, but 
with the philosophical interest which is to be found in one or two ways of 
speaking which, although perhaps not the most common, do exist widely 
enough to occur repeatedly in the writing of Quakers. 
 
Another way to begin explaining Quakerism would be to begin with a rich 
description – which would be unlikely, perhaps unable, to represent all of 
British Quakerism as the numbers can, but might provide information about 
the form of life constituting Quaker worship which cannot be conveyed by 
statistics (the Wittgensteinian concept of the 'form of life' will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 2). Some such descriptions are available in Quaker 
Faith and Practice,
25
 and a leaflet commonly distributed in meeting houses 
called 'Your first time at a Quaker meeting' offers the following description, 
alongside various pieces of advice about choosing a seat, listening to vocal 
ministry, and information about the running of the meeting such as that the 
signal to close is the shaking of hands: 
 
We are caught up in the still spirit of the meeting, and all of us are 
trying to come nearer to each other and to God, without reciting 
creeds, singing hymns, or repeating set prayers. We do not worship 
in isolation: we try to hold ourselves aware of all those gathered with 
us, uniting in a common purpose, so that the waiting and listening 
become an act of sharing.
26
 
 
                                                 
24
 Other questions did cover attitudes to Jesus and the Bible. 
25
 Britain Yearly Meeting, Quaker Faith and Practice: The book of Christian discipline of 
the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, 4th ed. 
(London: The Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, 
2008). See especially chapter 2, 'Worship and Prayer'. 
26
 Quaker Life Outreach, "Your first time at a Quaker meeting," (London: Britain Yearly 
Meeting, undated). 
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The details of this vary between Meetings – timings, books available, 
culture of hallway chatting, and so on – but the general shape of the practice 
is the same in all unprogrammed meetings.
27
  
 
Something should also be said here about Quaker Faith and Practice: The 
Book of Christian Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) 
in Britain, a key source for this thesis and a significant document in its own 
right. Quakers in Britain have long had a book of discipline, a collection of 
material found to be useful for future reference, which has been revised 
from time to time (approximately once in each generation) since it was "first 
issued – in manuscript form – in 1738".28 It has borne various names and 
been issued as both one and two volumes; the present, tenth, version is also 
published online.
29
 Quaker Faith and Practice might be said to contain, 
roughly speaking, two kinds of material: church governance and 
inspirational (in a previous version, these were published as two volumes, a 
book of discipline and a book of extracts). Much of the latter, and some of 
the former, takes the form of quotations from Quaker writers. This gives it 
something of the air of a compendium or commonplace book, and allows for 
a range of views to be represented without there being an 'official' 
position.
30
 We will see later in this chapter that diversity of opinion is, on 
many although not all matters, the norm among Friends. The most recent 
revision of the Book of Discipline, approved by the Yearly Meeting in 1994, 
                                                 
27
 Programmed meetings do exist; they are common in the Americas and in Africa. They 
may include some silent worship (sometimes known as Open Worship or Communion 
After the Manner of Friends), but also hymn singing, Bible readings, and a sermon, and in 
general more closely resemble other Nonconformist church services. In Britain, there is one 
programmed meeting, London Friends Programmed Meeting, which affiliated with North 
West London Area Meeting (and hence with Britain Yearly Meeting) in 2012. Being small 
and relatively new, they are not represented in the literature on which this thesis is based, 
and it remains to be seen whether contact between London Friends Programmed Meeting 
and the unprogrammed majority of Britain Yearly Meeting will have any theəlogical or 
liturgical effects. 
28
 Britain Yearly Meeting, Quaker Faith and Practice: Introduction. (Hereafter 'QF&P'.) 
29
 http://qfp.quakerweb.org.uk/qfpmain.html. Accessed 12
th
 May 2014. 
30
 An example of this is provided by the range of attitudes to abortion in chapter 22 – most 
if not all of which were commissioned by the committee tasked with drafting QF&P. 
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may not quite reflect the state of the Society now,
31
 but it remains the 
closest thing Quakers in Britain have to an authoritative text and provides 
valuable insight into the community. 
 
 
Quaker history: Development of today's Quakerism 
 
The historical roots of the practice of unprogrammed, silent or waiting 
worship, and of Quakerism more generally, are worth tracing briefly, and so 
this section will provide a very brief introduction together with some more 
detailed comments about points which are relevant to the other themes of 
this thesis, in particular the development of liberal Quakerism in Britain 
today. 
 
The Religious Society of Friends began in England in 1652, one of a 
number of religious movements which arose during that turbulent period in 
Britain's history immediately before, during, and after the English Civil 
War. George Fox, having travelled extensively and asked many questions 
about the established church of the time, had a vision of "a great people to 
be gathered" and found them in the north-west of England.
32
 He spoke to 
gatherings in the countryside and also went to churches – on one such 
occasion, he was heard by Margaret Fell, who wrote later that "I stood up in 
my pew, and I wondered at his doctrine, for I had never heard such 
before".
33
 On one occasion, in a letter from a prison cell, he wrote that the 
newly convinced Friends should:  
 
be patterns, be examples in all countries, places, islands, nations, 
wherever you come, that your carriage and life may preach among 
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 Indeed, Meeting for Sufferings, following a nationwide consultation, concluded in 
February 2014 that it does not, and therefore recommended to the Yearly Meeting that the 
process of revision should begin.  
32
 QF&P 19:06 & 07 
33
 QF&P 19:07 
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all sorts of people, and to them; then you will come to walk 
cheerfully over the world, answering that of God in every one.
34
 
 
We will encounter that final phrase – 'that of God in every one' – repeatedly 
in the course of this thesis; it is often used by Friends today to express the 
core of Quaker beliefs. Also important to early Friends was unmediated 
access to God; it was available to everyone and people therefore had no 
need of the university-trained priests whom Francis Howgill called 
"hireling-shepherds".
35
 
 
 
It is conventional for Quaker historians to define the rest of Quaker history 
in terms of periods. After the death of Fox and other first-generation 
Quakers there is generally understood to be a time of 'quietism' during the 
eighteenth century, in which much of the structure of today's Quakerism 
(the Book of Discipline, for example) has its roots.
36
 In the Victorian era 
evangelicalism became a dominant force, in British as well as American 
Quakerism, before the development of liberalism in the first part of the 
twentieth century.
37
 The trends examined in this thesis are best considered 
as a continuation of this latter movement. 
 
With their focus on unmediated access and individual experience, British 
Quakers have never adopted a shared creed or confession of faith. The 
closest they have ever come to adopting one was the proposal to accept the 
Richmond Declaration, drawn up by the Richmond Conference of all 
Gurneyite Yearly Meetings in 1887. Although London Yearly Meeting did 
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 QF&P 19:32  
35
 QF&P 19:08 
36
 John Punshon, Portrait In Grey: A short history of the Quakers  (London: Quaker Home 
Service, 1984). 102, and see also chapter 6, 'The Creation of a Quaker Culture'. I use the 
term 'quietism' here in the interests of brevity and familiarity, but note that much of what 
was said about it by, for example, Rufus Jones has been challenged in more recent work 
such as Rosemary Elaine Pryce, "An Exploration of the Theology of Quietism: its 
historiography, representation and significance in the Christian mystical and Quaker 
traditions" (University of Birmingham, 2013). 
37
 Punshon, Portrait In Grey: A short history of the Quakers: 216, 29. 
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seriously consider this, in 1888 they "declined to adopt" this statement of 
Evangelical Quaker belief, not least because in England "the tide of opinion 
[had] started to flow against Evangelism".
38
 Instead, thinkers such as 
William Charles Braithwaite,
39
 Rufus Jones and John Wilhelm Rowntree, 
who were to be at the front of liberal Quakerism in the early twentieth 
century, came to the fore, and the Manchester Conference of 1895 is 
frequently taken to be the beginning of a new era in Quaker history.
40
 
Characteristic concerns of this period, such as those "for roots, for 
organisation and for outreach… remain on the agenda for today".41 The new 
liberal Quakerism also had a distinctive theological position, or rather a 
series of interlinked positions, and since these form the basis of the modern 
Quakerism which I will be discussing throughout this thesis, it is worth 
examining these in depth.  
 
Martin Davie, writing in 1997 and himself a former Quaker who found the 
modern form of Quakerism too liberal, identified seven beliefs, all common 
to liberal theologians outside Quakerism as well as those within it, and 
described by speakers at the Manchester Conference, which are the 
foundations of this. Of these, the most significant for this thesis are the last 
two: an emphasis on "the immanence of God", which Davie links both to the 
acceptance of the theory of evolution, especially the idea that God must now 
be seen at work "in and through the evolutionary process rather than as 
making occasional interventions into His creation", and the claim "that 
theology had ultimately to be based on an appeal to immediate experience 
of God".
42
 This emphasis on experience will prove to be an important 
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 Martin Davie, British Quaker Theology Since 1895  (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1997). 50. 
39
 Whose son, R. B. Braithwaite, will be discussed briefly in chapter 3. 
40
 Both Davie and Heron use it at the starting point for their work, for example. Davie, 
British Quaker Theology Since 1895; Alistair Heron, Quakers in Britain: a century of 
change 1895-1995  (Scotland: Curlew Graphics, 1995). 
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 Punshon, Portrait In Grey: A short history of the Quakers: 210. Although this comment 
is now thirty years old, these concerns are in evidence in more recent publications: reports 
from the 2013 Kindlers' conference touched on them all. 
42
 Davie, British Quaker Theology Since 1895: 72. 
32 
 
feature of Quaker belief today, affecting especially the approach to pluralist 
or universalist theəlogies, introduced below and discussed at length in 
chapter 5.  
 
One final comment on this matter and the historical development of 
Quakerism comes from Pink Dandelion, who sounds a note of caution about 
claims of historical continuity, saying that although early 20
th
 century liberal 
Friends "imagined that they were reclaiming original Quakerism" they in 
fact established "the biggest departure from the rest of Quaker tradition to 
date".
43
 In particular, Fox's understanding had been that divine revelation, 
although primary, was "always confirmed by Scripture even whilst he was 
not looking for such verification", whereas the new liberal tradition of 
Quakerism placed "authority in experience alone" and tested it in the group 
if it needed testing at all: "theological reliability comes in numbers or 
collective experience for these Friends".
44
 Another shift, identified by 
Carole Dale Spencer in her study of the holiness tradition in Quakerism, was 
towards an "'affirmative' mysticism" in the work of Rufus Jones especially, 
who, she says, "overlooked the potential to synthesize the dialectical and 
paradoxical nature of the early Quaker movement, which included both a 
joyous affirmation of life and the mystical embrace of the reality of 
suffering".
45
 This move towards emphasis on the positive, also found in a 
decreased attention to sin and evil in modern Quakerism as compared with 
early Quakerism, might also find echoes in the mid-twentieth century shift 
in the framing of testimonies, from 'testimonies against' (war, oath-taking) 
to 'testimonies of' (peace, truth, equality).
46
  In this thesis, the Quaker 
emphasises on the importance of truth and equality will be particularly 
                                                 
43
 Pink Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 130. 
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 Ibid. 
45
 Carole Dale Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism, An Historical Analysis of the 
Theology of Holiness in the Quaker Tradition  (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007). 198. 
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 Rex Ambler dates this formulation (with four headings: equality, simplicity, honesty, and 
peace) to Hugh Barbour's 1964 book, The Quakers in Puritan England, making this also 
part of the mid-twentieth century developed of liberal-Liberal Quakerism. Rex Ambler, The 
Quaker Way: a rediscovery  (Alresford, Hants: Christian Alternative Books, 2013). 112. 
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important, as the values of seeking to speak the truth as one sees it, and to 
treat all people as equal, come into tension in the face of theəlogical 
disagreement between people who seem to be equally honest.  
 
A final development comes in the form of 'liberal-Liberal' Quakerism, Pink 
Dandelion's term for the recent pluralistic and consequentialist type of 
earlier liberal Quakerism just described. This might have roots in some 
Quaker writers as early as the turn of the century, such as William Littleboy, 
who tended to turn away from a mystical view of Quakerism towards one in 
which it is doing good, rather than feeling the presence of God, which is 
significant in a religious life.
47
 Dandelion dates the shift to as early as 1930 
but says that it was complete by 1966, and adds that it is characteristic of 
liberal-Liberal Quakerism that "belief is pluralised, privatised, but also 
marginalised: it is not seen as important".
48
 As a result of this attitude to 
belief, form is emphasised instead: there is a 'behavioural creed' (one aspect 
of which is the resistance to creeds formulated in words
49
) and pluralist 
theologies (discussed in chapter 5) and multiple religious belonging 
(discussed in chapter 6) become common. Again, this is visible in attitudes 
towards the testimonies, where especially in recent years acceptance of the 
peace testimony, or being a pacifist, has been seen as mandatory for 
Quakers, more important than theəlogical beliefs or a particular kind of 
spiritual experience. 
 
 
Quakers and their language today 
 
It has often been observed of (and by) today's unprogrammed, liberal-
Liberal British Quakers that a diversity of language for discussing religious 
experience has become common, and Quaker documents both note this and 
offer some attempts at explanation and a suggested attitude to be taken 
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towards this fact. For example, the introduction to Britain Yearly Meeting's 
Advices and Queries (1995 edition) says that: 
 
Within the community there is a diversity of gifts. … There will also 
be diversity of experience, of belief and of language. Friends 
maintain that expressions of faith must be related to personal 
experience. Some find traditional Christian language full of 
meaning; some do not. Our understanding of our own religious 
tradition may sometimes be enhanced by insights of other faiths. The 
deeper realities of our faith are beyond precise verbal formulation 
and our way of worship based on silent waiting testifies to this.
50
 
 
That contemporary Quakers consider some things are "beyond precise 
verbal formulation" does not mean, however, that words are unimportant to 
them. As the Quaker Women's Group says in another extract republished in 
the 1994 Quaker Faith and Practice: 
 
The language in which we express what we ... say is of vital 
importance; it both shapes and reflects our values.
51
 
 
They go on to discuss the ways in which "Christian teaching and language 
has been used to subordinate women to men", but the point about language 
more generally is clearly applicable to other areas of discussion as well.  
 
With concerns of this kind in mind, I have found myself fascinated by cases 
in which Quakers use religious language from a variety of different faiths, 
traditions or contexts. A typical example occurs in the acknowledgements 
section at the beginning of Spirit Rising, published in 2010. There, the 
editorial team remark that: 
 
We have many names for the Divine—Spirit, God, Heavenly Father, 
Universe, Papa, Mother, Light—and we know that without it this 
work would not have been possible.
52
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In this context – an edited collection of writing by young Quaker authors 
from around the world and across the spectrum of Quaker theəlogy and 
practice – this comment reflects the lengthy and complex process which the 
editorial team undertook in their quest to understand one another's language 
and belief. It also reflects an approach to theəlogical diversity which we are 
going to see is a continuing tradition in Quaker speech.
53
 It describes a 
theəlogy of diversity within unity, in which the "many names for the 
Divine" nevertheless refer to a singular Divine "without [which] this work 
would not have been possible".  
 
Repeatedly in the Quaker literature we see attempts made to be open to a 
variety of ways of discussing "that which we are seeking to worship" — 
several books giving guidance on Quaker discussion and exploration pose 
the issue of language as an open question. For example, volume 5 of the 
Eldership and Oversight handbook series, Quality and Depth of Worship 
and Ministry, phrases it as a simple question, giving some possibilities but 
trailing off into a visual form of silence: 
 
What do you call that which we are seeking to worship? 
The ground of our being, 
the ultimate reality, 
the meaning, 
the father, 
the mother, 
the everlasting arms, 
the spirit, 
God…54 
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(I discuss this example in detail in chapter 4.) In a similar way, the 
Becoming Friends Companion's Handbook
55
 asks experienced Friends to 
reflect on the words they use. The exercise says: 
 
It can be interesting to reflect with other Friends on words or ideas 
that you have each found tricky or liberating on your spiritual 
journey. As a companion, you will need to be sensitive to the 
spiritual language that a newcomer uses, which may be very 
different from your own. 
1.     In silence, write down words or ideas, one idea per note, as 
many as you like, that: 
 you use or have used when you speak of 'that reality which is 
unnameable' 
 you do not or no longer use when you speak of 'that reality which is 
unnameable'
56
 
 
It goes on to ask people to say these words out loud and attend to the 
emotional power of doing so. As we will see later, the emotional power of 
words is an undercurrent in much of the literature, although not often treated 
explicitly or in detail.  
 
Although there is very little literature on how British Friends are currently 
using religious language, these examples are augmented by hints in a range 
of sources which name and recommend something like the process 
discussed above. For example, Ben Pink Dandelion, in the opening 
paragraphs of his booklet Celebrating the Quaker Way, asks readers to 
"'translate' or hear where the words come from" when he chooses to "talk of 
God in the way Friends have traditionally talked of the divine".
57
 Taken 
together, a collection of these comments begins to reveal some assumptions 
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about religious language which seem to be widely shared among British 
Quakers today.
58
 
 
There is, of course, no single Quaker agreed explicit account of how 
language works. However, it is possible to piece together from a variety of 
sources a relatively coherent picture; what follows is my attempt to do so, 
supported by a similar exercise undertaken by John Lampen in his pamphlet 
Finding the Words,
59
 one of very few publications entirely devoted to the 
issue of religious language in Quakerism.  
 
Three major assumptions underlie the picture of (religious) language found 
in recent British Quaker texts. The primary assumption is that words are 
secondary to experience. The story goes that people have experience, 
mundane or religious, which is not mainly or at all verbal, and then must 
choose language in which to express that experience. Something gets lost in 
this process, because words are not experience, and so any language used 
will always be inadequate to the task. This makes Rex Ambler say, in a 
remark typical of the Quaker position I am outlining, that the problems of 
formulating experience into words are so extensive that in the end, we must 
leave religious experience as a "mysterious and finally inexpressible 
common ground".
60
  
 
As well as containing this primary assumption, which I will refer to as the 
experience-first assumption, this quotation points to the other key 
assumption found in these texts, namely that even when different words are 
in use, religious experiences are fundamentally the same – this leads to 
repeated claims or even an insistence that 'we mean the same thing' by our 
many choices of words. This is an assumption which I will call the unity-of-
religious-experience assumption. Although there is sometimes a slippage 
between the two, encouraged by an understanding that religious experience 
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is a direct, unmediated experience of 'God', it seems that it is religious 
experience which is held in common, and not notions about 'God', so that 
there is room for a variety of understandings and renamings of the latter 
without any threat to the commonality of the former.
61
 
 
A third assumption which can be linked to these two is the ineffability 
assumption, an accepted understanding that God cannot be adequately 
named. This is easily produced from the experience-first assumption, since 
an experience which is pre-linguistic and only has words applied to it later 
may well not find satisfactory words in a particular language. However, 
sometimes there is an implication that ineffability is demonstrated by the 
combination of the unity of religious experience and the observation of 
many different descriptions which happen to exist in history. This argument 
is something like: a variety of words are in fact in use to describe that-
which-is-experienced-in-religious-experience across different religious 
traditions, but religious experience is all of the same kind and/or all 
experience of a single Deity, and therefore the words used must be 
secondary to and inadequate for the ineffability of the Reality which we are 
seeking to describe. There are many reasons for questioning this line of 
reasoning. Not least of these reasons is that it is circular and uses 
unsupported assumptions to reach the conclusions which are expected. 
However, for the time being it is sufficient to note that it seems to exist in 
some modern Quaker thought, and that it embeds within a framework 
(which has a certain internal consistency) the following assumptions: 
ineffability, monotheism, pluralism, primacy of experience, and unity of 
religious experience. 
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Two of the central assumptions about religious experience – its primacy 
over language and its unity across humanity – can also be found in the first 
six points of John Lampen's twelve "suggestions for finding the words we 
need": 
 
1. There is something more in reality than whatever we can perceive 
with our senses and measure or hold in our minds. 
2. This "something more" is not merely the object of belief; it is 
experienced by the individual as a presence — and an absence. Some 
of us experience it as an encounter with something personal. It is not 
simply an individual experience since we can also meet it as a group. 
3. We believe that all people have the potential for this experience. 
4. This is the experience which has been given such names as "God", 
"The Light", "The Tao", "The Inward Christ", "The Spirit", and "that 
of God in everyone". It is not the naming which is important but the 
experience. 
5. The heart of worship is the desire and attempt to experience this 
presence. 
6. The "something more" is essentially indescribable. Theologies, at 
best, can only point towards it; but they can be helpful, even 
essential, to some of us, while unnecessary for others. So tolerance 
should be the rule in religious discussion, and there is nothing 
incongruous in people worshipping together who have wildly 
differing belief-systems, if they are trying to experience together the 
reality which underpins all creeds and honest seeking.
62
 (my 
emphasis) 
 
(I will be returning to the first part of this passage in chapter 5.) These 
assumptions have a considerable history in Quaker thought, and parallels in 
non-Quaker thought. Although a few carefully selected quotes can root them 
in Quaker thought as far back as William Penn,
63
 the turn in this direction 
really begins with the work of Rufus Jones, who, as I briefly mentioned in 
the section on history above, produced "an interpretation of Quakerism that 
captured a whole generation of the silent tradition" and is still deeply 
influential today.
64
 As summarised by John Punshon, the key assumptions 
of Jones' reading of Quakerism are that humans – universally – have an 
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"inward junction of the soul with God",
65
 which can be known in Quaker 
terms as "the Light within" or "the seed of God", and which "the wider 
mystical tradition has recognised as that of God within the soul",
66
 and 
therefore that "religion must be a matter of personal experience".
67
 It is easy 
to see how these ideas underlie the Quaker thinking found in more recent 
texts – the Quaker Universalists to be discussed in chapter 5 have especially 
relied upon them. Jones' work included extensive study of seventeenth-
century mystics – in particular, unearthing the influence of Jakob Böhme on 
early Friends – and popularising previously lesser-known parts of George 
Fox's work, such as the now-ubiquitous "that of God in every one".
68
 
 
Many other historical sources exist for these assumptions, including Quaker 
writers such as Robert Barclay, Isaac Penington, and Caroline Stephen, as 
well as non-Quaker thinkers including William James. However, one 
historical incident will serve to illustrate the general tendency and to show 
the origin of a much-used Quaker phrase. The story of Papunehang's 
reaction to Quaker Meeting for Worship has often been retold, discussed, 
quoted, and misquoted. It was originally told in The Journal of John 
Woolman.69 Woolman was travelling with other Quakers among the Native 
Americans (with whom the English were at war at the time; Woolman along 
with some others refused to pay taxes which would fund this), and found in 
Wehaloosing a chance to be present at their meetings. He was given 
permission to speak if he wished to do so. At one such meeting, he felt 
called to speak. To begin with, some interpreters tried to translate his words 
"but found some difficulty, as none of them were quite perfect in the English 
and Delaware tongues, so they helped one another, and we laboured along, 
Divine love attending". Later on, however, he asked the translators not to try 
and interpret, and Woolman simply prayed aloud in English. He then says 
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that: 
 
Before the people went out, I observed Papunehang (the man who 
has been zealous in labouring for a reformation in that town, being 
then very tender) speaking to one of the interpreters, and I was 
afterwards told that he said in substance as follows: "I love to feel 
where the words come from."70 
 
Retellings of the story (written and oral) may bring out different aspects - it 
is common to, for example, emphasise the fact that Papunehang did not 
speak English as evidence that the ways of Quakers and other Christians 
were wholly strange to him, although in fact when Woolman arrived there 
were already Moravian preachers present and some of the Native Americans 
had converted to Christianity.71 As retold, the story offers us a clear picture 
of a situation in which (some of) the participants in a Meeting for Worship 
do not have a common language. It also suggests that despite this, the 
people present were having (at least at some important level) the same 
experience. With this origin in mind, we can see that the concept of feeling 
the source of the words, rather than words themselves, is an important 
Quaker paradigm for approaching multi-theəlogy conversation.72 In turn, 
looking for the source of words rather than focusing on words themselves 
rests on the experience-first assumption – without it, there would be no 
reason to think that this move was possible – and also on the unity of 
religious experience assumption, which suggests that the same experience 
can be detected through very different expressions, and, bringing the process 
into a full circle, supports the practice of 'feeling where the words come 
from'.  
 
Moving forward through Quaker history, we find that Friends continue to 
make comments which embody these assumptions. For example, Silvanus 
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P. Thompson,
73
 writing in the Friends Quarterly Examiner in 1906: "By 
whatever name we call it – whether Inner Light, or Holy Spirit, or Christ 
Within – it is the same thing."74 From this position, firmly rooted in the 
Christian tradition (Thompson's other examples include that which "George 
Fox meant by the words, the Christ within; the same that the Apostle Paul 
meant when he said… 'Jesus Christ be formed in you'"), it is but a short hop 
to the position taken by Quaker universalists – as we start to see when we 
discover David Murray-Rust, in 1982, building on Thompson's ideas to 
argue that "the source of… unity is 'Divine Illumination', by whatever name 
we call this light."
75
 I will return to a more detailed discussion of this 
universalist trend, and the Quaker Universalist Group, an organisation 
which has published extensively on this perspective, in chapter 5. 
 
Following the brief overviews of Quaker history and the Quaker present in 
Britain, I now turn to examine in more detail some of the assumptions 
which I have uncovered in the process – assumptions which will be 
explored from various angles in the rest of the thesis, but which will benefit 
from further clarification before they are exposed to the philosophical 
analysis produced by the 'tools' which I will be exploring and refining in the 
next couple of chapters. 
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Initial exploration of these assumptions 
 
 
In this section, I consider some other perspectives on the three assumptions 
which I identified in my consideration of Quaker religious language today – 
experience-first, unity-of-religious-experience, and ineffability. In order to 
do this, I look at some cases where doubt has been expressed about these 
assumptions, offer some further examples of ways in which they manifest in 
the literature, and lay out key questions which arise from my explorations 
and to which I will be returning in the conclusion. 
 
The first step is to ask whether there are any expressions of doubt in the 
Quaker literature about the underlying assumptions. There are not many, but 
one does occur in Rex Ambler's editorial introduction to the Quaker 
Theology Seminar's 1995/6 Proceedings, where he questions the ineffability 
assumption and the assumption of a (current) unity of religious experience, 
asking whether what happens in Meeting for Worship is "beyond 
articulation",
76
 pointing out that George Fox used the language of Christ, 
and raising the possibility that previous generations of Friends relied on a 
"unity of the group's experience that no longer exists".
77
 He concludes that 
we should keep traditional language because modern (he implies secular) 
language is insufficient to the task of articulating religious experience. He 
does not tell us what had previously created that unity of religious 
experience within the group, or how he knows that it existed, and nor does 
he address other possibilities, such as the idea that an apparent 'unity of 
religious experience' may be created by, rather than reflected in, the use of a 
series of common words and phrases for describing the experience. 
Although this is an expression of doubt, it seems incompletely carried 
through, and does not question the full network of assumptions but only 
touches on ineffability, leaving experience-first and unity-of-religious-
experience firmly in place. In fact, in seeking to question the ineffability 
assumption, Ambler points towards the idea that some language is 
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irreplaceable for describing certain experiences – an idea which I will 
explore in more detail in conjunction with my discussion of Wittgenstein in 
chapter 2. 
 
The assumptions of experience-first and the unity of religious experience, 
then, go generally undoubted within the Quaker community and underlie a 
number of other observable features of Quaker talk about language. For 
example, there is often an acknowledgement that words are emotive and that 
many Friends are uncomfortable with a substantial subset of the terms 
available for describing religious experience, where the discomfort seems to 
be more visceral than intellectual.
78
 However, this is not treated in the texts 
as genuinely important,
79
 with Friends who do name their own discomfort 
preferring to point to worldviews rather than specific words, and the 
possibility of 'translating' held up as an optional method for Friends to use in 
dealing with their discomfort.
80
 Andrew Greaves puts his finger on this 
phenomenon when, in an essay for an anthology "on being a Quaker today", 
he describes Friends using language "rather as does the Red Queen in Alice 
in Wonderland. When confronted by 'difficult' words such as 'worship' or 
'prayer', one response in discussion with others may be to redefine them, 
whether mentally or outwardly, in terms with which we can feel more 
comfortable."
81
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We see all of these things in the opening pages of Peter Parr's 2012 Kindlers 
booklet, Answering that of God. He writes that "at best, words are pointers" 
which "are tools we can use to describe an experience, but... are no 
substitute for experience itself",
82
 then on the next page explains that he uses 
'God' as "shorthand for that which is eternal: Being, Essence, Is-ness. Some 
would call this Light, or Love, or Christ."
83
 Noting that some Friends might 
be uncomfortable with some, many, or all of these words, he announces his 
intention to keep using them but also issues an invitation to the reader to 
translate into their preferred terms. In the process, he has given examples of 
all three assumptions, experience-first, unity-of-religious-experience, and 
ineffability – "words are pointers" because experience comes first, we have 
a unity of religious experience (of 'that which is eternal') which enables us 
to translate from one term to another knowing that we are all describing the 
same experience, yet that experience is ineffable and words cannot 
substitute for it. The ease with which the reader is expected to translate the 
terms is supported by the general looseness with which the words are held in 
the first place: assumed to be only somewhat related to the single, but 
ineffable, experience of contact with the Divine. 
 
Friends clearly can and do 'translate' in this way, but it raises questions: why 
would a religious community need to behave in this way? What forces lead 
individual Quaker speakers, as well as those who are speaking from 
committee positions, to make these kinds of list-format remarks, or ones 
which make explicit in other ways the diversity of possible theəlogical 
positions? In some ways, the practice seems at odds with the assumption of 
the unity of religious experience, because if all the words point to the same 
reality, why would you bother translating them? If you do, is it really 
'translation' or something more like relabeling? If the latter, how is it 
working?  
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Another trend becoming visible in Parr's work is that of Friends seeking to 
overcome their discomfort and reclaim traditional English religious 
language, which is almost always Christian in connotation. Peter Eccles 
writes that although he is uncomfortable with the Christian religious world-
view, he loves the language associated with Christianity which, he says, 
"reflects an experience of reality which is ours, too".
84
 This acknowledges 
the social dimension of language choices. Christine Trevett makes an 
interesting variant of this point in her 1997 Swarthmore Lecture, Previous 
Convictions, when she compares the 'de-Christianised' language of the 1994 
Quaker Faith and Practice with the linguistic situation in Wales, writing 
about a sense that "'they' have taken away my language".
85
 In saying this, 
she uses a 'religious language as natural language' metaphor (a metaphor 
which I explore in detail in chapter 3) to make a clear plea for the retention 
of Christian terminology. There are various possible motives for this – 
natural language loss is linked to the loss of history and community identity, 
but there is also the suggestion that some words are irreplaceable (because 
untranslatable). 
 
With this wider picture in mind, we can see that Quaker multi-theəlogical 
remarks are a relatively small sub-set of related comments about language 
for the Divine, some others of which may have similar motivations. The 
closest cousins of the list-format remarks are the requests for the reader to 
translate, and the 'or whatever you want to call it' statements, and I want to 
look briefly at these and the possible reasons why Quakers use them. 'Or 
whatever you call it' statements usually have a list format (and so are not 
clearly separated from list remarks), ending with the key phrase, and 
sometimes, although not always, are multi-theəlogical as well. It may be 
significant that the 'or whatever' phrase seems to shorten the length of the 
list, sometimes to almost nothing: for example, Rex Ambler uses the phrase 
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"God or whatever we may choose to call it".
86
 Ambler is a relatively self-
aware writer and goes on in this piece to a discussion of a few possible 
reasons why Friends may hesitate in choosing language – reasons which 
will be discussed in more detail later, especially in chapter 4. He mentions 
secularisation and feminism as well as a general sense of vagueness among 
Quakers – contrast this with Christine Trevett's claim that 'escapism' leads to 
demands among Friends to avoid painful language.
87
 The existence of a 
recognisable 'shortcut' for this form of speech hints at how common it has 
become; but the 'or whatever' phrase also invites us to ask why any 
particular words are in use at all. There are simultaneously explicit claims 
that words do not matter, based on the experience-first assumption, and a 
good number of implicit clues that particular words matter very much to 
those who are using or refraining from using them. Holding these ideas in 
tension seems to be a key contributory factor to the production of multi-
theəlogy list-format remarks, although in the course of this thesis I will also 
discuss other factors which support this practice. 
 
In workshop exercises such as those found in the Becoming Friends: 
Preparing to be a Companion Handbook and Quality and Depth of Worship 
and Ministry,
88
 phrases like "that which we are seeking to worship" and 
"that reality which is unnameable" do multiple things. As well as striving 
towards a kind of neutrality by coining new terms with fewer previous 
connotations,
89
 they gesture at the unity-of-religious-experience assumption, 
in which there is a single thing 'out there' which we are able to name in a 
variety of ways, none really better or worse than the others. It is therefore 
worthwhile gathering possible names and exploring the emotional responses 
which Friends may have to them – emotional responses which are 
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mentioned regularly in the literature, but without detailed exploration.
90
 A 
useful insight into possible answers can be gathered from Klaus Huber's 
survey of 'Buddhist-Quakers'. He asked respondents to give words which 
they preferred to 'God', if any, and lists those which occur more than once: 
"love, Light, the Unborn, Spirit, energy, and Gaia".
91
 None of these terms 
seem especially Buddhist, and 'Gaia' is even more surprising in such a list 
since it is not traditionally Quaker either. One answer may be that we may 
be seeing the effect of the Community of Interbeing which uses that name 
for a 'Mother Earth' Bodhisattva in an otherwise obviously Buddhist liturgy; 
another might be that this particular sample includes some Quakers who 
have been influenced by the work of James Lovelock. However, there is 
evidently a community sense of what belongs in such a list – and a general 
acceptance that multiple answers are possible or even encouraged – which 
facilitates the asking and answering of such questions. 
 
Having noted the patterns of list-making and the inclusion of multi-theəlogy 
items, and observed the existence of this 'community sense', I set out to 
address three key questions about Quaker multi-theəlogy and list-format 
remarks, which can be summarised as follows:  
 What are the unwritten guidelines for this language usage? Or, to put 
it another way, in what ways do Friends generate that community 
sense of correct language use which enables them to see that terms 
such as 'light' and 'seed' belong on a list of synonyms for 'that which 
we encounter in Meeting for Worship' but would make them laugh at 
'potato'? 
 What are the criteria on which these forms of Quaker language, 
especially the multi-theəlogy remarks, might be judged and how 
does this depend on the position of the person judging? How do 
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ethical, pragmatic, coherence, and truth considerations figure in the 
construction of these criteria? 
 Do any of the remarks under consideration make truth claims? If so, 
what claims do they make and do they succeed on their own terms? 
In order to address these issues, I turn in the next chapter to Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language and specifically Wittgensteinian approaches to 
religious language. 
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Chapter 2: Tools from Wittgenstein 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce, discuss, and refine a series of concepts – 
drawn from the later work of Wittgenstein and the secondary literature 
surrounding it – in order to produce a set of tools or lenses for analysis 
which in the course of later chapters I will apply to the kinds of Quaker uses 
of language which I described in the previous chapter. The work of this 
chapter, then, is to introduce three key concepts, to argue that the view of 
language and community which they produce is a plausible one, and to use 
some of the debates which have arisen around these concepts to sharpen our 
understanding of them. Although some interpretation of the work of 
Wittgenstein himself will be involved, in this chapter (and throughout this 
thesis) I am more interested in pragmatic considerations, such as whether 
the ideas are coherent, plausible, and useful, than in questions of exegesis 
such as whether Wittgenstein himself actually held such-and-such a 
position. Questions of exegesis cannot be entirely avoided – they are 
inevitably entangled with the issues just outlined – but to focus on them can 
lead to the exclusion of other, more useful considerations.  
 
It should also be noted that in the process of applying the ideas I find in 
Wittgenstein's work to religion specifically, I draw on theological as well as 
philosophical interpretations. Although the bulk of my discussion of 
Lindbeck's work will be reserved for chapter 3, he and other theologians 
who have used Wittgenstein appear in this chapter as indicators of the ways 
in which Wittgenstein's ideas may be useful. 
 
In the method of the Philosophical Investigations, observation is primary 
and although it presents a picture of how we might understand language, 
those who turn to it for a complete theory find themselves disappointed. 
Thus, as Fogelin puts it, we see "the development of Wittgenstein's thought 
as a movement from a proxy theory of meaning to a constructivist theory of 
meaning"
92
 and can, like him, find that although "Wittgenstein's later 
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philosophy is of fundamental importance; it is also radically incomplete".
93
 
For this reason, I am not seeking a theory in the work of Wittgenstein,
94
 but 
rather a series of tools, based on his work and drawn out through the 
secondary literature, which can be applied to real uses of language and 
hopefully help us to unpick and understand them more fully. 
 
All of the Wittgensteinian ideas introduced in this chapter arise from one 
central insight, which will be detailed first: namely, that words do not obtain 
meaning through definition, ostensive or otherwise, but gather it by their 
use. Use is made of words by particular speakers in specific contexts and 
within communities of speech and practice, and in this process words both 
gain and change their meaning. Because of this, there can be no language 
which is both meaningful and truly private – admitting of only one speaker 
– and the implications of this will be explored in the second part of this 
chapter. Finally, this understanding of how language works will lead us to 
think that many words, and the 'pictures' we attach to them, are irreplaceable 
or cannot be rephrased (to, for example, remove theistic content) without 
also losing the original meaning of the remark. 
 
 
Formation of meaning 
 
At the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects 
his previous way of thinking about language – the way laid out in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, closely related to the views of language 
held by philosophers such as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell,
95
 and 
traceable to much earlier sources, such as Augustine. Wittgenstein quotes 
the latter extensively at the opening of the Philosophical Investigations, 
using a passage in which the infant Augustine supposedly learns the 
meanings of words by ostensive definitions provided by adults:  
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When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned 
towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified 
by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out.
96
 
 
Wittgenstein regards this picture as "a less sophisticated version of that view 
of language which received greater elaboration in the pages of the 
Tractatus."
97
 In the Philosophical Investigations, he will argue that this 
theory, sometimes called the picture theory of language because each 
proposition is held to give a picture of a state of affairs,
98
 is not entirely 
wrong, but that it is extremely limited, and does not do justice to the 
complexities of language as we actually use it. One of the main problems is 
that the soon-to-be-rejected theory rests heavily on the understanding that 
names are the most basic signifying unit. As Marie McGinn says, in this 
theory: 
 
Each name stands for an object. By putting names together to form 
propositions we construct pictures or models of possible states of 
affairs, where the latter are conceived as constructions out of the 
objects from which names stand.
99
 
 
Although we can imagine – and Wittgenstein describes – a language in 
which naming objects is indeed the only function of words,
100
 this theory is 
not, as McGinn goes on to say, "based on observing how our everyday 
                                                 
96
 Augustine, Confessions. I.8; cited in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §1. That 
Wittgenstein ignores parts of Augustine's account, and indeed of his own previous account, 
substantially weakening it in the process, does not concern me here because I am seeking to 
demonstrate the plausibility of one account rather than the implausibility of any others. 
Similarly, Fogelin argues that Wittgenstein ignores the nuances of the previous theories 
because he is concerned with the domination of a single picture which has led philosophers 
to underestimate the importance of the difference between observed and theorised 
language. Fogelin, Wittgenstein: 96-98. 
97
 Brian R. Clack, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion  (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 13. 
98
 Addis, Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed: 28. 
99
 Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical 
Investigations  (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 1997). 34. 
100
 The 'block and slab' language of the two builders, elaborated further below. As we will 
soon see, to come close to representing a real language, a good deal must be added beyond 
the list of nouns. 
53 
 
language actually functions" but rather motivated by the need to solve 
problems in previous philosophical analyses of language (in particular, 
puzzles about the nature of propositions).
101
 When we turn to look at real 
language, or even imagined but slightly more complex language, we see that 
naming objects is far from the only function of words.  
 
It is worth following Wittgenstein step by step through this stage of the 
argument, because it introduces key concepts and terms to which we will be 
returning later. In §2, Wittgenstein describes for us an imaginary language 
"for which the description given by Augustine is right".
102
 Builders A and B 
can use a language with only four words – "'block', 'pillar', 'slab' and 
'beam'"; if A calls out one of these words, B brings the corresponding item. 
Wittgenstein accepts that this can count as a complete system of 
communication, but notes that "not everything that we call language is this 
system".
103
 That is not to say that this system is not a useful one; indeed, 
Wittgenstein says that it might be thought of as "one of those games by 
which children learn their native language".
104
 This is the context in which 
he introduces the much-used term "language-games": he says of the games 
by which children learn a language that he "will call these games 'language-
games'" and that he will "sometimes speak of a primitive language as a 
language-game." However, in the same section he goes on to say that he will 
"also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is 
woven, a 'language-game'."
105
  
 
Of all the things which have been called 'language-games', both by 
Wittgenstein and by others, one of the most intriguing is the application of 
this term to religion – sometimes, as Kerr reports, with the implication that 
because words gain their meaning through the roles they play in the game, 
religious words have meaning to religious believers but those outside the 
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specific religion cannot be expected to understand them.
106
 Although it is 
common to speak as if there are firm and impermeable boundaries between 
a religious group, other religious communities, and secular society, our 
everyday experience tells us that this is obviously mistaken (and one part of 
that mistake will be considered in detail in chapter 6). However, it will 
remain important that the game being played, and hence the observable 
rules, may change between different contexts. The language-game approach 
to religion will also allow us to see 'how we are initiated into the use of the 
word 'God''– and other religious terms.  
 
In §23 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein provides us with a 
very disparate list of "language-games". He says that he uses the "word 
'language-game'" to "emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part 
of an activity, or of a form of life." He then gives a long list which includes 
the following, and notes that there are many other examples as well:  
 
Giving orders, and acting on them – Describing an object by its 
appearance, or by its measurements … Reporting an event – 
Speculating about the event … Making up a story; and reading one 
… Cracking a joke … Translating from one language into another – 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
107
 
 
Having given this list, Wittgenstein says that "it is interesting to compare 
the diversity of the tools of language and of the ways they are used, the 
diversity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about 
the structure of language."
108
 The note which follows, that the logicians 
concerned should be taken to include the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, points us to the ways in which Wittgenstein is refuting his 
own former position and suggesting that logicians who follow that route say 
things about language which are too limited to reflect the real complexity of 
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language as it is actually used. This complexity and diversity is important to 
Wittgenstein, and the continual drive to observe real usage rather than 
postulate in the absence of facts about language reflects this.  
 
Kerr provides a further list which relates specifically to language-games 
within which we might use the word 'God', and includes "such multifarious 
activities as blessing and cursing, celebrating and lamenting, repenting and 
forgiving, the cultivation of certain virtues and so on", noting that "there 
will be little place for the inferring of some invisible entity's presence" – 
which once again pulls us away from the traditionally philosophical view of 
God and towards the complexity of the word's real use.
109
 This is the 
foundation of the need to examine genuine examples of religious language, 
as I will do in detail in chapters 4 and 7. 
 
Returning to the issue of Wittgenstein's own use of 'language-game', I want 
to look for a moment at why he uses it sometimes to encompass "the 
whole". This is important because it clarifies that Wittgenstein's view of 
language encompasses not just words but practices. In his expansion of the 
slab/block language, the builders A and B add not only extra words (such as 
a numbering system), but also pointing gestures to go with the terms 'this' 
and 'there' and a series of colour samples which can be shown at certain 
times
110
. It must be remembered, though, that 'game' is only a metaphor – in 
his earlier work, Wittgenstein had favoured 'calculus' as an image for "the 
complicated game which we play with other words".
111
 In the 
Investigations, he also uses the image of 'tools' quite heavily, as in §11 
where he asks us to "think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, 
pliers, a saw" etc., and then notes that "the functions of words are as diverse 
as the functions of these objects".
112
 Rhees also usefully reminds us that the 
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analogy between languages and games can only be taken so far.
113
 Although 
in this thesis I will make much use of the term 'language-game', it is only an 
image; and as Wittgenstein uses it, the term includes much which is not 
always identified as part of 'language' – for example, the gestures are part of 
the slab/block language and things such as art, diagrams, typography, 
placing of objects such as furniture, and other patterns of behaviour might 
all be included depending on the context.
114
  
 
Brian Clack helps to clarify the term 'language-game' further when he says 
that Wittgenstein's new "characterisation of language as a practice (or an 
activity), rather than as the 'phantasm' presented in the Tractatus, highlights 
what [he] came to see as its essentially social nature".
115
 Clack then 
discusses Wittgenstein's remarks in §23, where the term 'form of life' is 
introduced. Wittgenstein says that "The word 'language-game' is used here 
to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or 
form of life".
116
 The phrase 'form of life' is itself, as Clack says, "the subject 
of some controversy", but it "suggests that language gains its significance 
only within something collective, like a society".
117
 This changes the focus 
of philosophical work: "Sociological considerations were entirely lacking 
from the framework of the Tractatus. In the Investigations such 
considerations assume a position of prominence".
118
 This is the refocusing 
to which Fogelin refers when he says that Wittgenstein is seeking "a 
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reorientation in our sense of importance"; specifically, the "disparity 
between language as [previous thinkers] described it and the appearance of 
language as we all encounter it" has been ignored or downplayed but is now 
brought to the forefront.
119
 Ferré describes this as a change from 
'verificational analysis', which "tends to conceive of language largely on the 
model of a useful invention", to 'functional analysis', which "tends to picture 
languages more as a natural growth or organism".
120
 Here again there is a 
movement towards what might be called sociological considerations: the 
turn towards real examples and actual use. This is the central move which 
makes the direction of my project Wittgensteinian.  
 
One of the significant aspects of this change is that when we adjust our 
priorities in this way, we see that words gain meaning when people use 
them, something which must always inherently involve specific contexts. 
There is no abstract space of definition in which words can continue to 
mean something when totally separated from their uses. With this 
understanding to hand, we can more easily see how words come to change 
their meanings – people, for whatever reason, begin to use a particular word 
differently, a change which is made clear by the linguistic and physical 
surroundings, the context, of the new usage. In this connection, it is worth 
noting that in German, Wittgenstein seems to have used two available words 
– Gebrauch and Verwendung – to distinguish between two forms of use, 
which work together to produce meaning: "use as fact", or previous and 
established usage, and "use as act", or the potential uses to which a word can 
be put when someone undertakes the act of using it.
121
 Not all translators 
have chosen, or perhaps been able, to make this distinction, and for this 
purpose it is sufficient to note that 'use' can include both these senses.  
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Does this perspective reduce philosophy to dictionary-making? Russell 
rejects this part of Wittgenstein's work entirely, writing that "if it is true, 
philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers".
122
 The point here is 
that if all philosophy is concerned with language, and words are only 
defined by the ways in which people use them, the philosopher will have 
nothing left to do except gather examples of language use – just as a 
lexicographer does. This is not the case at all. Dictionaries are useful tools, 
especially those which focus on the collection of historical examples and the 
many shifting meanings of words, and a philosopher might do well to 
consult one. However, a dictionary must track a huge number of words over 
the usage of vast crowds of speakers, and so they cannot follow every slight 
shift, every nuance of a word in a particular community or sub-culture. 
There is space here for someone, interested in both philosophy and 
sociology – someone whose stage is set by Wittgenstein's later philosophy, 
although Wittgenstein did not manage to do this work directly – and any 
such scholar will find much to do in examining such restricted contexts and 
the word-uses which arise within them. Furthermore,  lexicographers 
concern themselves with questions which do not bother the philosopher, 
such as, 'when was this word first used in this sense?' and 'what part of 
speech does this word occupy?'
123
 Similarly, the philosopher is empowered 
to ask questions for which the lexicographer has no time: questions which 
involve making judgements on value and coherence. These might include 
questions like 'what purpose does this usage serve within the community?', 
'in what ways does this usage make sense – or not?', or 'how does this new 
use change the picture of the world created by the community's patterns of 
language, and is that for the better?' as well as more traditionally 
philosophical questions such as 'what assumptions are embedded in this 
claim?' and 'what chain of logic does this argument require?'
124
 I would also 
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argue that it does not matter if there is some overlap, since disciplines are 
inter-related and the boundaries largely arbitrary anyway.  
 
I have shown, then, that Wittgenstein himself used the term 'language-game' 
in a variety of ways, although always to emphasize the fact that language 
does not stand alone, but is deeply embedded in the surrounding context and 
especially the practices of the community who use that language in 
question. It is also worth clarifying here that the term 'game' is not a 
trivialising one in this context; some readers of Wittgensteinian work, 
especially on religion, take offence at having their practice called 'a game' 
because it seems to imply childishness and lack of seriousness.
125
 The word 
'game' is used because the analogy with the many things we call 'games' is 
useful – it suggests rule-guidedness, but also diversity, and the interaction of 
verbal and non-verbal practices. Of these, the presence of constitutive rules 
which makes certain moves acceptable, and others unacceptable, within the 
game – in language, the grammar – is probably the most important 
feature.
126
 Perhaps those who worry about this would be reassured to know 
that it is not just religious forms of language which can be regarded as a 
language game; Finch reminds us that in order to make sense of "a bank 
draft, a police summons, and a candy wrapper" we must know what role/s 
each of these word-laden pieces of paper plays in a broader game.
127
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A language-game must take place within a context – a "form of life". As we 
have already noted, this is a contested term, with perhaps conflicting uses in 
the work of various Wittgensteinian scholars. Wittgenstein himself uses it 
just five times in the Investigations, leaving us with relatively little material 
from which to build an understanding of the term; Hans-Johann Glock refers 
to Wittgenstein's use of this term as "nonchalant".
128
 That being so, some 
scholars prefer to take it to mean something quite large: all of humankind,
129
 
for example, since it can be argued that "there is really only one form of life 
for human beings, [and] that different forms of life are simply unintelligible 
to us".
130
 Although this pattern of us does not quite fit with Wittgenstein's 
own use (which is, as noted, sometimes multiple), it may have advantages 
for the pluralist perspective on religions and has an intuitive appeal when 
we are looking at concepts for which we expect all human speakers to have 
words. It should also be noted that the static nature implied by the word 
'form' is not necessarily the right connotation for this concept: Malcolm 
records Wittgenstein also using the phrase "stream of life", and perhaps this 
image of running water better captures the ongoing and changing nature of 
the life-context within which languages are used.
131
 Related expressions, 
such as "life as a weave" and "hurly-burly", emphasise interconnectedness 
between elements and complex ongoing movement, all features of life as we 
encounter it.
132
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Other scholars have taken Wittgenstein's phrases in their own ways: ahead 
of my discussion of Lindbeck, it is worth noting that he uses the terms 'form 
of life' and 'language-game'. It seems, from his usage, that he thinks of a 
'form of life' as a culture or collection of cultures: 
 
... just as language (or "language-game", to use Wittgenstein's 
phrase) is correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both 
cognitive and behavioral dimensions, so it is also in the case of a 
religious tradition.
133
 
 
The first problem here is that a language-game is not usually what we 
would, in ordinary terms, call a language. The classic examples provided in 
Philosophical Investigations are much simpler than full human languages, 
being systems in which only orders, or yes/no questions, can be 
communicated.
134
  The second is that, like many other readers of 
Wittgenstein, Lindbeck has understood a 'form of life' to be much larger 
than I have argued that Wittgenstein originally intended.  
 
Kerr's discussion of this is clear and useful. He assesses Roger Trigg's 
consideration of whether whole religions, such a Christianity, or 
denominations, should be regarded as 'forms of life', and demonstrates that 
Wittgenstein's text does not imply anything on so large a scale.
135
 He quotes 
in particular the slab/block language which Wittgenstein discusses, and an 
example of Malcolm's – namely, that a 'form of life' might be "the complex 
of gestures, facial expressions, words and activities that we call pitying and 
comforting an injured man".
136
 He does note that Malcolm himself has taken 
the concept to be larger than Kerr thinks Wittgenstein intended, treating 
religion explicitly as a form of life, but argues that this is mistaken, because 
"it is impossible to apply the expression to any phenomenon on the scale of 
'religion' – which must include innumerable language-laced activities".137 
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With this in hand, we are reminded to keep our language-games and forms 
of life small. 
  
In the field of religion, what should be covered by the term 'form of life'? As 
discussed above, religions – Christianity, and even Quakerism – are clearly 
too large, although some scholars have used the term that way. Practices 
within them will be forms of life, though – some, such as 'praying', are on 
Wittgenstein's list of language-games.
138
 In the context of Quakerism we 
might specify 'attending Meeting for Worship', and add other activities, such 
as 'holding a Meeting for Worship for Business', 'having a meeting of a 
Quaker committee', 'going to a Quaker study group', and 'chatting over the 
post-Meeting tea and biscuits'. I will show in chapter 4, the first set of 
worked examples, how these forms of life inform language use and are 
therefore useful levels at which to apply the tools of analysis.  
 
Taken together, then, how do these ideas – the concept of 'a language-game' 
in which words, sentences, and actions are significant within the context of 
a particular 'form of life' – help us to understand what is happening when 
religious people speak and write? Firstly, they can move us away from an 
overly-simplistic and fact-seeking analysis of what it means to speak about 
religious matters, such as the existence of God. As we will see in chapter 3, 
religious philosopher-practitioners who work from a Wittgensteinian basis 
do not waste their time on unanswerable and often conceptually confused 
questions, such as the physical location or 'real existence' of a being called 
God. Instead, in this Wittgensteinian mode attention is turned to what is 
happening in the community when people speak of God's presence within a 
situation, or use other religious pictures like 'God is watching over us'.  
 
Secondly, having let go of an expectation that a particular word must have a 
single meaning or 'essence', we can more fully appreciate the many ways in 
which words are used. Under a Wittgensteinian analysis, I go on to observe 
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that people who are non-realists about external divinity but remain within 
religious traditions and those who are atheists and reject all religious 
traditions use the word 'God' in different ways and even to refer to different 
objects or express different concepts, without needing to try to adjudicate 
correct usage via an attempt to reach outside language to 'reality'. This will 
be a useful view if they are trying to speak to one another: we can say that 
they will need to clarify and perhaps wish to synchronise their usage of a 
word, while recognising other uses as valid within other contexts. Those 
other uses will hopefully be signalled by the differing contexts in which 
they occur – at the very least, a change of speaker is a change of at least part 
of the context, and alerts us to the potential for a change in use. The word 
can circulate between groups, having some level of mutual intelligibility but 
also technical or context-specific differences. 
 
If we look at this from the perspective of rule-following, we could say that 
we sometimes switch between multiple sets of rules for a particular word – 
many words have one common use, but any specific term can have more 
than one. We use contextual information, about the speaker, the phrase, 
sentence, and paragraph, and actual or implied audience, to understand it.
139
 
In linguistic terms, this switching between sets of rules is one of the things 
which makes up the practices of 'codeswitching' (between languages) and 
'style shifting' (between ways of speaking within a language, such as formal 
and casual).
140
 
 
Furthermore, with this picture of how language works already in hand, we 
can better understand the metaphorical uses to which some Wittgensteinian 
theologians have put the concept of 'language'. For example, George 
Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic" way of looking at religion would make a 
very different point if he used a picture theory of language (it might default 
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to a cognitive-propositional view). I will consider these terms and this issue  
in more detail in chapter 3. 
 
 
 
Private language problems 
 
Wittgenstein denies the possibility of a private language. In each case which 
he considers, it turns out that "my language is not a 'private' one".
141
 This 
reveals an important feature of how language itself works – in particular, 
turning attention once again to the significance of language as communal – 
and has implications for the use of religious language, especially the 
creation of new religious terminology. 
 
This claim has been the focus of much attention, and is addressed in, or the 
centre of, a significant percentage of the secondary literature on 
Wittgenstein. These works include a considerable amount of debate (as laid 
out very clearly in the collection of paired essays edited by O. R. Jones
142
), 
many detailed and technical analyses of limited parts of the Philosophical 
Investigations (such as Mulhall's exploration
143
) and the usual range of 
introductory texts, as well as a variety of other considerations of the issue. 
Kerr observes that "the bibliography on the private language argument 
spreads like bindweed",
144
 and for this reason I am not going to attempt to 
survey it as a whole. Rather, I will mention here those texts which clarify 
why this argument is worth considering, and then turn to the argument itself, 
using in the process those scholars whose work contributes usefully to the 
points which I need to make.
145
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The 'private language argument' is not a straightforward one; indeed, Pears 
says, "the search for a single argument may well be the result of an over-
simplification".
146
 Although it may sometimes be convenient to refer to 'the' 
private language argument as if there is only one, Wittgenstein's text does 
not actually support this. Multiple issues are interwoven throughout the 
relevant sections of the Philosophical Investigations – and, as Saul Kripke 
says, we need to cast our nets widely enough to catch all the relevant 
sections, rather than just those which are most obviously related to the issue 
of a private language.
147
 Furthermore, it may be too strong to say that 
Wittgenstein "presents an argument for a conclusion, or even that he 
presents a conclusion".
148
 Rather, Wittgenstein "reminds us of things we 
normally say which seem to conflict with the things which we feel inclined 
to say occasionally in philosophical moments".
149
 
 
In order to understand why it is important from the Wittgensteinian 
perspective to deny the possibility of a private language, we must see why 
other philosophers thought that such a thing would be possible – indeed, that 
some of them took all language to be private in some sense. In his 
Wittgenstein Dictionary, Glock lays out this background very clearly: 
 
The possibility of a private language is tacitly presupposed by the 
mainstream of modern philosophy from Descartes through classical 
British empiricism and Kantianism to contemporary cognitive 
representationalism. It is the result of two natural assumptions. 
Firstly, the meaning of words is given by what they stand for – this 
is part of the Augustinian picture of language. Secondly, in the case 
of psychological terms, what they stand for are phenomena in a 
mental theatre which is accessible only to the individual. Sensations, 
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experiences, thoughts are inalienable and epistemically private… . 
No one else can have my pain, or know what I have when I am in 
pain – this is the inner/outer picture of the mind. It follows 
immediately that no one else can know what I mean by 'pain'. 
Moreover, if ideas, impressions or intuitions provide not just the 
evidence for all our beliefs, but also the content of our words – a 
view shared by representationalists and idealists, rationalists, 
empiricists and Kantians – our whole language is private in this 
sense.
150
 
 
It is helpful to note that Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations 
does not accept either of the assumptions which these views share. Key 
features of the Augustinian picture of language, and Wittgenstein's reasons 
for rejecting it, were discussed above, and Wittgenstein's alternative to the 
private theatre of the mind will be discussed below, with reference to the 
communal nature of the correct application of words. 
 
The first problem in considering the debate about the possibility of a private 
language is to have a clear idea of what is being deemed to be logically 
impossible or unintelligible: many of the 'private' languages one might first 
think of are in fact sufficiently public that they do not provide true 
counterexamples. A truly private language must be private to only one 
person – codes, ciphers, jargons, and nearly extinct or dead natural 
languages do not count, because they have, have had, or could have more 
than one user, rendering them accessible to a small but relevant public. It 
must also be freshly created – I can write a diary in code, but if that code 
represents a pre-existing language in a new form, it does not count as truly 
private because I learnt the language from others (even if my code is 
unbreakable). However, we should not be surprised to run into trouble 
understanding what is denied, because the claim being made is that the very 
idea of a private language is unintelligible. 
 
This particularly narrow use of the term 'private' helps to clarify why A. J. 
Ayer's first objection – "… it is obvious that there can be private languages. 
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There can be, because there are" – is misguided.151 It is true that the 
languages which Ayer cites exist (slangs, jargons, and encoded diaries, for 
example), but it is not the case that they are sufficiently private to concern 
us in the context of this argument. What, in this context, is intended by the 
concept of total privacy? 
 
Wittgenstein uses an example in which a person records a repeating 
sensation by writing 'S' on a calendar on days when he experiences that 
sensation.
152
 This can be taken to be a problem about memory – does he 
really remember what the sensation he calls 'S' was like accurately enough 
to recognise it again? – or a problem about definition – without any outside 
way of distinguishing between using 'S' correctly and thinking that it is 
being used correctly, how can he know that it is always the same sensation? 
Indeed, Wittgenstein's own remarks go on to discuss the difficulty of giving 
oneself "a kind of ostensive definition" in such cases, and the fallibility of 
"commit[ting] it to memory". Those who believe that private language is 
possible might assert that our memories and definitions are good enough for 
the real world if not for the sceptic, pointing out that we can and do have 
practices of recording sensations.  
 
In some ways, I think that all of these responses miss the most interesting 
force of this example, which is that this is really a problem about the 
communicative function of language. To illustrate this, we can take the 
example quite literally, and then test it in the world of public language. 
Imagine that the user of this truly private word – the recording of the 
symbol 'S' upon the experience of a certain sensation – takes his calendar to 
the doctor. Even if 'S' is his only private word, it won't help him to 
communicate, because when the doctor asks him what's wrong, he can only 
say, "I have a repeated sensation I call 'S'".
153
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In fact, we have trouble imagining this scenario, because actual sensations – 
besides the fact that the term 'sensation' is already a term which has a sense 
in public discourse – occur in a part of the body, something which already 
has a public 'name', allowing that one can at minimum name concrete 
objects by the socially conventional technique of pointing at them; and they 
usually have a quality which we can describe, accepting that descriptions of 
sensations need be no more than desired responses – 'a sensation which 
makes me want to scratch' is usually called 'an itch'. But supplying these 
unmentioned extras to the example misleads us, because it is exactly these 
reaction-based and socially-determined providers of meaning which 
Wittgenstein's example excludes.  
 
Here we must return to Ayer's further objections. Ayer argues that "for a 
person to use descriptive language meaningfully it is not necessary that any 
other person should understand".
154
 I detect, though, a disagreement about 
what it will take for someone to speak meaningfully – Ayer, obviously, 
thinks that it is enough for the term 'S' to indicate a particular sensation to 
the single person who experiences, records, and reads records about that 
sensation. However, this is so far from the normal use of natural language, a 
primary purpose of which is communication between people, that it is not 
clear to me that it should be called 'language' – although it is undoubtedly a 
form of record-keeping, in which the main problems are about memory and 
consistency as mentioned above.
155
  
 
Should we call something a 'language' when it cannot be used for 
communication? Of the many ways in which we normally use the word 
'language', all seem to imply communication, as one of the important if not 
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the only purpose – English is a language, Esperanto is a language, Tolkien's 
Elven is a fictional language used for communication among fictional 
people (and their dedicated fans), the language of flowers is a method of 
communicating via floristry, we use a programming language to 
communicate instructions to a computer, whale song may be a language 
especially if whales use it to communicate among themselves, and so 
forth.
156
 That being so, it seems odd to call something a language if it cannot 
be used for communication. Wittgenstein made this point in his Notes for 
the Philosophical Lecture, where he says that it is indeed possible to have a 
private sewing machine, "but in order to be a private sewing machine, it 
must be an object that deserves the name 'sewing machine', not in virtue of 
its privacy, but in virtue of its similarity to other sewing machines, private 
or otherwise".
157
 
 
This is enough of an argument – it would be sufficient to say: language 
cannot really be private because language, to be language, needs to 
communicate somehow, and a private language inherently does not do that. 
It is simply too far from what we ordinarily call a language, and must be 
called something else. Therefore, in examining language we will turn away 
from private attempts and focus on the community. But it seems that 
Wittgenstein wishes to go a step beyond this: not only can a private 
language not become public, but, as Finch says, it "would not even be a 
language for the person who had it, but only empty sounds or meaningless 
marks".
158
 In terms of communication, I might put it this way: a truly private 
'language', because of the problems of definition and memory described 
above, would not even be able to communicate between myself now, 
making marks, and myself in two weeks' time, trying to read them.  
 
                                                 
156
 Even talk about the 'language of DNA' seems to support this, as the point being made is 
that it communicates information. 
157
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951  (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1993). 448. 
158
 Finch, Wittgenstein - the Later Philsophy: An Exposition of the "Philosophical 
Investigations": 129. 
70 
 
Finch formulates the significance of this by describing Wittgenstein as 
giving two aspects to the anti-private-language argument: firstly, that "we 
cannot imagine or invent an absolutely private language which would be 
able to function as a language", and secondly, that "no existing language or 
part of an existing language would be able to function if it were such a 
private language or based upon such a private language".
159
 To understand 
why this is the case, we must also consider a deeply related theme which 
occurs in Wittgenstein's discussion: the issue of 'rule following'.  
 
The problem of rule following is a sceptical problem about consistency in 
language, although it also has implications for other topics such as the 
philosophy of mathematics. Much material on the 'private language' issue 
focusses on the sections following §243 in the Philosophical Investigations, 
but Saul Kripke argues – successfully, in my opinion160 – that to really 
understand it we must take a wider picture of the context within which 
Wittgenstein introduces it. Kripke's version (which makes no claims to be 
the version which Wittgenstein intended, or the view which Kripke 
personally endorses, only one possible view which seems to Kripke to be 
interesting and plausible) focusses on the sections preceding §243, on the 
issue of how we can follow a rule, and how we know whether or not we are 
doing so.
161
 For example, Kripke calls attention to §202, where, he says, 
Wittgenstein's "conclusion is already explicitly stated": 
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Hence it is not possible to obey a rule privately: otherwise thinking 
one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.
162
 
 
Kripke gives a clear version of the problem, by using a mathematical 
example, though others are possible (and even given in Wittgenstein's text). 
The problem is: can one know, at any given time when completing an 
apparently simple piece of addition, whether one really used the function 
'plus' as one would always have done? To dramatise this, Kripke introduces 
the alternative 'quus', which is symbolised by '' and defined as follows: 
 
x  y = x + y if x, y < 57 
 = 5 otherwise.
163
 
 
Imagine that I have never before added to a number greater than 57. I can 
have practised adding numbers below that quite considerably, and be 
confident when I add 68 and 57 that the answer should be 125: but then 
along comes a character whom Kripke calls 'the sceptic', who claims that I 
am now not only incorrect in this calculation, but am "misinterpreting my 
own previous usage" because I actually meant quus all along.
164
 How can I 
know whether or not this is true? 
 
As Kripke says, we cannot agree with the sceptic that we do not know: that 
would be "insane and intolerable".
165
 In solving Kripke's puzzle, we will be 
led back to the impossibility of private languages, because the solution 
depends upon there being public criteria for following a rule. To follow this, 
it is useful to understand that despite the name, the 'private language 
argument' is not strictly about private language, but about all language, and 
how it can be possible – Kripke notes that "Wittgenstein's main problem is 
that it appears that he has shown all language, all concept formation, to be 
impossible, indeed unintelligible".
166
 The rule-following considerations 
explicated by the plus/quus example appear to show that language is 
                                                 
162
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: 202. 
163
 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: 9.  
164
 Ibid. 
165
 Ibid., 60. 
166
 Ibid., 62. 
72 
 
impossible because we do not, perhaps cannot, know what we mean when 
we speak. Because it gives this appearance, which is false, the (anti-)'private 
language argument' is required to show why the rule-following 
considerations do not lead to the result that we cannot know what we mean 
when we speak. Having clarified this, Kripke goes on to present a solution, 
although in a form not native to Wittgenstein's own work: following a rule, 
a key part of speaking in a regular way, can only be judged in community.
 
167
 Thus, when we judge that someone does addition correctly, we judge that 
they use 'plus' in the same way that we ourselves – and others in our 
community – are inclined to use it.168 The correct response to the 
generalising sceptic, the person who looks at the plus/quus scenario and 
decides that all language is impossible, is to say: language is possible within 
a community, because we can assess the linguistic competence of others 
alongside ourselves. Together, our patterns of use can add up to meaning 
which we cannot create alone. 
 
Mental arithmetic is not the only example, and although Kripke focusses on 
it, it may not be the most helpful one. Another typical example is of pain 
and other sensations, to which the 'private language argument' can also be 
applied. It is useful to do so because these examples more closely resemble 
cases usually considered to be 'religious experience'. In the process of 
examining the 'private language argument' as it applies to sensations, it will 
be useful to address another thought-experiment found in the Philosophical 
Investigations and frequently cited as explaining something about this 
problem: the beetles-in-boxes scenario. Wittgenstein sets this thought-
experiment up as follows: 
 
Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call 
a "beetle". No one can ever look in anyone else's box, and everyone 
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here 
it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different 
in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly 
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changing. – But what if these people's word "beetle" had a use 
nonetheless?
169
 
 
Finch describes this as the case where, in trying to "make a sign refer to an 
inner sensation as a private object", "we already have the word… and know 
how to use it and then try to understand its meaning as deriving from 
reference to a private object".
170
 The example usually taken, including by 
Finch, is the word and concept 'pain'. However, it is also interesting to 
consider the thought-experiment in relation to the circumstances of the 
person who is seeking to describe and/or understand their religious 
experience, especially if their tradition has already supplied plenty of words 
for it: such a person knows that they have something in their box, but may 
be unsure whether to call it a beetle, or an ant, or a six-legged beast. 
 
Wittgenstein says of this that "the thing in the box has no place in the 
language-game at all",
171
 because, as Finch puts it, "it wouldn't matter if the 
boxes were empty; nothing would be changed" – because we cannot access 
the contents of anyone else's box, only our own, "which is supposed to serve 
as [our] meaning for what the word beetle means to [us]".
172
 Helen Hervey 
provides a good discussion of the beetle-in-the-box image, in which she 
asks whether sensations are really "in us in the same way that beetles are in 
boxes".
173
 She argues that the thought experiment goes astray because the 
beetle is not connected to or part of the box in the way that sensations are 
within us.
174
 However, this objection does not succeed because the problem 
which is of interest for the purposes of this project does not lie in the 
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connection between the beetle and myself, but in the attempt to compare my 
beetle with someone else's beetle, without either of us ever seeing the other's 
beetle.
175
 Perhaps we could talk about hearts instead, since if we pretend for 
this thought-experiment that they are never seen or detected by other people, 
they could stand in for the beetles while becoming clearly physically 
attached to us. If my heart were private in this way, I might still want to talk 
about it – to speak of the beating organ in my rib cage, just as I spoke of the 
wriggling insect in this box, even though I can only access my own.  
 
Kripke argues that Wittgenstein has us look for assertability conditions, 
under which we can make meaningful statements about such private things 
as sensations and mental arithmetic without assuming that this gives us 
'access' to the things themselves – in such a way that it doesn't matter 
whether they exist in the form in which we imagine them. In his conclusion 
Kripke puts it this way: under the assertability conditions which 
Wittgenstein proposes, it does not follow that "the answer everyone gives to 
an addition problem is, by definition, the correct one, but rather the platitude 
that, if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will feel justified 
in calling the answer wrong".
176
 
 
Perhaps the first thing to note here is that a platitude is not automatically 
useless to us – especially if it is something which we are otherwise inclined 
to overlook. When we are considering a small community which takes pride 
in accepting free thinkers and a range of perspectives, the reminder that 
community agreement may be sufficient justification for making an 
otherwise problematic statement seems useful. The concept of justification 
as operating within the community context – and perhaps not portable 
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outside it – will be an important one in my consideration of the religious 
language of a particular community. 
 
The second is to consider how this awareness will shape our approach to 
religious language specifically. In order to do this, it is useful to look at two 
parts of religious language: language about religious experiences (which 
might be considered as a kind of private sensation like the ones discussed in 
the section on private language, above) and language about God, which also 
has to deal with problems about ineffability.  
 
Generally, language about religious experiences should sit somewhere 
between two possible creative forces: the experience itself as private to the 
experiencer (if we accept that any such thing exists without or before 
language, which Quakers usually do – see discussion of the experience-first 
assumption in chapter 1), and the surrounding group of people, the culture 
or society to which the experiencer must communicate. If there is no such 
thing as pre-linguistic experience, then the 'experience' is drawn much 
closer to the surrounding culture which teaches the experiencer language in 
general and specifically about religious experience. We will see that some 
people (those whom George Lindbeck calls the 'experiential-expressivists', 
which might include many Quakers) want to hold experience both apart 
from language – so that many expressions can represent the same 
experience – and close to it – so that expressions of religious experience can 
be held to accurately communicate it. The ideas from Wittgenstein which I 
have discussed so far tend to push away from the former – the distance 
between 'experience' and language – and towards the latter – because 
language and experience are both so intricately bound up with culture and 
surrounding context. 
 
There are many traditional theological responses to the problem of speaking 
about the ineffable, and it is probably not advantageous to rehearse them all 
here. However, it does need to be noted firstly that ineffability is not 
overcome by more detailed or richer descriptions – a vivid mystical poem is 
no closer to capturing the ineffable Divine than are the dry technical terms 
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of philosophy.
177
 Secondly, the ineffability of God, which could be seen as a 
linguistic rule in which we are asked to speak about God in ways such that 
the inadequacy of our language is visible, known in theological terms as 
apophatic speech, does not prevent us from saying things about God – it 
merely confirms that whatever we say will not be sufficient to say 
everything about God, or accurate enough to tell the whole truth. As I 
argued in chapter 1, ineffability is closely linked to the other Quaker 
assumptions about religious experience and the ways in which we speak 
about it, and in chapters 3 and 4 the impact of the private language argument 
and other positions which run counter to the assumptions, especially the 
experience-first assumption, will be seen. 
 
Irreplaceability 
 
This section considers and develops another tool, focussed on the concept of 
irreplaceability. The ideas are drawn from some notes made on lectures 
given by Wittgenstein and a certain amount of preliminary work is needed 
to clarify and understand them. The discussion focuses on 'images', both 
visual images and the kind of pictures we create through certain uses of 
language. I use Cora Diamond's reading of the lecture notes and add some 
interpretations of my own in order to produce a useable tool, which amounts 
to an argument that some 'images' (visually or verbally created) are 
irreplaceable in the process of understanding and communicating religious 
concepts. 
 
In considering the roles of language in a religious community, it is useful to 
begin by thinking about a small-scale example, such as the use of religious 
language in particular conversations. One example of this kind is found in 
Wittgenstein's Lectures on Religious Belief,  where there is a hypothetical 
discussion about a statement concerning the Last Judgement and the range 
of positions in which we might find ourselves with regard to such a 
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statement.  The text is not a clear one, being composed of lecture notes 
taken by students while Wittgenstein was speaking or shortly afterwards, 
but it nevertheless suggests a great number of interesting possibilities. For 
example, here is one of the remarks about the Last Judgement, in which 
Wittgenstein fails to be moved by the contention that the Last Judgement 
will happen:  
 
Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in 
a Last Judgement? But I couldn't either say 'Yes' or 'No' to the 
statement that there will be such a thing. Nor 'Perhaps' nor 'I'm not 
sure'.  
It is a statement which may not allow of any such answer.
178
 
 
Cora Diamond offers an analysis of these options, 'yes', 'no', 'perhaps', and 
the inability to answer, arguing that Wittgenstein and the 'ordinary' atheist 
are in different positions regarding the person who asserts that there will be 
a last judgement
179
 – it is not simply a matter of disagreeing, or even 
disagreeing for different reasons. Diamond's analysis offers four options for 
reacting when someone says the last judgement will happen. You can have 
the same manner of handling propositions and agree or disagree with this 
claim: for example, if Smith and Jones both study the Bible and Smith 
becomes an exclusivist with regard to eschatological life while Jones 
becomes an inclusivist, they disagree about the nature of the last judgement, 
meaning different things by the term, but have the same foundations. You 
can be in need of teaching or an explanation – relevant Biblical quotations 
or a translation of key terms into another language – and then become 
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capable of agreeing or disagreeing as outlined in the previous options. 
Alternatively, you can have a different manner of handling propositions and 
disagree because of that. This is the case of the atheist, who doesn't accept 
the existence of God, which is foundational to the idea of the last 
judgement; perhaps you can sometimes even agree despite that, if you arrive 
at the same conclusion by a different route. However, you can also not be 
able to agree or disagree because you can't – in Diamond's phrase – find it in 
yourself to move with the concept at all.
180
 This lack of movement is not 
emotional (to move with a concept is not the same as to be moved by it), but 
rather intellectual and practical, a failure to find any use for or to have any 
affinity with a particular mode of thinking.  
 
It is useful here to dismiss some other ways of thinking about this which 
would take us away from the core Wittgensteinian insights about how 
language works. Hilary Putnam argues that of three conventional ways of 
thinking about Wittgenstein's position, one is useless and the other two are 
wrong. He identifies "the Kuhnian idea of incommensurability", the idea of 
religious language as expressing emotions or attitudes, and the concept of 
"non-cognitive" language (contrasted with the "cognitive" language of 
science).
181
 Incommensurability, as defined by Putnam, is the idea that "two 
speakers aren't able to communicate because their words have different 
'meanings'" (where meaning is defined only by use).
182
 Wittgenstein, 
however, dismisses this, saying that it is "not clear what the criterion of 
meaning the same is".
183
 Similarly, Wittgenstein does not accept the idea 
that religious statements express attitudes in those cases where the statement 
cannot be replaced by "an explicit expression of the so-called attitude", and 
Putnam argues that this is because he is rejecting the move towards a 
metaphysical discussion (the difference between a 'statement of fact' and a 
'non-literal statement' turning on whether there is a metaphysical 'fact' of the 
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matter).
184
 Finally, talk about 'non-cognitive' language does not help us 
understand this at all; much of it sounds as if it has "forgotten what religious 
language sounds like".
185
 Instead, Putnam says that Wittgenstein is saying 
that "religious discourse can be understood in any depth only by 
understanding the form of life to which it belongs".
186
 This is the position to 
which I subscribe, and which informs the approach of this thesis to real 
examples of religious language and their community contexts – to be 
explored in detail in chapter 4. 
 
Part of a religious form of life is the creation of religious pictures, both 
visual images (including those described rather than drawn) and 
metaphorical ones. Another way of considering the failure to move with a 
religious concept is to say that someone in that situation does not have the 
relevant religious picture. If you have a certain picture, religious or 
otherwise, of the way the world is, then it affects your actions, speech, and 
other beliefs. It is a significant part of your form of life. People in the first, 
second, and third positions considered above – who can react to the picture 
and choose whether or not to include it in their life – can imagine having the 
picture, and the effects on their life seem comprehensible. If, however, you 
can't even imagine what it would be to have that picture of the world, you 
cannot move with the concept at all. You cannot, furthermore, be sure which 
consequences to draw from it; when you speak of your friend's eye, you 
know you can speak of an eyebrow as well, but when the Eye of God is 
spoken about, the religious believer with the picture knows which 
consequences to draw (the eye of God looks, but talk of eyebrows would be 
out of place), but people who cannot move with the concept do not.
187
 This 
is in keeping with Wittgenstein's emphasis on religious beliefs having an 
effect on the life of the believer; as Diamond says, he:  
 
emphasizes in his account of the ramifications of talk about a Last 
Judgement connections with what the assertor does, and with which 
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he says about such things as forgoing pleasures; he does not 
emphasize, and (so far as the lecture notes are a reliable guide to 
what he said) indeed did not bring in at all the significance of the 
connections the assertor might make with talk of God's actions and 
promises.
188
 
 
From this we might conclude – as the idea of meaning as use within specific 
contexts had already hinted – that to understand a religious position, we 
must have or at least be able to imagine having the 'picture' concerned. 
 
However, the idea of the religious claim as a picture is raised in another 
context later in the Lectures on Religious Belief, and it is used in a different 
way to that suggested above.
189
 On the one hand, the 'religious pictures' 
discussed above are images of how the world is which comprise a 
significant part of the religious form of life; on the other hand, an actual 
image such as a painting might be a religious picture if it depicts a religious 
subject, and this understanding also interests Wittgenstein. In the course of 
the discussion in the Lectures, he touches on a series of points which will be 
useful for my project, not least the 'picture' metaphor itself. The comparison 
between religious concepts and pictures arises from cases where we access 
religious beliefs by looking at objects identified as ‘pictures’ in everyday 
language, such as Michelangelo’s paintings of religious subjects.190 
Wittgenstein is talking about the ways in which we use pictures to identify 
things in everyday life, and our technique of comparison: "The word 'God' is 
amongst the earliest learnt—pictures and catechisms, etc. But not the same 
consequences as with pictures of aunts. I wasn't shown [that which the 
picture pictured]".
191
 Pictures of religious, rather than secular historical, 
subjects play quite a different role in our practice: 
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It is quite clear that the role of pictures of Biblical subjects and role 
of the picture of God creating Adam are totally different ones. You 
might ask this question: “Did Michelangelo think that Noah in the 
ark looked like this, and that God creating Adam looked like this?” 
He wouldn’t have said that God or Adam looked as they look in this 
picture.
192
 
 
I find two things worth saying about Wittgenstein's view as represented in 
this passage. Firstly, that we do gain some understanding of religious 
concepts from paintings and catechisms. Although we cannot use our 
everyday method of comparison,
193
 unlike when we are given a picture of an 
aunt or a tropical plant,
194
 we do think that we can learn something about a 
religious tradition (and perhaps, but not necessarily, about God) from the 
visual or verbal pictures it produces. The criteria for the value of a religious 
picture are not discussed in this passage, and I would suggest that this is 
because any such criteria are generated from inside the religious tradition, 
rather than being the concern of the outsider. Wittgenstein does say that he 
assumes that Michelangelo is the best, presumably as an artist, but the 
comparison with the picture of the tropical plant shows that visual accuracy 
of representation is not a criterion on which we can judge images of God
195
. 
He does not seem concerned with issues such as the aesthetic quality of the 
picture, and for this purpose that seems irrelevant – a picture of an aunt may 
be informative without being attractive, and this presumably applies also to 
God.
196
 It is for the religious believer, perhaps the theologian, to judge 
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whether an image gives information about God which represents the God 
they know – i.e., whether what they learn from this image is 'grammatically 
correct' in relation to what they have learnt from other images and ways of 
speaking. 
 
Secondly, since the pictures produced by a religious tradition are not only 
paintings, but also other kinds of imagery, we can consider this usefulness 
in relation to figurative language. Considering 'pictures' to include verbal 
imagery,
197
 taken together with the remarks about religious pictures above, 
adds up to a clearer understanding of metaphorical remarks like 'the eye of 
God is watching me'. The Michelangelo painting cannot be compared with 
that which it represents, unlike the photograph of a tropical plant, to see if 
the likeness is good;
198
 rather, it must be assessed based on the effect that it 
has on the viewer. Similarly, the remark about the eye of God cannot be 
taken to be a picture of the world which corresponds with God's eye, but 
should be assessed on the role that it plays in the life of the believer. This 
directs us back towards specific contexts which we need to take into account 
when seeking the meaning of religious language: its role in the life of the 
people who use it. 
  
The metaphor of religious expressions as pictures has some other interesting 
implications, however. For one thing, we do not expect to be able to – or 
indeed to need to – restate pictures in any different ways: there is no 
practice of translation in pictures.
199
 We do have a practice of clarifying – of 
taking better passport photos, for example – but this seems more like 
rephrasing a sentence than translating into another language (I will be 
discussing this in more detail in chapter 4). Furthermore, if two people 
create pictures of the same thing, they will often include significant 
differences which give clues to their relationship to the object depicted – at 
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the most simple level, this may simply be perspective or angle, but it can be 
much richer and more complicated. Two artists, even trained and operating 
within the same tradition, may produce very different work – but it remains 
to be seen whether this metaphor will stand, as language and visual art are in 
many ways quite different. 
 
This brings us back to the theme of the irreplaceability of some pictures or 
expressions.
200
 There are some times when you can replace a photograph of 
your aunt with a detailed description of her – it might be better for an oral 
history book, and just as good if you're reporting her missing. There are also 
times when you could replace the photograph with an impressionist painting 
– the painting would be good for your family history, but not likely to be 
useful to a police officer who is hunting for her; perhaps this is like 
replacing a word with another which has the same denotation but a different 
connotation (the morning star/Venus). But at other times a photograph or 
representational painting is the most useful, perhaps the only useful, tool: 
when you need to identify one tropical plant among many, for example, and 
you can compare shapes and colours visually which would be impossible to 
put into sufficiently detailed words.
201
 If some religious expressions are like 
pictures in this way, then it seems right that phrases in our language, 
particularly phrases which involve religious imagery, may be impossible to 
restate in ways which do not contain that religious content, or indeed at all. 
That said, there could be many photographs or paintings of a tropical plant 
equally good for this task because very similar to one another in this regard; 
perhaps it is better to think of these as versions of a single image rather than 
many images – compare this to the way of describing matters such that this 
word 'word' and that word 'word' are one word rather than two. 
 
Although religious speech can sometimes express emotions, 'God is 
watching over me' is not the same as 'I feel safe'. When language creates 
                                                 
200
 And harkens back to Wittgenstein's remark that he would like to say that "a picture tells 
me itself". Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: 523. 
201
 Another example would be doing a jigsaw puzzle. The picture on the box lid may not be 
quite irreplaceable, but it is certainly more useful than even a very detailed description. 
84 
 
pictures, perhaps especially when those pictures are of religious subjects, it 
seems that those pictures may sometimes be irreplaceable.
202
 This might be 
illustrated with reference to the translation of poetry, and other 
'untranslatable' things: although it is sometimes possible to capture 
something of the same idea in another language, or to say something which 
can give another person a start at understanding the concept, direct 
translations are not possible. In the world of pictures, we might say that 
simply creating another picture of the same subject is not enough to convey 
the content of the original picture – I might paint a picture of a starry night 
sky, but it would not be a replacement for Van Gogh's Starry Night.  
 
In one of the conversations from which I derive these ideas, Wittgenstein 
says to Smythies that "the whole weight may be in the picture"
203
 – but we 
need to know what we understand by the idea that a picture (here, a 
metaphor as much as a visual image) is essential to a way of speaking. Cora 
Diamond offers three possible interpretations, of which she rejects the first 
two and endorses the last.
204
 The first interpretation suggests that the 
specific and ordinary uses of the words involved in a way of speaking are 
essential to that way of speaking – so that, for example, we can understand 
someone who speaks of 'God watching us' if we know how the words 'God' 
and 'watching' are ordinarily used. However, it seems clear that these words 
do not, in this context, take their ordinary meanings and that we cannot read 
off the sense of such talk with the "eyes of logic", and so these 
commonplace pictures cannot be essential in this sense.
 205
  
 
Diamond also rejects a weak interpretation of the claim, in which we see 
"the anthropomorphic character of [someone's] conception of the Divine as 
essential to it in the sense that they cannot imagine anyone's having that 
conception without that picture".
206
 This is to say that although those within 
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the practice cannot imagine anyone having the practice without the picture, 
the picture is not in fact essential to the practice.
207
 Diamond rejects this 
idea, which she attributes to Kemp-Smith, because it does not meet the 
requirement that it explain what Wittgenstein actually said. If we, from 
outside the practice, are willing to say that the picture is inessential, it would 
be very strange for us to also say that the whole weight is in the picture, or 
that the picture is irreplaceable. 
 
Having dismissed both the above interpretations, Diamond seeks to provide 
a third interpretation which lies between them. She observes that "pictorial 
language may seem necessary in describing the use of pictorial language in 
the narrative of the doings of this God",
208
 but goes on to say that such 
circularity is not problematic. Indeed, uncovering it is useful, because it 
demonstrates that such language is necessary to discussions of these topics. 
This is pictorial language in general rather than a specific example – 
preliminary sketches or other work by the same artist may be a help to 
understanding a work of art in a way that an attempt to state its meaning 
verbally may not, perhaps cannot, and pictorial language might be helpfully 
expanded by other forms of pictorial language – but these helps to 
understanding are not full restatements of the original. In this way, a picture 
may be inescapable "in any description which she [the thinker] can 
acknowledge as describing her use of words, her life with those words" 
because it is "at the ground of her thought, that is, tied to her way of taking 
the game".
209
 If this is so, then particular ways of describing the Divine – 
intertwined as they are with theəlogical positions and understandings – will 
not be easily interchanged. This can be seen in relation to the example 
discussed earlier, of belief in the last judgement. A belief in a theologically 
meaningful event such as the last judgement – an event in which the Divine 
has a particular role to play – is a picture of the way the world is or will be; 
this picture of the world and the ways of describing the Divine which it 
entails (God as Judge, perhaps) is so entangled with other aspects of a 
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worldview, a religious belief, and probably patterns of action, that it cannot 
be exchanged for another without loss of some aspect of this understanding. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced and discussed three key Wittgensteinian 
concepts: the process of the formation of meaning through use, the 
impossibility of private language, and the irreplaceability of some words. 
This has built up a picture of how language works – of language as 
something which is necessarily communal at some level – and shown why it 
must be discussed in its real context rather than as an abstraction.  
 
It follows from the idea that meaning is created when people use words in 
real contexts that in order to understand words, to comprehend their 
meanings, we must turn to real examples of their use. In particular, we must 
look at not only the use of words 'in the wild', but also take a full picture of 
the contexts in which they are used – the background and circumstances, the 
previous uses of a word and the nuances of the use in which we are 
interested. In the next chapter, I aim to do exactly this: take a series of 
examples of Quaker language use, and examine them in detail, exploring the 
context for any relevant material and considering also the history and other 
uses of the more intriguing words. 
 
This process can alert us to many things which might otherwise go 
unnoticed. This will become clearer in chapter 4 when I put this method into 
practice, but on the abstract level, examples might include the ways in 
which words move between communities, trailing some but not all of their 
previous connotations, and the ways in which words change through time 
and use – phrases become abbreviated, words acquire new meanings in one 
sub-culture which then spread to others, and so forth.  
 
Finally, I also want to note here some of the ways in which this 
Wittgensteinian understanding of the workings of language challenges the 
Quaker assumptions which I described in chapter 1. When a Quaker chooses 
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one word over another, or includes some items but not others in a list, that 
will tell us something about the language game within which they are 
operating, both in cultural aspects and their individual perspective on the 
situation. It may not, however, tell us what we at first think it might tell us 
about either their experiences (if they have language-independent 
experiences at all), or the content which religious experiences are held to 
have (that is, of the Divine, if experience can have language-independent 
content). In ordinary language, we do talk about our experiences and think 
that we can compare them by comparing what we say about them; but there 
are two things to say about this.  
 
Firstly, we acknowledge that this breaks down in some places. When my 
brother, who is a little colour-blind, tells me over the phone about his new 
car, I might not recognise the colour of it from his description, and we do 
not think anything strange is happening if this turns out to be the case. If he 
tells me about the colour of the beetle in his box, or the Deity in his vision, I 
have no choice but to trust him since (unlike his car) I cannot go and look at 
those things for myself – but I also have a reasonable expectation that if I 
could by some miracle experience what he 'saw', it might appear differently 
to me. In religious experience, we are not usually talking about anything as 
simple as colour, but I think it is reasonable to import the idea that one 
person's description of an experience into language will not necessarily 
match another's. 
 
Secondly, there are two different uses of the word 'experience' in play here, 
with quite different connotations. Sometimes, the word 'experience' is used 
to suggest 'raw experience', something pre-linguistic, pre-cultural, which is 
therefore taken to be a trustworthy source of information about the world. 
Sometimes, though, the word 'experience' is used to suggest the 'whole 
experience', the combined qualia, if I may be forgiven such an 
unWittgensteinian term, of being the people we are in the world, and this 
use must, for humans, include the experience of being a language-user and 
part of one or more cultures. This is tricky, because I admit to having 
slipped between the two uses. When I say, "if they have language-
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independent experiences at all", I am suggesting the possibility that we 
might deny the possibility of 'raw experience' being truly pre-linguistic, but 
when I say, "we do talk about our experiences", I am thinking of the 'whole 
experience' (though practically we only have time and space to compare 
parts of it), the way it feels to be in the world as a language-using being. 
 
Furthermore, if we accept that religious pictures, visual or verbal, carry with 
them significant content which is not easily replicated in other 'pictures' – 
hence, that they are not always or even usually replaceable – we will want to 
pay close attention to the specific words used, and reject the idea that one 
can simply be 'translated' into another. The burden of proof will fall onto the 
'translator', to show that the words used are close enough in meaning to 
convey a usefully similar picture, and this is a problem to which I will return 
in chapter 4. 
  
89 
 
Chapter 3: The cultural-linguistic model of religion 
 
The English have no respect for their language, and will not teach 
their children to speak it.
210
 
 
In light of Fergus Kerr's conclusion that the reception of Wittgenstein's 
work by recent theologians has been modest and mixed, not to mention 
frequently misinformed, the idea that this chapter will examine theological 
uses of Wittgenstein's work might be thought misguided.
211
 However, even 
Kerr would agree that there are theologians who have taken Wittgenstein's 
ideas seriously, often under the influence of other teachers (such as Paul 
Holmer, a philosopher and sometime theologian who taught both George 
Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas). 
 
That being so, the purpose of this chapter is to see how Wittgensteinian 
tools have been applied to theological topics by other scholars, and what 
assets this previous exploration adds to our tool-box. The main scholar to be 
considered will be George Lindbeck: I examine his book, The Nature of 
Doctrine, in some detail, looking at its Wittgensteinian roots, and the ways 
in which Lindbeck develops those ideas.
212
 Lindbeck is the focus here not 
only because he is one of the first theologians to develop Wittgensteinian 
ideas in depth, and not only because his work has been enormously 
influential, but also because his work and the comments and debates which 
have followed on from it provide a series of considerations and tools which 
will prove useful to the project I am undertaking. 
 
I then move on to consider the criticisms which Lindbeck provides of other 
positions we will encounter – these prove especially fruitful because 
Lindbeck's work together with comments from D. Z. Phillips effectively 
stages an intervention into positions common and rarely questioned in 
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Quakerism. Although some discussion has to be postponed until chapter 5 
(when we turn to look at some defenders of pluralist positions which have 
some features in common with 'experiential-expressivist' positions), two 
debates do emerge as key to this area: the issue of truth claims within 
religions (when and whether religions make them and what can be said 
about them), and the question of the boundaries of communities or 
traditions.  
 
At the end of this chapter, I consider Lindbeck's own position and some 
critiques of Lindbeck's work from Kwok Pui-Lan, D. Z. Phillips and Fergus 
Kerr, before finally summarising the aspects which may be useful for our 
project going forward. In particular, I identify the concept of the group of 
competent speakers or the 'fluent elite' and the metaphor 'Christianity is a 
language' as tools which will be applicable, while discarding the first-
order/second-order distinction which does not relate well to Quaker speech. 
 
  
Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine 
 
In The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 
George Lindbeck's purpose is to advance the case for adopting a postliberal, 
or cultural-linguistic, view of doctrine in particular and of religion more 
generally. 213  Whilst acknowledging that there will be those for whom this 
is inappropriate, he argues his case carefully and thoroughly, pointing out at 
each turn the flaws in the positions he has identified as alternative views: the 
preliberal cognitivism or propositionalism, in which doctrinal statements 
about belief are taken to be mostly or most importantly statements of 
metaphysical truth, and the modern or liberal experiential-expressivism, in 
which doctrinal statements are taken to be expressions, varying by context 
and culture, of widely accessible or even universal human experiences.214 In 
the face of the problems created by these understandings, he intends to 
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move forward into a new view of religion.215 Lindbeck's work has indeed 
encouraged many to move forward in this way, and the scholars who do so 
are known broadly as 'postliberal theologians'. They include Lindbeck's 
colleagues Hans Frei, David Kelsey, and Kathryn Tanner, among others.216 
 
A central contention of the cultural-linguistic view of religion is that 
languages are the most apt analogy for religions.217 Specifically, religions 
are not just like languages, but accord with the Wittgensteinian view of 
languages. This has implications for the ways that we talk about them: for 
example, we see more clearly that the full practice of a religion cannot be 
learned from outside observation (as by listening to or reading translations 
from a foreign language), but only by practice and engagement, i.e. from 
inside the religion.218  This sounds like it may lead to complete fideism,219 
but it does not automatically do so: just as there are no sharp boundaries 
between natural languages (a speaker of one can often pick out some of a 
related language), we are not surprised if we can make some, but not total, 
sense of one religion from within another, or from within an analogous 
language.220 
 
The change which interests Lindbeck most, though, is the way that when we 
use the religion-as-language metaphor we are consequently enabled to see 
doctrines as second-order intra-systematic claims, analogous to claims about 
the grammar of a language, rather than as first-order claims about 
metaphysical realities, although he allows that doctrines may also represent 
                                                 
215
 And of doctrine. Lindbeck tends to slide between the two, and rather than fight to keep 
them distinct I am going to follow him, accept that what he says about doctrine can usefully 
and coherently be said about religion as a whole, and conflate them.  
216
 Ronald T. Michener, Postliberal Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed  (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013). 
217
 The term implies that cultures may also be an analogy for religions, but Lindbeck does 
not explore this possibility in nearly as much detail. 
218
 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: 35. 
219
 Nielsen, "Wittgensteinian Fideism." 
220
 I will return to the issue of boundaries between languages later in this chapter. 
92 
 
the metaphysical state of affairs.221 He notes that the cultural-linguistic view 
of religion has often been used by scholars of comparative religion, but 
usually from an atheistic standpoint; those same scholars may have a 
religious belief, but not use their cultural-linguistic analysis of religion to 
support it (he singles out Peter Berger as an example of this).222 The 
sociological roots of the cultural-linguistic perspective make it of particular 
interest to a project such as mine, which includes a strong empirical 
dimension – they provide a reason to think at the outset that this perspective 
may have something to contribute to my thesis. Further reasons will be 
found as we proceed. 
 
Lindbeck notes in his first chapter that much of the work which has inspired 
him has been inspired in turn by Wittgenstein, saying that Wittgenstein's 
work "has served as a major stimulus to my thinking (even if in ways that 
those more knowledgeable in Wittgenstein might not approve)".
223
 Not 
everyone thinks that Lindbeck benefits from his use of Wittgenstein, such as 
it is; for example, C. C. Pecknold finds it necessary to supplement Lindbeck 
with Augustine and Charles Peirce in order to produce a satisfactory 
understanding of doctrine, free of the flaws which he thinks Lindbeck 
inherits from Wittgenstein.
224
 The parts of Wittgenstein's work which 
Lindbeck does use are mainly from the material covered in the first section 
of chapter 2, namely the ideas that meaning is created by using words in 
particular contexts, and the concept of a 'form of life' within which a 
specific use of language is meaningful. 
 
I dealt extensively with Wittgenstein's uses of the terms 'form of life' and 
'language game' in Chapter 2, so it will not be necessary to cover that 
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ground again here, but only to note that Lindbeck uses these terms without 
anywhere clarifying his understanding of them. Observing the meaning 
from his use, though, I conclude that he thinks of a 'form of life' as a culture 
or collection of cultures: 
 
... just as a language (or "language-game", to use Wittgenstein's 
phrase) is correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both 
cognitive and behavioral dimensions...225  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, a language-game in Wittgenstein's use is not 
usually what we would, in ordinary terms, call a language. It is also clear in 
this passage that, like many other readers of Wittgenstein, Lindbeck has 
understood a 'form of life' to be much larger than it seems Wittgenstein 
intended in the Philosophical Investigations, treating it as the correlate of a 
whole natural language. However, given that Lindbeck acknowledges this 
disagreement, I am setting it aside in order to focus on the fruitful products 
of Lindbeck's engagement with Wittgenstein. 
 
The key strength of Lindbeck's argument is the usefulness of the 'religion as 
language' analogy. Lindbeck argues for this throughout The Nature of 
Doctrine, beginning by noting the "scholarly ascendancy of cultural and 
linguistic approaches", and going on to make the specific suggestion that 
religion "can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or 
medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought".
226
 In the rest of this 
paragraph, he makes a series of comments about the results of this view 
which are worth considering in detail. He contrasts it with the other views 
which he is rejecting, showing in the process that it can encompass some 
aspect of each them: 
 
…[religion] is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true and the 
good (though it may involve these), or a symbolism expressive of 
basic attitudes, feelings, or sentiments (though these will be 
generated). Rather, it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the 
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description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the 
experiences of inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments.
227
 
 
Significantly, we can see here that the cultural-linguistic view thinks of 
causation around religious experience as happening in the opposite direction 
to that supposed by the views which Lindbeck calls experiential-
expressivist. Rather than many people having a single kind of experience 
which, due to cultural forces, they describe in different ways, the cultural 
forces which make description possible also make possible the experiences 
themselves, which are therefore naturally as different as the descriptions. 
Lindbeck states this result as follows: 
 
Buddhist compassion, Christian love, and... French Revolutionary 
fraternité are not diverse modifications of a single fundamental 
human awareness, emotion, attitude, or sentiment, but are radically 
(i.e. from the root) distinct ways of experiencing and being oriented 
towards self, neighbor, and cosmos.228 
 
He also points out that "the relation of religion and experience" is "not 
unilateral but dialectical".
229
 That is to say, it is not just the case that 
experiences produce religions, but he takes it to be possible that religions 
can produce experiences and, in the light of the emphasis placed upon 
religious experience by the experiential-expressivist position, it is important 
to emphasise that they can.
230
 The debate over the relation between religious 
belief and religious experience, conducted within the framework of the 
cultural-linguistic view, is impossible to settle because if I thought that I had 
agreed with its conclusion, I would merely have changed the rules of the 
language game in which I was engaged. In any case, the terms of the topic 
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as laid out above – "the relation of religion and experience" – demand a 
separation between 'religion' (a category into which we put certain types of 
behaviour, language, and experience) and 'experience' per se, which there 
are good Wittgensteinian reasons for avoiding. 
 
Lindbeck also emphasises the multiple dimensions within which religions, 
like cultures, function. I said above that he understands a language-game 
and a form of life to be equivalent to a language and a culture, which have 
"both cognitive and behavioral dimensions", and "so it is also in the case of 
a religious tradition".
231
 He elaborates this by saying that a religion's 
"doctrines, cosmic stories or myths, and ethical directives are integrally 
related to the rituals it practices, the sentiments or experiences it evokes, the 
actions it recommends, and the institutional forms it develops".
232
 In 
retaining Wittgenstein's use of the term 'form of life', with reference only to 
the immediate situation within which a remark is made or an exchange takes 
place, but striving to understand a remark or group of remarks as fully as 
possible, we should not lose sight of the broader context – including all the 
aspects which Lindbeck mentions here.
233
 
 
The rest of Lindbeck's argument develops the themes of 'religion as 
language' and 'doctrine as grammar' in more detail. For example, he says 
that doctrines (whether official or operational, explicit or assumed) are to be 
taken as second-order claims within the system rather than as ontological 
claims.
234
 This leads to the observation that doctrines may be mistaken in 
the same range of ways as grammar books: they may be unaware of 
important exceptions to a rule, they may seek to force arbitrary preferences 
or alien structures onto a language, they may miss a deeper but relevant 
rule.
235
 We also have the notion of the fluent speaker who knows best: "The 
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experts must on occasion bow to the superior wisdom of the competent 
speaker who simply knows that such and such is right or wrong even though 
it violates the rules they have formulated".
236
 Developed in relation to 
doctrine, this leads Lindbeck to the idea that doctrinal formulations should 
be tested by "competent practitioners of that religion".
237
 
 
This creates the obvious challenge of identifying such people. Lindbeck 
poses the problem in relation to Christianity as follows: 
 
Who are the competent practitioners? Who have the pious ears? Are 
they Arians or Athanasians, Catholics or Protestants, the masses of 
conventional churchgoers or an elite of saints and theologians? 
Competence in natural language is easy to identify. It is possessed 
by native speakers and a few non-native ones who can communicate 
effectively in a given tongue. The limits of the language are marked 
by the point at which variations in dialect become so great that 
communication is impossible apart from learning the idiom as 
foreign speech. Among Christians, however, there are many groups 
who seem to speak mutually unintelligible dialects. This has been 
true not only of marginal sects such as Mormons, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, or Christian Scientists but also for major groups such as 
Arians and Athanasians, Latins and Greeks, Catholics and 
Protestants. Which claimants to the authentic Christian tongue 
should be heeded?
238
 
 
I think that Lindbeck overstates the simplicity of the natural language case 
here – there are pairs of languages which are called two tongues even 
though they are mutually comprehensible, such as Danish and Swedish, and 
sociolects of English which require special training without leaving the 
language, such as academic ways of speaking and writing. Even with native 
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languages, some speakers are more fluent, have wider vocabularies, or use 
more socially acceptable grammar than others. However, this does not take 
away from, but rather adds to, the difficulty of identifying the 'pious ears' 
who can test our doctrinal formulations for us.  
 
Lindbeck's own answer, for a religion as a whole, is that we should seek 
those who are fully competent, for whom their religion has "become a native 
language, the primary medium in which they think, feel, act, and dream".
239
 
He calls the demand for competence "the empirical equivalent of insisting 
on the Spirit as one of the tests of doctrine", and expects that if we seek 
these people in "the mainstream, rather than in isolated backwaters or 
ingrown sects", we will find that they have an "empirically recognizable" 
competence which tends to agree with others in the same position.
240
 This 
agreement, Lindbeck says, "may not improperly be called infallible", giving 
the example of a "virtually unanimous and enduring agreement among 
flexible and yet deeply pious Muslims throughout the world" which would 
be evidence that anything so agreed was "not in contradiction to the inner 
logic of Islam" – although he admits that "the practical difficulties of 
verifying the existence of such a consensus may be insuperable".
241
 
 
The practical difficulties of consulting them notwithstanding, this answer 
requires that such "flexible and yet deeply pious" people exist, and by the 
end of the book we are clear that Lindbeck is concerned that, within 
Christianity at least, this group may be disappearing – something of a 
problem for him, for obvious reasons; there is a sense that this may motivate 
his writing as well as his ecumenical work, since in doing and publishing 
Christian theology one presumably helps to foster a fluent Christian 
community. He says, for example, that "those who share in the intellectual 
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high culture of our day are rarely intensively socialised into coherent 
religious languages and communal forms of life".
242
  
 
In seeking the 'fluent elite' of Quakerism, someone – a theological Henry 
Higgins – might say that such a group no longer exists, or is dwindling, not 
least because of the distance which Quakerism has travelled from its roots 
(as discussed in chapter 1). From Lindbeck's perspective, it seems likely that 
Quakerism has failed to remain distinctive, instead submitting to "the 
homogenizing tendencies associated with liberal experiential-
expressivism".
243
 However, from a less pessimistic perspective, it is possible 
to see instead the 'competent practitioners' of Quakerism – schooled in the 
"communal forms of life" – picking up or creating a "coherent religious 
language" which reflects their collective understanding of truth (some of 
which may have been produced by the experiential-expressivist framework). 
It is also evident that Lindbeck sets a relatively high bar – one might feel at 
home in a language, speak it well, and know 'how to go on' with the 
language and related practices, without having reached the point of 
dreaming in it. We might also consider the difference between using 
formally correct language all the time, and knowing and recognising it in 
appropriate situations. In terms of actual Quaker competencies, some of the 
evidence presented in chapter 1 is indicative, and the issue will be explored 
further in chapter 4. For the time being, I merely suggest that Quakers may 
be an example of a dialect becoming a language – few Quakers now speak 
fluent Christian, but there is a 'Quaker language' in which one can be fluent. 
 
Before moving on to consider Lindbeck's three views of doctrine, however, 
I need to say something about the place of 'doctrine', and the roles of 'first 
order' and 'second order' kinds of speech within this debate. Lindbeck 
regards doctrine as the second order speech of churches – the things they 
say about the things they say – and it is this which interests him. He does 
not turn his attention to the first order speech of churches – the things they 
say ordinarily or as part of their life. I take the first order part of language to 
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be the mainstay of liturgy, as well as reports of religious experience, and the 
second order part to include most theological work, which I think follows 
Lindbeck's use. If applied directly to Quakerism, the content of both these 
categories looks rather slim: the first-order category looks set to contain 
mostly silence (which is important, but not under analysis in this thesis), and 
the second-order category a few notes about 'what we do in Meeting for 
Worship' and 'how Quakers talk'.  
 
The body of material I have identified contains written thoughts of Quakers 
about their belief and worship – neither liturgy and unreflective reports, nor 
philosophically minded considerations of previous Quaker writings. This 
thoughtful material is first-order in the sense that it seems like ordinary 
speech taking place within the 'language' of Quakerism and without 
attempting to be either descriptive of all Quakers or prescriptive of doctrine; 
but it seems to be second-order in that it is reflective and looks back on 
worship from outside. Because I am working with examples which do not 
support the first-order/second-order distinction, I collapse it somewhat, 
taking some of Lindbeck's ideas about doctrine to be applicable to a wider 
category of religious speech, although at times we will need to briefly 
resurrect it in order to consider, for example, realist understandings of first-
order Christian speech.
244
 
 
Exploring the other positions 1: cognitive-propositionalist 
 
Lindbeck does not develop the cognitivist or propositional model
245
 in great 
detail, but we do find in his text some pointers towards its strongholds. For 
example, he says that the cognitive-propositionalist model: 
 
                                                 
244
 I note that, for other reasons, Phillips also finds Lindbeck's first-order/second-order 
distinction to be confused. D. Z. Phillips, Faith After Foundationalism: Critiques and 
Alternatives  (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). 216. 
245
 I have chosen to call the three ways of talking about or looking at religion 'positions', 
'views' or 'models'; Lindbeck calls them 'theories' or 'models' and Phillips calls two of them 
'confusions' and rejects the idea that the third should be a theory. 
100 
 
… was the approach of traditional orthodoxies (as well as many 
heterodoxies), but it also has certain affinities to the outlook on 
religion adopted by much modern Anglo-American philosophy with 
its preoccupation with the cognitive or informational meaningfulness 
of religious utterances.246 
 
To some extent, the critiques of this position are embedded in the way in 
which Lindbeck describes it here, but these are worth unpacking at greater 
length: partly because to many people it seems like the obvious or common 
sense way of understanding doctrinal statements, and also because some 
related critiques underlie critiques which have been made of Wittgenstein 
directly. Furthermore, it is mistaken, but not always for the reasons that 
Lindbeck provides. 
 
To open up the discussion of Lindbeck's arguments, I turn to D.Z. Phillips, a 
Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion who has worked on many related 
topics. In Faith After Foundationalism, he says that Lindbeck "rightly wants 
to oppose that strong tradition in which propositions about the existence of 
God are treated as the presuppositions of religion".
247
 Phillips characterises 
the results of such a position thus: "Two theologians advancing conflicting 
doctrines are understood to be like two men trying to describe an object in 
less than ideal conditions"; this is a position which always seems to rule out 
reconciliation without capitulation.
248
 However, Phillips points out that in 
Lindbeck's book there is no "actual philosophical elucidation of the ways in 
which we are tempted by these confused views of theology" and directs us 
towards an essay by Rush Rhees in which some of that exploration can be 
found.
249
 
 
Rhees explores the ways in which we talk about God, and how we learn the 
word, looking for those places where our speech misleads us. In this extract 
from a letter, he writes: 
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If one lays emphasis, as you do, on the fact that 'God' is a 
substantive, and especially if one goes on, as I think you might, to 
say that it is a proper name, then the natural thing will be to assume 
that meaning the same by 'God' is something like meaning the same 
by 'the sun' or meaning the same by 'Churchill'. … But nothing of 
that sort will do here. … Supposing someone said, 'The word 'God' 
stands for a different object now'. What could that mean?
250
 
 
He concludes that none of the usual things can be said in this case – we can 
talk about statements like "'the Queen' stands for a different person now", 
and we know which questions can usefully be asked if we doubt such a 
statement. But "nothing of that sort could be said in connexion with any 
question about the meaning of 'God'… and [this] is one reason why I do not 
think it is helpful just to say that the word is a substantive".
251
 Although 
Rhees may have gone too far – if one is deriving 'the meaning of 'God' for 
this group' from that particular group's language and behaviour in relation to 
God, and that group changes their language and behaviour dramatically, one 
might want to say something like 'the meaning of 'God' for this group seems 
to have changed'. This is not the same as the method one uses for concrete 
objects – Rhees' objection – but perhaps it is acceptable in our ordinary way 
of speaking. 
 
However, it is still difficult to know what questions to ask in order to 
ascertain this, especially if the group themselves assert that they are still 
speaking of the same God although in new ways. For example, if a feminist 
Christian creates new ways to speak of God, but claims to still be speaking 
of the Christian God, what questions does one ask to see whether this claim 
holds? 'Does the group accept the new way of speaking?' will not do, since 
it is almost certainly the case that some members of the group like it, some 
hate it, and some are indifferent to it, and 'Does the group still speak and act 
in the same way in relation to God?' is self-defeating, since the point is that 
new language has been produced. Ultimately, one will end up either 
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drawing an arbitrary line on a spectrum of change, or referring to other 
markers about the boundaries of communities, such as presence or absence 
of a continuous tradition or the coherence between one utterance and 
another – continuity and coherence being related in that a continuous 
tradition of speech is likely to produce a series of largely similar and hence 
coherent remarks. These are not the things one has to do when asking 
questions like 'is the present Queen the same person as the Queen of 
1899?'
252
 As when Wittgenstein contrasted Michelangelo's painting of God 
with a picture of a tropical plant (discussed in chapter 2), we can see here 
that our checking procedures around ordinary concrete nouns are quite 
different from our checking procedures around the word 'God'.  
 
Phillips points out that at times Lindbeck "seems to be endorsing the kind of 
analysis Rhees has provided", but that at other times "he seems to be still in 
the grip of the very confusion he is hoping to eradicate".
253
 Phillips explains 
that this is because, in trying to avoid the confusion, Lindbeck goes too far, 
"attacking the notion that theological statements have to do with an 
objective reality or with truth claims", when actually there is no need to 
abandon this idea, but only to avoid "construing talk of 'objective reality' 
and 'truth' in religion in a certain way, namely, in the way in which we 
construe them where talk of physical objects is concerned".
254
 
 
The cognitivist theory is a mistaken account of religious belief – rather than, 
as Lindbeck sometimes describes it, "an optional way of talking about 
religion which one might choose to adopt", or which it might be possible to 
embrace if one is sufficiently deeply embedded in the life of a religious 
community.
255
 If Rhees and Phillips are right, the cognitivist view which 
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treats 'God' as a word for an object like other concrete objects is mistaken no 
matter where you stand in relation to a religious community.  
 
Phillips and Rhees argue that this is wrong because it is founded on an error 
about the kind of thing which is happening when religious believers make 
claims about God. In other words, they take concrete objects as the 
paradigm and try to put 'God' into this model, but it will not work.
256
 
Lindbeck may not wholeheartedly endorse this, and Hensley claims that 
Lindbeck accepts or at least leaves space for a quite different view, namely 
that believers' ordinary or first-order claims can be understood in a realist 
way,
257
 but from a Wittgensteinian perspective Rhees and Phillips are right, 
and that whether or not you are a believer it is possible to see that the rules 
of religious claim-making are different from the rules of making claims 
about empirically observable objects. These are different language-games 
and it is reasonable to expect their rules to be different. 
 
It might also be said at this point that the analysis provided by Rhees opens 
up the possibility of a more nuanced version of the cognitive or 
propositional kind of position, which does not accept Lindbeck's claims 
about it, and could support, for example, the independent reality of God, 
without claiming that this independent reality is "like the independence of 
physical objects".
258
 Within a religious language-game, a word can be used 
differently to its ordinary use– a feature we regularly observe in other 
settings, and which we handle without difficulty using contextual cues (not 
imagining, for example, that a bishop in a chess set is the Bishop of a 
specific diocese). To spell out quite what the 'independence' of God might 
mean under the rules of a particular tradition is the task of the theologian 
working within that single tradition, and need not concern us here so long as 
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the basic claim, that it is theoretically possible to do so, is granted. In this 
way, religious remarks can still have the possibility of propositional content, 
without our making the mistake of trying to test their content in the same 
way in which we test the objective content of claims about physical objects. 
 
However, this move is not unlike one which Lindbeck himself makes and 
which Phillips criticises firmly. Lindbeck, having replaced talk of 
'ontological truth' with his term 'intrasystemic truth', and failed in that 
process to fully explore what Phillips calls "the grammar of the 
'independently real' in a religious context", then tries to create another 
logical space for ontological concepts, but as Phillips says: 
 
No use of capitals in talking of the 'Most Important' and the 
'Ultimately Real' can hide the fact that he is trying to place these 
concepts, whatever they are, in a logical space which transcends the 
language-games and forms of life in which concepts have their life. 
The notion of such a logical space is an illusion.
259
  
 
Whatever we say, it is said within a language-game – even 'writing a 
theological book' cannot escape that – and the words we use have meaning 
because of the ways that we and others have used them in this and other 
contexts, throughout the many language-games in which we have learned 
and spoken the language. Even as we move smoothly from one context to 
another, from chess to the Church, each setting is a complete (although not 
self-sufficient) form of life in which our language-games are entirely 
entangled, and as linguistic beings we cannot move 'outside' those contexts. 
No transcendent logical space is available to us to make this move. 
 
As a result of these considerations, I maintain that the cognitive-
propositionalist view involves a misunderstanding about the relation 
between language and reality. Language – and not just religious language – 
must be considered in relation to its functions within the community which 
uses it, because these uses are entirely intertwined with it. 
 
                                                 
259
 Ibid., 206. The capitalised terms Phillips is citing are from Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine: 65. 
105 
 
2: Experiential-expressivist 
 
Having considered the cognitive-propositionalist approach, I now move on 
to the second position which Lindbeck opposes, the one which he labels 
'experiential-expressivist'. The core of this position is that it takes doctrines 
to be "noninformational and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientations", and generally also assumes that this 
inner experience is similar for everyone but expressed in different terms, or 
at least that it might be similar without any particular similarity appearing in 
the outward expressions of it.260 In this way, it stresses similarities, and not 
differences, between religions.261 Lindbeck says that scholars such as Tillich 
who take this approach accept: 
 
the general principle… that insofar as doctrines function as 
nondiscursive symbols, they are polyvalent in import and therefore 
subject to changes of meaning or even to a total loss of 
meaningfulness, to what Tillich calls their death.262  
 
Phillips identifies two strands of objections to this model. Firstly, Lindbeck 
sometimes seems to prefer other theories "because of their greater economy, 
or because they correspond more closely to the facts".263 However, at other 
times Lindbeck regards it as incoherent, a critique with which Phillips is 
inclined to agree. In this section, I will discuss Lindbeck's other objections 
to the experiential-expressivist view, then the charge that it is incoherent, 
leaving the claims that another model is better to the section on the view 
which Lindbeck prefers, the cultural-linguistic view. The experiential-
expressivist perspective which Lindbeck describes is in many ways close to 
the Quaker universalist perspective described in chapter 5. It embeds some 
of the same attitudes towards language and reaches similarly pluralist 
conclusions (which I will be revisiting in chapter 5).  
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Lindbeck provides some other arguments for the weakness of the 
experiential-expressivist model, which I consider here in order to show why 
they are not convincing (before moving on to one which is convincing). For 
example, Lindbeck argues that the experiential-expressivist is wrong to call 
religions similar when they describe similar experiences. He returns to his 
analogy between religions and languages, saying that languages are not 
called similar because they "use overlapping sets of sounds or have common 
objects of reference".
264
 This might be the case for linguists who are 
concerned with the "grammatical patterns, the ways of referring, the 
semantic and syntactic structures"
265
 which he suggests as an alternative, but 
in ordinary terms I think we wish to say that 'using overlapping sets of 
sounds' is a point of similarity between languages. The issue is rather that it 
is not a very interesting one.
266
 However, the fact that human languages 
typically have (at least some) common objects of reference is an important 
similarity between them which makes translation possible. A lack of any 
common objects of reference – with an alien language, perhaps – might 
even make it impossible to conceptualise that as a language.  
 
Furthermore, it is not inherently implausible that there could be common 
human experiences which come to be expressed in very different ways, 
especially when those experiences are more numinous and less urgent than, 
say, feeling pain: for example, the collection of experiences which might be 
called 'being in the presence of God'. Certainly, this style of thinking and 
talking about religion as a common human experience which underlies a 
multitude of religious expressions – a position which we might call 
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universalist
267
 – is common and accepted among the Religious Society of 
Friends. Lindbeck accuses Lonergan of assuming without evidence that 
religious experience is the same underneath different expressions,
268
 and 
then presents as an alternative hypothesis, although without going into the 
evidence in detail, that religious experience is different when language for 
discussing it differs.
269
 His argument seems to be circular: he says that 
experiential-expressivist approaches are mistaken because religions are like 
languages, but then advances 'religious are like languages' as a better 
alternative to the experiential-expressivist position. However, these matters 
pale into insignificance when compared with the claim that the experiential-
expressivist position is entirely incoherent. 
 
Although Lindbeck does identify this problem, Phillips puts it best, and 
most starkly, when he says: 
 
No intelligible account can be given of the notion of an experience 
which is not only supposed to be contingently related to the language 
in which it is expressed, but which is supposed to remain consistent 
in character while the linguistic expressions of it vary enormously. 
No content can be given to this notion of experience because it is 
confused in its conception.
270
 
 
Stated in this way, it becomes clear that two claims, both equally important 
to the experiential-expressivist position, cannot be consistently held 
together: the experience and the language used to describe it are 
simultaneously supposed to be very closely related, in that the language 
expresses the experience accurately, and yet detached enough that the 
language can be wholly substituted, in that other, very different, language 
expresses the same experience just as well. The problem here is about the 
identity conditions for the experience: under what conditions are we 
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justified in saying that the two experiences are the same? The only access 
which we have to the experience of another person is through the language 
they use to describe it, which is supposed to be very closely related to it. 
This, incidentally, is what makes religious experiences, dreams, pain, and so 
forth, different in nature from an object which we can both see and touch, 
for example. When the experiential-expressivist argues that the experiences 
are the same despite the very different language used to describe them, and 
at the same time holds that the language used to describe them does give us 
good access to them, it is no longer clear on what basis this claim of identity 
is made.  
 
Any defence of the experiential-expressivist position would either have to 
let go of the requirement that religious language adequately expresses 
religious experience (thus putting religious language back into the realm of 
something entirely created by communities), or the claim that religious 
experience is all of a single or similar character. It would be logically 
possible, perhaps for a universalist religious believer, to relinquish the first 
of these in order to keep the second – to say that religious experience is 
probably all similar, but that language does not adequately express it at all. 
Some Quakers are indeed doing this, although others seem to want to retain 
both parts. Lindbeck prefers to reject the second, arguing that it follows 
from the diversity of language that there is a diversity of experience.
271
 This 
would be in keeping with the Wittgensteinian concept of irreplaceability 
which I discussed in chapter 2. Further along these lines, we can reject the 
terms of the first, the assumption that religious experience sits at a distance 
from the words and practices of the one who experiences it, in favour 
perhaps of an understanding in which experience is shaped by the language 
and concepts which are available to the experiencer, and from those 
premises necessarily reject the second as well. 
 
A full evaluation of the experiential-expressivist position would require 
attention to why one might want to adopt it in the first place. This is not 
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covered by Lindbeck (who is setting up the position as a largely fictional 
one, ascribed to 'liberals', which he can oppose) or by Phillips (whose 
concern is with Lindbeck and Wittgenstein) or by other postliberal 
theologians (who accept that Lindbeck has argued against it sufficiently). 
There are some theologians who have argued for somewhat related 
positions, however. Some fall broadly under the pluralist perspective, and I 
will discuss John Hick and others in detail in chapter 5; but one or two have 
embraced expressivism particularly, without a focus on pluralism or adding 
the experiential aspect, and I will deal with them briefly here.
272
 In an essay 
titled 'The Simple Believer' R.M. Hare considers his own views on religion 
and also those of another 'expressivist', R.B. Braithwaite, and I will take this 
opportunity to consider them together since they take very similar 
positions.
273
 In particular, these are positions which focus on the use of 
religious language to express moral convictions and not, unlike the position 
which Lindbeck describes and opposes, the use of religious language to 
describe religious experience.  
 
Hare identifies his position as set in a context where discussions of religion 
are taking place between three main parties, whom he describes as follows: 
 
The first party consists of the orthodox Christians; the second of the 
downright no-nonsense atheists. The third party is made up of those 
courageous people who, like Professors Braithwaite and [Paul] van 
Buren, want to be Christians and yet to hold a faith which is 
defensible against the attacks of the philosophically well-armed 
atheist.
274
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Hare is himself a member of the third party. He notes that people in his 
position are often told – from both the first and the second positions – that 
they are no longer genuinely Christian. Hare concedes this, saying that the 
labelling of a set of beliefs is less significant than their content.
275
 What 
content, then, does this position have? It does not involve the supernatural, 
but can accept an idea of transcendence – although Hare notes that this is, 
"as Wittgenstein might have said, idling – doing no work".276 The position 
may have specific moral content (based, presumably, on the teachings of 
Jesus, although Hare does not go into this in detail), but also has a meta-
moral claim, namely that "it is possible to find moral 'policies' … which are 
not pointless".
277
 
 
Mostly, however, it has a subjective focus – like the experiential-
expressivist position which Lindbeck describes, this form of expressivism 
regards religious language as expressing at attitude or state of mind in the 
believer rather than a state of affairs in the world outside the mind. For 
Hare, as for Braithwaite, the core content of a religion is actually focussed 
on morality and in particular that there are "non-futile moral policies" – that 
the possibility of realising one's moral ideals does exist.
278
  
 
However, the key point to note here is that Hare's position – whether or not 
it is useful, justifiable, or tenable – bears almost no resemblance to the 
position which Lindbeck describes under the name of 'experiential-
expressivist'. It may be a form of expressivist position, but it completely 
lacks the focus on experience which is vital to the position Lindbeck is 
interested in critiquing. Since the 'experiential-expressivist' position 
described by Lindbeck corresponds much more closely to the Quaker 
assumptions I described in chapter 1 than does the 'expressivist' position 
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described by Hare, I will set Hare's position aside and focus on Lindbeck's 
version in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
The core of the experiential-expressivist approach as outlined by Lindbeck 
is the combination of attention to religious experience and willingness to see 
the 'same' experience expressed in multiple different ways. Religious 
language might also, as Hare argues, express moral opinions, or, as in the 
cognitive-propositionalist view, make truth claims about the world, but the 
experiential-expressivist position focuses on religious experience. Lindbeck, 
however, finds this inadequate and instead proposes his own preferred 
understanding of doctrine, the cultural-linguistic model. 
 
3: Lindbeck's proposal, the cultural-linguistic 
 
The cultural-linguistic theory of doctrine is the 'theory' which results from 
Lindbeck's interpretation (undertaken at one remove or more) of 
Wittgenstein's later thought.
 279
 It takes the form of a proposal about how we 
should think of religion, namely, that a religion is like a language. Although 
some theologians have taken this up as a useful way of talking about 
religion,
280
 and I will do so later in this thesis, Phillips argues that it is 
confused. He says that although Lindbeck speaks "as though he had 
introduced us to a conception of truth… which has an application 
independently of religion and independent of any form of life we could 
specify" this is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of a form of life, 
because "it is only within such contexts that the question of what it means to 
ask whether a statement is true or false can arise".
281
 Faced with the 
"ragged" picture of many "different religious traditions and emphases 
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present to us within Christianity, not to mention different religions", 
Lindbeck is – Phillips says – right to note that many disagreements are 
grammatical but wrong to conclude that there is still a common Christian 
framework which can address these questions.
282
 
 
Lindbeck is actually close to admitting this point when he writes about the 
ways in which many Christians today do not speak Christian fluently; but 
nevertheless he goes on to assume that a 'fluent elite' can be identified 
whose "agreement in doctrinal matters may not improperly be called 
infallible".
283
 Another argument against this point from Phillips would be to 
suggest that he has too liberal a view of the process of change in natural 
languages – there are cases in which, even if the majority accepts a new 
usage, it would have been more useful, in the sense that we preserve the 
ability to make a particular kind of distinction, to retain an older or more 
technical usage. It might be useful to save the term 'literally' for things 
which are in fact the case, for example, rather than applying it to metaphors 
which the speaker wishes to emphasise.  
 
The main problem which Phillips identifies in Lindbeck’s text is a tendency 
to slip from the idea that within a religious group, the competent speakers 
determine what is acceptable doctrine in the sense that it accords with 
previous rules and practices (even where these rules are implicit), and the 
idea that competent speakers within a religion can determine which 
doctrines are correct and therefore what is true. The issue about truth is part 
of Lindbeck’s ongoing conceptual confusion, which I discussed in part 1 of 
this chapter. This 'confusion' which Phillips finds is what allows Jeffrey 
Hensley to slide in between parts of Lindbeck's text and produce a realist 
reading of the cultural-linguistic model.
284
 Most people, both realists (who 
accept the reality of God independent of the human mind) and anti-realists 
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(who do not), read Lindbeck as an anti-realist – and Hensley cites a number 
of them.
285
 He then proceeds to claim loose language in one place and 
careful phrasing in another, to give a reading of Lindbeck which allows 
Christians to make truth claims in first-order statements, only some religious 
remarks having been relegated to second-order or grammatical claims. I 
think that, even taking into account Hensley's use of Putnam's work to 
demonstrate that this is a possible position, this is to miss the point about 
religion as an idiom – all religious remarks, even those which are 
"catechetical or doxological",
286
 and regardless of the intentions of the 
speaker – are to be understood as having grammatical content. As Hensley 
says, Lindbeck's  
 
…analysis gets complicated by the frequent simultaneous use of the 
same sentence as both a first-order truth claim and a second-order 
rule for forming appropriate Christian discourse.
287
 
 
Hensley fights hard to maintain this distinction despite Lindbeck's 
ambiguities (because his claim of Lindbeck's metaphysical neutrality 
depends on it), and he is right to do so because Lindbeck requires the first-
order/second-order distinction in order to answer Phillips' critique. The 
metaphysical claims, whatever they are, would be made in the first-order 
speech – as I said above, Quakers make very few of these, other churches 
more – and the doctrinal claims are second-order and hence, in 
Wittgenstein's sense, grammatical. The slide which Phillips detects between 
one and the other may be a confusion caused by the fact that some remarks, 
depending on their context, may be first-order, second-order, and even both 
at once. For example, 'Christ is Lord' is both a first-order claim about a state 
of affairs and a second-order claim about doctrine; any claim which 
contradicted this would be hard to reconcile into a Christian world-view and 
therefore likely to be deemed ungrammatical for use in Christian contexts.  
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In a review of Phillips' book, Kathryn Tanner defends Lindbeck from the 
claim that he is an uncomplicated anti-realist, writing that, arguing that 
although Phillips characterises Lindbeck as " simply den[ying] that religious 
believers make truth claims", Lindbeck actually "says that doctrines should 
not be understood as truth claims but as rules for speech when they are 
performing a doctrinal function".
288
 She concludes:  
 
When a text becomes this nonsensical and self-contradictory, 
shouldn't the interpreter start again?
289
 
 
Overall, Tanner thinks that Lindbeck does leave room for realism – 
although I note that leaving room for is not at all the same as endorsing.  
Phillips regards this space left for realism as a flaw, and particularly as a 
diversion from the best, Wittgensteinian, line of thought, but Tanner sees no 
reason to agree that it is a problem. While it is true that Phillips might have 
done well to start again with Lindbeck's text, it also seems to be the case 
that Lindbeck's text is inexplicit and confusing on some of these points. As 
Hensley demonstrates, many readers assume that Lindbeck will follow 
Wittgenstein (or rather, the path they assume that Wittgenstein took) into 
anti-realism, and do not look for realism in his work.  
 
Bruce Marshall, in exploring the metaphor of 'scripture absorbing the 
world', addresses the issue of whether this is a flight from the question of 
truth.
290
 He calls Lindbeck's characterisation of truth "modestly realist" 
(broadly in agreement with Tanner), and identifies two criteria for truth: 
categorical adequacy and intra-systemic coherence.
291
 Marshall also 
considers objections to Lindbeck's scheme, all variations on the charge of 
fideism. He puts this charge in general terms as the suspicion that "the 
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project of absorbing the world into the biblical text… cannot possibly take 
external truth claims (especially apparently conflicting ones) with sufficient 
seriousness".
292
 Those who worry that Lindbeck is insufficiently 
Wittgensteinian should find this reassuring, as fideism is a very 
Wittgensteinian thing of which to be accused.
293
 Furthermore, because of 
this more general problem of fideism, projects other than Lindbeck's can 
stand accused of these three kinds of fideism. 
  
The first form of fideism which Marshall considers is isolationism. This is 
the accusation that: 
 
The project of "absorbing the world" by interpreting and assessing 
alien truth claims in terms of internally Christian criteria, and 
maintaining that the project is justified when it succeeds by its own 
standards, seems to be wilful theological isolationism of the worst 
kind. It seems to imply a decision to rest content with the internal 
discourse of the Christian community and a correlative refusal to 
engage, much less take seriously, external and potentially 
threatening truth claims.
294
 
 
Marshall argues that this objection misses the point of the 'absorb the world' 
metaphor, because any such absorption must involve "open-ended 
engagement with whatever truth claims are being made in the times and 
places in which the Christian community exists".
295
 This is not a project 
which "shuns the external and alien" but rather the opposite, one which 
"embodies an imperative… to internalize everything".296 
 
The next objection takes up the hint given in the defence against the last 
one, and argues that the problem is not isolationism but imperialism, or in 
Marshall's words that the problem is: 
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… not that [the postliberal account] ignores non-Christian truth 
claims, but rather that it consistently gives primacy to Christian 
standards in assessing those claims. Coherence with the scripturally 
and doctrinally normed web of Christian belief might be a partial test 
Christians would rightly want to employ in assessing truth claims, 
but, so the argument might go, primacy or at least parity must be 
granted to some external standards of truth; it is fideistic to 
subordinate all other standards of truth to Christian ones.
297
 
 
However, it is not clear what to do about this, in the sense that it is not clear 
which, if any, other sets of criteria should be given primacy. In particular, to 
take "criteria which are themselves internal to some other comprehensive 
cultural-linguistic system or world-view, religious or otherwise" as primary 
would be to beg the question, since this would surely stand in the same 
danger of imperialism by, or fideism to, a different system.
298
 Striving for 
generality of criteria – either something external or internal to all – seems 
likely to fall into the trap of not treating each individual system "with real 
seriousness".
299
 The only real alternative for this view is to take a 
foundationalist perspective, arguing that all reasonable beliefs are based 
upon some which are primitive or foundational – those which are justified 
by "the world itself".
300
 This foundationalist perspective is the view taken by 
much of traditional Western philosophy, but (as can be seen from the title of 
Phillips' book, Faith After Foundationalism) it has, for various reasons, 
fallen out of favour among some philosophers and many theologians. 
Marshall suggests, for example, that one of the issues has been a growing 
realisation that we cannot really access 'objective' facts about the world in 
the way that the foundationalist assumes that we can, because we cannot get 
outside our own bodies, experience, and language to make those 
judgements.
301
 If this is so (and it has been widely accepted in theology that 
it is), then it is "difficult to characterize plausibly" the criteria by which 
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Christian beliefs should be judged without either side acting 
imperialistically.
302
 
 
There is one final form which fideism could take, however. Marshall 
suggests that the "charge of imperialism could… be made in a different 
way", in which the problem would be seen to lie not in the refusal of the 
theological project to "be bound by shared criteria" but in the denial that 
there are any shared criteria.  
 
If we insist on repairing to established internal criteria in 
conversation with those who make alien truth claims… we will 
inevitable fail to take those claims with sufficient seriousness. 
Pressed by alien claims which seem not to fit with our established 
web of Christian belief, we will be inclined simply to reject those 
claims and so bring the conversation to a premature close.
303
 
 
This could be characterised as a form of imperialism which becomes 
isolationism on the eve of battle. We cannot hold to the strong sense of this 
position, which would demand that we be prepared to doubt all our beliefs 
at the outset of every conversation, but it can be put in a weaker way which 
is more plausible.
 304
 This requires that Christians: 
 
…be prepared for the possibility that encounters with alien belief 
systems may give them good reasons to give up or revise at least 
some of their beliefs, even if there is no external standard for 
deciding when this should happen or which beliefs should be 
changed.
305
  
 
This openness to change, Marshall argues, can be taken alongside ascribing 
"justificatory primacy to the plain sense of Scripture" to "dispel this last 
whiff of fideism" from the Christian project of absorbing the world into the 
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text.
306
 This defence of Lindbeck's position, and in particular Marshall's 
final move which emphasises the ongoing flexibility of Christian doctrine 
gives a fuller picture of the way that doctrines work as grammatical 
statements. It is a move which is very much in keeping with the cultural-
linguistic model, in which grammatical changes are inevitable if 
unpredictable. In considering pluralism and multiple religious belonging in 
chapters 5 and 6 I will take into account the way that particular contextual 
pressures, sometimes external to a religious tradition, can support or 
encourage change; although I do not conduct a full historical analysis, 
certain trends and directions of change will be visible. 
 
In a smaller but interesting point, Phillips asks whether the metaphor of 
religion as language could have been applied at the beginning of 
Christianity, when the Christians were only "a sect".
307
 He concludes – 
almost before he has stated the problem – that Christians would have been 
ruled to be out of line with the accepted doctrine and therefore mistaken. 
However, I think that this is a premature conclusion; Lindbeck can argue 
that the fluent group needs to be within a single religious tradition. The new 
religion, Christianity, may be small but it has an internal group of competent 
speakers – just as the larger Jewish and Pagan groups around them have 
their competent speakers. This solution brings new problems, of course, 
such as how we draw those boundaries (Phillips is correct if the new 
‘religion' is judged to be within the older religion), but those can be solved 
in turn. In any case, the line between a dialect and a different language is 
rarely sharp, so groups within groups do not automatically scupper the 
analogy between religion and language. 
 
A bigger problem with this proposal is that it does, as indicated, rely on our 
ability to identify a group who are all speaking, or trying to speak, the same 
religion. In the modern Western situation, where many religions may be on 
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offer to an individual and an increasing number of people have been 
members of more than one religious group (either serially or concurrently; I 
will return to the issue of multiple religious belonging in much greater depth 
in chapter 6), it will not be easy to establish this separation. It cannot, for 
one thing, be established by considering the language used, at least at a 
surface level, since the technical terms in a religious vocabulary may be 
drawn from ordinary language, or at least have a wide circulation in the 
language within which the religious idea is being expressed: not only the 
words used in metaphorical phrases (‘bread of life’) but also specific words 
(‘angel’, ‘altar’, and even ‘God’) are widely used in secular contexts. 
 
However, in practice we find that groups do persist, both identifying 
themselves and being identified by outsiders, and the voluntary sharing of 
space and labels tells us much about them. Kathryn Tanner has also 
addressed this problem; we encountered her review of Phillips above, but I 
now turn to her wider project, which focuses on the cultural part of the 
cultural-linguistic model. She explores the idea of religions as analogous to 
cultures thoroughly in her book Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for 
Theology. There, she describes some of the problematic assumptions found 
in Lindbeck's work, for example that "Christians have their own language, 
their own ways of doing, understanding, and feeling; people who are not 
Christian have some other," and that: 
 
… one does not work from what one  already knows in the process 
of becoming a Christian  – say, by translating  a new Christian 
language into the language one already uses, 
 
and goes on to say that such a: 
 
… description … of the postliberal account of Christian identity is 
nonetheless a caricature in that followers of George Lindbeck gladly 
admit that a Christian way of life is influenced by outside cultures,  
mixed up with and modified by them.
308
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She argues, though, that this caricature "remains a good likeness… because 
postliberals interpret the mixed character of Christian discourse and the 
composite nature of a Christian outlook in ways that again strongly suggest 
the self-contained and self-originating character of Christian identity".
309
 
Given the facts mentioned above, for example, about the sharing of 
vocabulary between Christian and secular speech, Tanner says that 
postliberals would argue that "vocabulary or conceptuality of doctrines may 
be so influenced [by outside forces] but not the basic rules by which they 
abide".
310
 
 
Rather than succumbing to the effects of outside forces, the basic rules of 
doctrines are governed, in the cultural-linguistic model, by the 'fluent elite' 
or community of competent speakers whom Lindbeck argues have the skills 
and should be given the authority to determine whether a new term or idea 
is grammatically acceptable, i.e. whether it continues to fulfil the 'basic 
rules' which make the religion what it is. If applied to Quakerism, then, this 
would mean that vocabulary – words and phrases – and also perhaps 
concepts could come in from other religious or secular traditions, but once 
in use within a Quaker language-game, they would need to be used in ways 
which continue to respect the underlying rules of that game. In chapter 4, I 
will be concerned with both the sources of particular uses of words and with 
the ways in which they are made to follow the implicit rules of Quaker 
speech. 
 
 
Importance of the three models 
 
The availability of these three models or modes of thinking, the cognitive-
propositionalist, the experiential-expressivist and the cultural-linguistic, is 
important because if the cultural-linguistic view is correct and our socially 
prevailing ways of discussing religious experience shape those very 
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experiences, then people for whom the experiential-expressivist description 
of religion is culturally dominant will tend to have experiences which fit 
that model and appear to support the universalist theory. On this reading of 
the cultural-linguistic model, it absorbs both of the others into itself, making 
room for them as cultural-linguistic constructs of particular contexts. This 
can sometimes be seen in action, as people bring their understandings of the 
world to the situations in which they find themselves. I have in mind an 
occasion when a group of Quakers, of whom I was one, went to visit a 
mosque.311 Arriving at one of the times of Islamic prayer, we were invited to 
sit in silence at the west side of the room while our Muslim hosts prayed. 
Perhaps triggered to a worshipful mode of thought by the invitation to 
silence as well as by the worshippers we were watching, several Friends 
reported afterwards that they had felt a strong sense of 'gathering' in the 
room and expressed an understanding that both groups had been, in some 
way, doing the same thing. This kind of experience is not uncommon among 
Friends (and, as John Woolman's much-quoted experience, discussed in 
chapter 1, suggests, has a long history), but the cultural-linguistic view 
challenges us to ask: is it created by a universalist theology which assumes 
that this is what is happening whether it can be sensed or not? 
 
As we consider this question, it is worth noting that any answer will have a 
political dimension. Kwok Pui-Lan brings this out in her brief discussion of 
Lindbeck, when she says that "some of his rhetoric comes close to a defence 
of American foreign policy".312 In particular, the way in which Lindbeck's 
cultural-linguistic view of religion stresses the differences and not the 
similarities between groups "reinforces the myth of 'clash of civilisations' 
and fosters a narrowly constructed and tightly bound view of religious 
identity".313 With this political slant in mind, we can see why the 
experiential-expressivist view has been associated with liberal thought more 
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generally.314 Of course, isolationism is also a possible outcome of the 
propositionalist view, in which doctrines are taken as statements about 
metaphysical reality, so that "if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and 
if it is once false, it is always false" – indeed, it is a charge which Lindbeck 
himself levels at this view, and claims that his cultural-linguistic perspective 
can overcome this. 315 
 
In contrast to the experiential-expressivist view which encompasses the 
possibility of similarity disguised by different language, Lindbeck's solution 
to the problem focuses on the way in which rules can be at odds with one 
another but correctly applied in different circumstances. His example to 
illustrate this is the pair of rules of the road, 'Drive on the right' and 'Drive 
on the left'. These rules are completely contrary, and yet also both correct 
(one in the US and one in the UK, among other places). Lindbeck says that 
along these lines, "oppositions between rules can in some cases be resolved, 
not by altering one or both of them, but by specifying when or where they 
apply".316 I am not sure that this entirely answers the accusation, since 
religions are not countries (in fact, they seem to be making claims over the 
same 'spaces' in the lives of potential believers), and doctrines are not 
straightforwardly or only rules for behaviour. When do 'Christian rules' 
apply? Only in church? Only in the lives of Christians? Only to Christian 
beliefs or claims?  
 
Lindbeck would further answer the charge of isolationism and increasing 
tension between religions by referring to his original aims in advocating the 
cultural-linguistic position, one of which is to make ecumenism (and 
perhaps also, by implication, interfaith work) easier, by providing a view of 
doctrine in which neither head-to-head clashes nor the too-easy assumption 
of sameness are allowed to derail the discussion. Within the religion as 
language metaphor, different religions, like different languages, simply have 
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different grammars and patterns of expression; each one forms a context 
within which things can be right or wrong, but they cannot usefully be 
judged by the standards of another context. We cannot judge Islamic 
remarks by Christian standards any more than we can judge the grammar of 
an English sentence using Latin rules – despite the best efforts of certain 
grammarians.   
 
In summary, I have argued in this chapter that Lindbeck's theory of doctrine 
offers some useful insights for understanding the Quaker community. 
Although his first-order/second-order distinction between categories of 
speech does not stand up to use within the Quaker context, the religion as 
language metaphor has potential to be useful and so does the concept of the 
'fluent elite'. In the next chapter, I will apply these ideas, and those derived 
from Wittgenstein in the previous chapter, to three real examples of Quaker 
speech to show how they are helpful in advancing our understanding of the 
Quaker comments and also to consider whether they should be refined 
further in the light of such use. 
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Chapter 4: Worked Examples 1, or, Using the Tools 
 
Let's get together and talk about our gods sometime/ you show me 
yours, I'll show you mine/ hey we're both consenting adults so any 
god is fine/ Christian, Buddhist, Hindu or Jew,/ Muslim or New Age 
soft shoe/ My God, my God, my God,/ Talking 'bout myself.
317
 
 
Taking the tools established in chapters 2 and 3 – our Wittgensteinian 
understanding of how meaning is created by the use of words and phrases in 
particular contexts, the necessity of community understanding and 
agreement in use of specific terms, and the irreplaceability of certain 
religious 'pictures' or ways of speaking, together with Lindbeck's concepts 
of religion-as-language and the 'fluent elite' – this chapter returns to some of 
the examples of Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks which were initially 
described as a group in chapter 1. (Further examples will be considered, in 
the light of issues emerging from this discussion, in chapter 7.) In order to 
have a realistic picture of the ways in which language is used, we need to 
turn to real examples and consider them in some detail, striving to 
understand the context and connotations which they carry, the forms of life 
which inform them. Although this is a straightforward consequence of the 
Wittgensteinian view of language and philosophy, the project has not been 
carried out in this empirically grounded way before, and so this chapter is in 
effect an experiment to see whether the method works when used in this 
way. If it does, it should help us to uncover the grammar, or underlying 
rules, which the community is using when they speak in particular ways. 
 
Through this method, this chapter will begin to explore the reasons why 
multi-theəlogy remarks are popular and widespread within contemporary 
British Quakerism, leading into a consideration in the following chapters of 
some of the principles which underlie these ways of speaking. This chapter 
focusses on three examples, all from mainstream Quaker material which is 
recent – created and published between 1987 and 2009. The first is the work 
of a committee of Britain Yearly Meeting; the second was written for a 
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small magazine in the USA but has been anthologised by Britain Yearly 
Meeting itself; and the third is from a workshop participant, anonymised 
and included in an edited collection by The Kindlers.
318
 These three 
examples provide something of a cross-section of the types of material 
produced fairly centrally by Quakers in Britain, and allows us to access to 
both works perhaps somewhat moderated by their formation within group 
structures, and a work which represents the diversity (and perhaps the 
extremes) of Quaker thought. From these pointers, I hope to be able to 
indicate some of the ways in which Quaker speech is affected by that of 
other speech-communities, and be ready to look in chapters 5 and 6 to some 
of the relevant outside influences. 
 
At the end of the chapter, I consider these examples as a group, and look at 
how they are interwoven with the cultural context which produced them. As 
we saw in chapter 2, a language-game takes place within a form of life, and 
they shape each other. Not only will understanding the form of life help us 
to comprehend the language-game, but a close study of the rules of the 
language-game may illuminate some aspects of the form of life within 
which it is played. I also note here again the collapse of the first-
order/second-order distinction which was drawn by some writing about 
postliberal theology. The examples we will consider are neither one nor the 
other, not "first-order statement[s] about objective facts… or subjective 
feelings" nor "second-order directives[s] guiding and informing" Quaker 
speech.
319
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Example 1: Quality and Depth of Worship and Ministry 
 
Quality and Depth of Worship and Ministry is a pamphlet, volume 5 of the 
"Eldership and Oversight handbook series", published in 2001 by Quaker 
Books, who are based at Friends House, London. It is copyright the 
Committee on Eldership and Oversight, who compiled the text, drawing 
mainly, as their introduction tells us, on "a distillation of experience and 
reflection offered… by meetings around the country in the spring of 
1998".
320
 This material was taken and "formed the basis of the gathering for 
those responsible for eldership and oversight at Yearly Meeting that 
year".
321
 Friends would undoubtedly reject the term 'fluent elite' if used to 
describe the committee or those who contributed to the body of "experience 
and reflection";
322
 however, the distillation process, and perhaps also the 
committee appointment process, offers something similar to the benefits of a 
'fluent elite' as described by Lindbeck. In particular, it means that the text 
both draws on the actual speech of Friends today, and has been considered 
and accepted by a group who specifically intended to edit it.  
 
The resulting text is brief (with a total of 44 pages), and composed mainly 
of questions . Everything in the main text ends with a question mark, except 
in chapter 1: Introduction, and the Resources section at the end. For 
example, chapter 14, 'Conclusion', consists of five questions, beginning with 
"Have you a growing awareness of your individual responsibility for 
sustaining the quality and depth of worship and ministry?"
323
 Although 
perhaps still unusual, this follows something of the form of the familiar 
Quaker Advices and Queries, and so is not a surprising format for a Quaker 
text of this kind.
324
 It is explained in the Introduction that the Committee 
writing it hopes that it will "bring into the open questions which we need to 
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address together"
325
 – there is no attempt to provide answers (except the 
kind which are hidden within the questions, of which there are plenty), but 
rather the aim is to raise issues which might otherwise not be discussed.  
 
It is mainly intended for use by those who have been appointed by their 
Meetings to serve for a time as Elders and Overseers, but also for other 
Friends who are interested in the topic, and there is a suggestion at the end 
of the book that it might be used for study groups within Meetings. These 
particular forms of life produce a need for particular kinds of material: a 
Quaker study group, for example, wants questions about spiritual matters to 
consider but usually assumes that the participants will bring any relevant 
answers, so even if some answers are suggested they will remain open to 
discussion – not least because among Quakers there is generally an 
acceptance that participants may themselves have a range of different 
answers. It is also worth noting at this point that all of the intended 
audiences know something of Friends already, and are mostly committed 
Quakers. This is an internal text which can therefore rely on the shared 
assumptions of Friends, some of which I began to identify in chapter 1.  
 
Particularly interesting in terms of Quaker religious language is chapter 2: 
Worship.
326
 It is split into two sections, 2a: "What is worship?" and 2b: 
"Preparation for meeting for worship". Each contains a list of questions, 
mostly short, but some with suggested answers – in 2b, the second question 
is "Do you prepare yourself specifically for meeting for worship?" and is 
followed by a list of possible kinds of preparation, grouped into six bullet 
points including "in regular times of quiet withdrawal", and "in music, 
poetry, painting, sculpture". The final one, obviously intended to keep the 
question relatively open, is "in other ways".
327
 This context helps us to 
understand the mode in which the first question in the booklet, at the 
beginning of 2a, is asked. 
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Page 3 of the booklet, immediately after the introduction, reads as follows: 
 
2. Worship 
 
2a. What is worship? 
What do you call that which we are seeking to worship? 
 The ground of our being, 
  the ultimate reality, 
   the meaning, 
    the father, 
     the mother, 
      the everlasting arms, 
       the spirit, 
        God… 
In what ways does our communal worship nourish and strengthen 
you? 
In what ways does it illuminate the true self in the depths of our 
being? 
In what ways does it sustain our service to each other? 
In what ways does the spirit of worship underpin all that you do? 
In what ways do you enrich your spiritual life? 
There is love at the heart of worship: 
Is this your experience? 
How do you share it?
328
 
 
At the bottom of the page there is a small round picture, a detail from G. E. 
Butler's painting, 'For the faith of their fathers', showing a young woman 
holding a baby and with her arm around another child.
329
 It is not 
immediately clear why this particular image has been selected – unlike on 
p34, where it appears again under a set of questions headed "Supporting the 
provision for children and young people in meeting". Although the link to 
children is obvious, the link to worship is not, and it may have been an 
arbitrary choice for this page.  
 
I want to focus, as I did when discussing this quotation before, on the first 
question, "What do you call that which we are seeking to worship?". The 
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comparison with the list of suggested answers provided on the next question 
suggests that this list of ways of naming God is intended as a scattering of 
prompts and reminders of the possibilities, rather than all to be accepted by 
one individual. The ellipsis at the end seems to be serving a similar function 
to the words "in other ways" – making it clear that the list is incomplete and 
that Friends are free to add to it as they wish. Because the eight items which 
are on the list are disparate, there is a high level of indeterminacy about 
what else might be appropriately added. However, the inclusion of exercises 
like this one in a variety of resources for use in groups – this book, the 
Becoming Friends Companions Handbook discussed in chapter 1, and other 
sources – suggests that if one does in fact ask Friends to do this, they will 
have personal favourites to add and will not be surprised by the suggestions 
that other Friends make. This widespread understanding that such exercises 
are possible seems to be evidence that there are some underlying rules, or at 
least guidelines, which Friends follow when they engage in this list-making 
language-game, even if they themselves would deny that. This lends 
support, too, to the more general idea that the language-game view of this 
activity, in which we would expect there to be such rules, is an appropriate 
way of looking at this situation. 
 
The list itself bears closer examination. The terms as written have come 
from a wide range of backgrounds and have complex connotations: some 
seem to refer to theological work, some to traditional Christian language, 
and some are not traditional. Given the method described in the pamphlet's 
introduction, it seems most likely that all have been gathered from 
suggestions by Friends, though there is an editorial hand at work in their 
selection and arrangement.
330
 In some cases – especially the pairing of 'the 
father' and 'the mother' – the order of terms seems to be significant, while in 
other parts of the list there seems to be little logical connection between one 
item and the next. By turning our attention to the details of their previous 
uses, we can uncover more of what they have meant in various contexts – 
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with a special interest in those contexts with which Quakers are likely to be 
familiar, and hence with the places where they might have learned to use 
these phrases. 
 
'The ground of our being' is a phrase most closely associated with the mystic 
Eckhart and the theologian Paul Tillich. Some Friends may have read these 
authors directly, but it is more likely that they have encountered them 
through other sources. For example, Tillich's work was used – or perhaps 
"bowdlerized"
331
 – by John Robinson in Honest to God, a work which was 
widely read by liberal Christians, including Quakers.
332
 It was discussed in 
The Friend at the time of its publication – in an editorial on April 5th, 1963, 
Bernard Hall Canter notes that quotes from Robinson's book have "a 
peculiarly Quaker ring",
333
 although Friends also had other issues on their 
minds at the time; later in the month, a correspondent compares Quaker 
struggles over Towards a Quaker View of Sex, a pamphlet dealing with 
homo- and heterosexuality, with Anglican struggles over Honest to God.
334
 
Views and terms found in Robinson's book have filtered into Quaker 
writing, perhaps not surprisingly since it created much debate in the British 
national media and in some ways set the theological agenda for many 
people at the time. More recent developments in this very public strand of 
liberal theology – especially in the work of Don Cupitt and John Hick, or 
even more recently Karen Armstrong – have continued to be influenced by 
Robinson and the sources on which he drew, and will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 5. For my purpose here, it is sufficient to note that the term 'the 
ground of our being' is most likely to have reached a Quaker audience 
through the work of John Robinson or another associated theologian. 
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'The ultimate reality' has been used to mean many things. It has been used in 
a couple of recent Quaker publications,
335
 but generally speaking, it is 
probably most associated with the philosophies of Eastern religions, 
especially Buddhism. In much teaching of Buddhism in the West, 'ultimate 
reality' is contrasted with 'everyday reality', with the latter considered to be 
an illusion.
336
 It is not immediately obvious how this would make it a 
suitable candidate for a list of things which we might be seeking to worship, 
although perhaps if 'worship' is seen as an attempt to 'get in touch with' 
something it would make more sense. That said, I also note that Christian 
theologians have used the phrase. Paul Tillich's book Biblical Religion and 
the Search for Ultimate Reality treats 'the search for ultimate reality' as a 
synonym for the philosophical project, which Tillich characterises as always 
in the end an ontological search.
 337
 Having laid out reasons for thinking that 
Biblical religion and philosophy/ontology are incompatible, in the end he 
argues that we do in fact need both as part of our overall theological project, 
concluding in the end that God must be the ultimate reality. In this context, 
then, the use of 'ultimate reality' – like Tillich's phrase 'ground of being' – as 
a synonym for God is acceptable to the community.  In another context, 
John Hick equates 'ultimate reality' with the Arabic term 'al-Haqq' – usually 
translated 'truth' or 'reality' and one of the names of God in the Qu'ran – to 
name that to which all religions respond, albeit in ways heavily conditioned 
by their surrounding cultures.
338
 Whether Hick's use of these terms as 
synonyms is justified is more debateable, but it is the case that he uses them 
in this way. With these previous uses in mind, it is clear that 'the ground of 
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our being' and 'the ultimate reality' do form a kind of pair – both terms 
which could be found in the kind of liberal Christian theology which 
Quakers are most likely to read.
339
 They are also both relatively abstract and 
relatively new coinages. Together with the next term, 'the meaning', they 
might be seen as the 'philosophical' entries in this list. 
 
'The meaning' is too vague a phrase to track down to particular sources in 
the way in which one might wish to in an exercise of this kind. When a 
Friend provides it as the answer to a question like 'What do you call that 
which we are seeking to worship?', it seems to me that they might actually 
be answering a question which is very similar and related but in theəlogical 
terms significantly different. That question might be 'What do you call that 
which we are seeking in worship?' Many people do find meaning (for their 
lives, for events in the world, and so forth) arising from the practice of 
waiting worship, and in the situation of a workshop or discussion group 
there can be a blurring between that which is found in or through the 
worship, and that which is worshipped. In any case, the idea that religion or 
belief in God has to do with finding meaning in life is a familiar one, and at 
one time Wittgenstein went so far as to equate the two, saying, "To believe 
in God means to see that life has a meaning".
340
  
 
'The father' is a familiar image for God in Christianity – "Our Father, who 
art in Heaven". Although it may be in use in other contexts as well, it is 
undoubtedly most familiar to British Quakers as a term arising from the 
Christian tradition. Far from making it a safe choice, however, this means 
that it is one of the most contested terms, as the next item in the list 
indicates. 'Father' has also sometimes been regarded as a name for God, 
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although it is arguable that it is actually either a title or a metaphorical 
description.
341
 Without any other clues in this context, we cannot know 
which of these roles it takes in this Quaker language-game. In any case, it 
produces a certain picture of how God is, drawing in part on our experience 
of ordinary fathers;
342
 to many Christians, this would be an irreplaceable 
picture,  both because of its Biblical basis and because of the simplicity, 
power, and emotive connotations which it carries. Even to those who have 
left Christianity, terms learned in childhood often retain a certain power – 
even for those who disagree with them for political reasons. This would help 
to explain the inclusion of such a term in a list like this one, where it is 
powerful but optional, significant but in need of immediate balancing. 
 
'The mother' is perhaps also an obvious image for a loving God; it has been 
used by various Christians, including John Paul II, although it is not nearly 
as widely used in liturgy as 'father'. Its inclusion suggests that the Friends 
who contributed to the booklet are aware of discomfort around the term 
'father', which are often rooted in feminist thought, and the editorial decision 
to place it just after 'father' suggests a desire to balance the two terms – 
perhaps they often came up together in Friends' responses.  
 
'The everlasting arms' is not as widely used a term for God – compared with 
'father' – and many of the Friends who read this booklet will not recognise it 
as a Biblical quotation, although perhaps those who suggested it and 
included it in the list did recognise it as such. It is from Deuteronomy 33:27, 
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which in the King James Version reads: "The eternal God is thy refuge, and 
underneath are the everlasting arms".
343
 The phrase has been used before in 
Quaker contexts – it appears, for example, in John Barclay's 1835 Memoirs 
of the Rise, Progress, and Persecutions of the people called Quakers in the 
North of Scotland,
344
 and Martin Davie notes that reference to this metaphor 
made hymns like 'Safe in the Arms of Jesus' acceptable to Friends, if Joyce 
Neill's 1986 pamphlet Credo is to be believed.
345
 
 
'The spirit', although somewhat Christian in reference, has here lost much of 
its traditional Christian connotation as it moves from 'the Holy Spirit' to 'the 
spirit' – the loss of the capital letter is in keeping with the other phrases in 
the list, and may be no more than stylistic, but also seems to change the 
connotations which a reader brings to the word. 'Spirit' is a term commonly 
used among Friends, occurring 23 times in Quaker Faith and Practice 
(compared with 55 for 'light' and 13 for 'Christ').
346
 
 
Finally, the list closes with "God…". The ellipsis invites us to assume that 
the list could continue, but nevertheless this is a striking place for an 
apparently simple but much debated term.  
 
 
Example 2: Rose Ketterer, quoted in Quaker Faith and Practice 
 
                                                 
343
 I have chosen to quote the King James Version here as it is widely read and familiar. 
Other translations provide very similar renderings of this half-verse, almost all including 
the phrase "everlasting arms", so that it could have come from any of the most common 
translations. 
344
 John Barclay, Memoirs of the Rise, Progress, and Persecutions of the people called 
Quakers in the North of Scotland  (Philadelphia: Nathan Kite, 1835). 154. 
345
 Joyce Neill, Credo  (London: Quaker Home Service, 1986). 13; Davie, British Quaker 
Theology Since 1895: 236. How widely Neill's work was actually accepted by Friends is 
somewhat in doubt; Davie notes that she was seeking to "re-express traditional Christian 
ideas so as to make them acceptable to those who have rejected fundamentalism". 
346
 Figures produced by searching the online version at 18
th
 October 2013. Britain Yearly 
Meeting, Quaker Faith and Practice. http://qfp.quakerweb.org.uk/qfpmain.html. 
135 
 
The next example was originally written by an American Quaker, Rose 
Ketterer, in an article for a magazine called Friendly woman.
347
 This was "a 
quarterly journal focusing on Quaker women's concerns and experiences", 
containing "essays, fiction, poetry, commentary, and art".
348
 The way in 
which this extract has been accepted and republished by Britain Yearly 
Meeting both represents the depth of cross-Atlantic contact and allows us to 
assume that it represents the views of at least some British Quakers – views 
which it was felt right to represent in the very public and official context of 
Britain Yearly Meeting's Book of Discipline, currently called Quaker Faith 
and Practice. As we will see, however, it did not do so without a struggle, 
not least because it employs a way of speaking about the Divine which 
(although it echoes the kinds of concerns which produce remarks like the 
others discussed here, in chapter 1, and in chapter 7) was not familiar to the 
majority of Friends. 
 
The quotation appears in chapter 26, "Reflections", in Quaker Faith and 
Practice. There are four sections in this chapter, "Experience of God", 
"Ways of seeking", "Perceptions of truth", and "The light that shines for 
all", and this quotation is found in the third of those, which runs from 26.30 
to 26.41.
349
 Other quotations in this section reflect on the nature of God – 
for example, 26.31 contains Harvey Gillman's reflections on the existence of 
"a power which is divine, creative and loving, [which] we can often only 
describe … with the images and symbols that rise from our particular 
experiences and those of our communities"
350
 and 26.33, by John Lampen, 
includes the claim that we do not always need the word 'God' to grasp the 
"connections" to which he takes it to refer, namely those between "the 
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marvels of the natural world, the moral law, the life of Jesus, the depths of 
the human personality, our intimations about time, death and eternity, our 
experience of human forgiveness and love, and the finest insights of the 
Christian tradition".
351
 Within a community which accepted those ideas 
without trouble, the contents of 26.35 are perhaps not as surprising as they 
might otherwise be, although there is still much about the quotation to 
puzzle us. 
 
I give it here in full, as it is given in Quaker Faith and Practice, followed by 
26.36, which seeks to expand upon it, contextualise it, and explain it 
somewhat. It is unusual for extracts to be provided with this kind of 
expansion and explanation, and so the existence of this second passage is in 
itself noteworthy. 
26.35 All my life I've heard, 'God is love', without understanding 
what was meant. Recently I've come to feel that in a very real way 
G-d/ess is the love that flows in and between and among us. The ebb 
and flow of my commitment to love, to peace, to harmony makes G-
d/ess stronger or weaker in my heart. 
Sometimes the web feels like G-d/ess' body, her vast cosmos, of 
which we are an inextricable part. The web is also the love that 
flows through creation, from G-d/ess, from us, from everywhere. 
The web is an affirmation and comfort, support and clear-naming. 
The web is harmony, proving to me by its fleeting, fragile 
appearances that peace can happen. Most of all, for me, the web is 
friendship. 
That the web exists is my faith. Spinning at it, dancing along it and 
calling others into it are my ministry. Ripping it or withdrawing into 
isolation and despair are my sins. Articulating my faith is hard 
enough; living it is often beyond me. But we are all connected. 
Strength seeps in from everywhere and amazing things happen. The 
sense of participation and communion sweeps over me like ocean 
waves.  
At the end of the article from which this extract is taken, the writer 
explained her use of 'G-d/ess':  
I've yet to find a term that describes how I feel about the divine. 'The 
Spirit' comes close, and so, sometimes, does 'Goddess'. 'G-d/ess' 
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attempts to convey the difficulty of naming the divine. The dash is 
an old Jewish practice meant to show the impossibility of confining 
the divine in a word. The single 'd' and feminine suffix are to show 
that I don't experience the goddess as different from or inferior to 
what folks generally refer to as God. 
Rose Ketterer, 1987 
26.36 As the Yearly Meeting in 1994 struggled to find unity on 
whether 26.35 should have a place in our book of discipline, Jo 
Farrow wrote: 
In the seventeenth century the first generation of Friends shocked 
many of their Christian neighbours. In trying to express their 
experiences of God – within them, as spirit, inward light, seed, 
inward teacher – they used words and phrases which sounded 
strange and audacious to their contemporaries. They spoke of their 
experiences of being drawn into community with one another using 
metaphors and analogies which were both new and old at the same 
time. 'The kingdom of God did gather us all in a net...' wrote Francis 
Howgill, trying to express the sense of relief and excitement which 
was theirs when they discovered one another and became aware of 
how deeply they had been drawn together as they struggled to 
articulate their experiences of the Spirit. In much the same way 
many women today are discovering a need to express their 
spirituality in ways which seem as strange to some Friends as the 
expressions of early Quaker spirituality did to those who first heard 
them. Rose Ketterer is a member of Haddonfield Friends Meeting, 
New Jersey. She writes of her attempts to reclaim a more womanly 
understanding of the divine. 
For our purpose, perhaps the most interesting section of this is the final 
paragraph of Rose Ketterer's piece, where she lists several terms and 
describes them as more or less closely reflecting how she feels about "the 
divine" – which is itself taken as a neutral, although not preferred, term, 
alongside 'Spirit', 'Goddess', and her own coinage, 'G-d/ess'. We see here 
that language is personally important to her: she wants to describe how she 
feels about the divine, drawing out again the theme of emotional connection 
which we saw emerging in chapter 1. We can also see that she is aware of 
the ways in which her linguistic choices might be received by the 
community, especially that she wants to be clear that the feminine names 
she uses are for something not "different from or inferior to what folks 
generally refer to as God".  
138 
 
In creating her own term, Ketterer draws on two main sources beyond her 
own creativity: a Jewish tradition, and the Goddess worship movement. By 
the time when Ketterer wrote this, the latter had been active for some time 
(Starhawk's The Spiral Dance, a foundational text, was first published in 
1979
352
), and so it is no surprise that this line of thought was reaching 
Quaker women. The new formation, 'G-d/ess', draws in meaning from these 
sources as well as gaining it in the course of Ketterer's own use and 
explanation. A handful of other writers have hit on similar terms (such as 
'G*ddess' and 'God/ess') in their explorations but there does not seem to be 
any consistent pattern of the use of this term.
353
 
 
Several interesting observations appear here when we consider this example 
in light of the material from the previous two chapters.  
 
One is that the nature of the term itself is interesting. It is a hybrid term, 
drawing as I have just described from at least two traditions. It is also an 
unpronounceable term, having something in common with formations such 
as 's/he' – written, they make clear the writer's desire to be inclusive of two 
genders, but when such texts are read aloud they can create a lack of fluency 
because there is no single agreed method of sounding them. This tells us 
something significant about the language-game which Rose Ketterer is 
playing:
354
 it is a written one. I suspect that she shares this with another 
thealogical writer with whom her use of language has much in common, 
Mary Daly. I have in mind works of Daly's such as the Wickedary, in which 
Daly creates words and plays with words in a similar way.
355
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An interesting point of comparison between this example and the last is that, 
where the list we examined above implies the replaceablity of the words – 
as if each could be equally 'translated' by the next and only personal 
preference separated them – Rose Ketterer seems to be trying to capture 
something in a single irreplaceable word. However, on a close reading of 
what she says I am not convinced that 'G-d/ess' is that word: "I've yet to find 
a term that describes how I feel about the divine. 'The Spirit' comes close, 
and so, sometimes, does 'Goddess'."
356
 There is a tiny proto-list here (the 
divine, Spirit, Goddess; later in that paragraph, God), and the solution she 
was using at the time of writing, G-d/ess, captured more her struggles with 
language than her feeling about "the divine". It does, though, point us to 
some of the features of the Divine which she wishes to make prominent: that 
it is both feminine and masculine (or, perhaps, beyond gender or of no 
binary gender), for example, and that traditional language will not suffice to 
express it.  
 
Furthermore, although the explanatory passage by Jo Farrow addresses the 
discomfort which Friends may feel with "words and phrases which sounded 
strange and audacious", and attempts to overcome that discomfort by 
drawing a link between the writing of Rose Ketterer and the writings of 
early Friends (which were creative but rooted in Biblical sources), it does 
not address the sources of that discomfort, other than that these words may 
seem strange. Unfamiliarity is taken to be the only objection, or at least, the 
only one which needs addressing in this formal context.  This leaves the 
potential theological objections, of which there are several to be found in 
wider literature about feminist language for God (and which might have 
been found in relation to other aspects of this usage) rather out in the cold. 
 
In the situation of seeking to introduce a new use of language to a 
community – which this piece does, although the new word is patched 
together from old terms – one important task is to give examples and 
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explanations such that the reader learns not only the new word, but also how 
to carry on with it, how to use it in the future. Since this word is not 
pronounceable and I have not found it in use in any other Quaker literature, 
perhaps the attempt has failed; on the other hand, since feminist concerns 
often are represented or alluded to (among other places, in the previous 
example I discussed the inclusion of 'mother' as an example of this gendered 
awareness and in chapter 7 one of my examples includes the term 'God-the-
Goddess'), and Rose Ketterer's piece has been republished in Quaker Faith 
and Practice, perhaps some of the ideas embodied by it have been taken 
into the mainstream. 
 
It may also be fruitful to compare Ketterer's 'G-d/ess' with the 'S' of 
Wittgenstein's sensation-diary thought experiment – to use Wittgenstein's 
example as an "object of comparison" to shed light on Ketterer's usage.
357
 I 
discussed 'S' in chapter 2, in the context of the private language debate, and 
concluded that, alone, 'S' – the invented term for the repeated but otherwise 
unidentified sensation – cannot communicate meaningfully. Like 'G-d/ess', 
'S' is not intended to be spoken aloud, nor is it replaceable or a familiar 
usage (indeed, the point is that it is a new and supposedly private term). 
Like 'S', 'G-d/ess' is an invented term. Like 'S', 'G-d/ess' is intended to 
capture and record in language an aspect of an individual's experience – one 
a sensation, one a feeling about the Divine. It is tempting to say that the 
latter is more complex than the former, or perhaps has more content, but I 
do not see that this is obviously so – sensations may be rich and layered, and 
a 'feeling about' something may be straightforward or simple.  
 
The key difference between Ketterer's coinage and Wittgenstein's imaginary 
symbol is that Ketterer's does communicate: partly because it begins to 
gather meaning through the process of her own use, which is published and 
embedded in a natural language (whereas the sensation diary is only for one 
reader and contains only 'S'), but also because it carries forward meanings 
from the previous uses of the terms 'God', 'G-d', and 'Goddess' (and, 
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arguably, the 'ess' suffix in general).
358
 Although it deliberately disrupts and 
challenges conventional uses of those terms, it also points back to them: it 
would make much less, if any, sense if you had never encountered those 
words before. Ketterer could have chosen any other word or symbol ("in a 
very real way S is the love that flows in and between and among us"), but in 
choosing to combine in a new way words or parts of words which were 
already rich with connotations, she invites her readers to read them afresh. 
 
Reading this example back towards the issue of private language, we could 
see it as another argument against the very possibility. If private language 
would work in this situation, Ketterer could have invented something – used 
'S', for example – and there would be no need to struggle to find the right 
word. The fact that she does engage in that struggle suggests that there is 
something valuable about it, in particular that she finds a need to locate her 
experience within a wider social and historical context. In using familiar or 
semi-familiar terms and techniques – 'God', 'Goddess', the omission of a 
vowel, and in offering other terms in a miniature list – Ketterer links her 
new term to others, as in the list familiar terms are placed alongside less 
familiar ones, and this enables members of the community to locate the 
newer ones in relation to older ones. In this case, Jo Farrow's extra 
explanation, which links Ketterer's practice of linguistic inventiveness with 
historical Quaker examples of the same practice, also serves this purpose of 
locating the move within the community's existing rules. In this way, terms 
from outside the community's existing vocabulary (either previously non-
existent, or previously used only by others) can be taken into the 
community's language-game. In chapters 5 and 6 I will be looking in more 
detail at the underlying assumptions and practices which enable this to 
happen. 
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Example 3: Journeying the Heartlands 
 
Journeying the Heartlands: exploring spiritual practices of Quaker worship 
is a pamphlet published in 2009 and edited by Elizabeth Brown and Alec 
Davison.
359
 Brown and Davison are founding members of the project of 
North West London Area Meeting, The Kindlers, described in the preface as 
"a new-born, informal Quaker group".
360
 The group aims to engage with the 
first of the seven priorities laid out in Britain Yearly Meeting's 2009-2014 
five-year plan, "strengthening the spiritual roots in our meetings and 
ourselves".
361
 It is a response to the question, as it is put in the preface of 
Journeying the Heartlands: "how can the worshipping life of the Society be 
renewed within a religious faith that eschews leadership and gurus, has no 
paid ministry and can claim little contemporary inspiring spiritual 
literature?"
362
  
 
Their answer is that, "it can only come from the grass-roots, for there is no 
top-down. The person in the pew is as good as it gets".
363
 Working from that 
basis, The Kindlers ran a series of workshops, and gathered the responses 
given by participants. They print them (probably a selection of them) as the 
body of the pamphlet, divided into nine sections which describe Meeting for 
Worship and then explore "the narrative of the spiritual practices that make 
up the unity of that worship experience".
364
 The section which interests me 
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here is entitled 'Entering Light'. The introduction to this section makes 
various remarks about the image of light, linking it to birth, creativity, and 
the story of creation in Genesis. The editors also make some remarks about 
Quaker uses of the term 'light', noting that within Quakerism, "Light is seen 
as the presence of God in our midst, hence Quakers speak of 'waiting in the 
Light' for guidance, as giving clarity of insight, or 'holding someone in the 
Light' when praying for them".
365
 They quote John's Gospel (1:9), and Jim 
Pym, a Quaker-Buddhist author, who is also quoted on the next page by a 
contributor (and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7, where one of 
my examples is from his work).  
 
In the final paragraph of the introduction to the section entitled 'Entering 
Light', however, the editors go on to say: "Light is a universal symbol for 
the Divine in all world religions. … Sometimes the Light is personified, as 
with Christ the Light of the World, or the Buddha of Infinite Light in the 
Buddhist tradition".
366
 There is, unfortunately, no indication here of the 
grounds or other sources on which they base the claim that Light is a 
"universal symbol", let alone that in "all world religions" it stands for "the 
Divine". The general tone of the remark is universalist, in the Quaker sense 
of that term as discussed in chapter 1, and perhaps there is some conceptual 
slippage between a 'universal symbol' and a 'universal experience' or 
'universal access'.  
 
The preceding remark about 'Light' does help to explain why the editors 
chose to open the chapter with a series of remarks from workshop 
participants grouped under the editorial heading 'JESUS: Light of the 
world', followed by some headed 'CHRIST: the god-form in all'. These two 
lists take up page 26; the other parts of the section are headed 'WAITING 
IN THE LIGHT: until the way opens', 'MEDITATION: steadying the mind', 
and 'MYSTICAL CONTEMPLATION: Light as transforming', and these 
complete the chapter. 
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The eight remarks from participants under the heading 'JESUS: Light of the 
world' point to a human Jesus who was "a teacher", "the greatest prophet", 
"an example"; one says that he was "that of God manifest in human form", 
but this is the closest they come to claiming a Divine nature for him.
367
 This 
is important because it helps to put into perspective the four comments in 
the next part, under the title 'CHRIST'. The subtitle for this part, 'the god-
form in all', clearly uses a phrase from the first participant comment, which I 
give here in full:  
 
I understand that Christ, Krishna, Buddha are examples of 'god-
forms' in all people's consciousness, from time's beginning.
368
 
 
I note that these two remarks seem to make subtly different claims – one 
that Christ is the god-form present in all people, and the other that Christ, 
Krishna, and Buddha are among a selection of god-forms present in all 
people. I do not argue, however, that this difference is intentional, especially 
given the clearly intentional borrowing from one to another and the 
idiosyncratic grammar of the latter. Although the term 'god-form' does occur 
in some other literature – in the Western Mystery Tradition, for example – 
the use is quite different and, although it remains possible that the 
participant picked it up from another source, it seems more likely that this is 
an independent coinage. 
 
The participant quotation given above is followed by one from a participant 
who quotes Jim Pym, including Pym's characteristic capitalisation of 
anything to be construed as a name of the Divine: 
 
I note that Jim Pym writes: 
The Light is also the Guide when it assumes a personal 
aspect for us. It is the Inner Teacher or Christ in us. The 
Light enables us to see the Way (another synonym for Christ) 
and follow the Way which is the right one for us in harmony 
with God's will.
369
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This quotation is from Listening to the Light: how to bring Quaker 
simplicity and integrity into our lives, with slight changes to punctuation.
370
 
It may assist in understanding it to know that Pym says in his introduction to 
Listening to the Light: "…words are capitalised when they are synonyms for 
God, for Quaker tradition uses a number of synonyms for God. To these, I 
have added one or two of my own".
371
 I will return to Pym in chapter 7; 
here, it is sufficient to say that he is incorporating into this remark the 
'experiential-expressivist' thought that all these various terms – Light, 
Guide, Inner Teacher, Christ, Way, God – become synonymous because 
they are based on common experiences of the same Divine. 
 
The process by which these remarks have arrived in this setting – especially 
the last one, published in a book and selected by first a workshop participant 
and then the editors – points to a certain level of communal acceptance of 
the kinds of ideas represented. Not all Quakers would assent to them, and 
they would not all be accepted by the Yearly Meeting, but we can safely 
think of them as acceptable views to hold within the modern British Quaker 
community. This may not be the kind of 'fluent elite' which Lindbeck 
envisaged, but it is a group of people who speak Quaker fluently enough to 
have some sense of which does and does not 'fit' in a book of this sort. If it 
is also the case that the first and second remarks (the editorial comment in 
which, via the Light, Christ and Buddha are equated, and the participant 
comment which lists 'Christ, Krishna, Buddha' as synonyms) are the product 
of fluent Quaker speech – which, since they have been produced by the 
editors or included in this anthology, I take it that they are – I need to ask 
how the terms 'Krishna' and 'Buddha' came to be present within Quaker 
discourse. 
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One of the answers will obviously be that people like Jim Pym, who practise 
dual belonging, have helped to import them. In chapter 6, I will consider the 
practice of dual or multiple religious belonging (including the particular 
popularity of Buddhism as a partner in this process) and how this practice 
affects the movement of words between religious communities. In this 
chapter, however, I want to turn instead to another set of processes, the 
ways in which languages borrow and share words, and how those are 
mirrored (or not) by the ways in which religious and cultural groups borrow 
one another's words and phrases within a single natural language. 
 
In considering Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic understanding of doctrines in 
chapter 3, we saw that a smaller group within a wider society can 
nevertheless have a distinctive linguistic pattern, a dialect or sociolect, and 
fluent speakers can be experts in this (Geordie, early Christianity) as well as 
competent speakers of the wider language (English, first-century Judaism). 
It was also mentioned that a wide range of words can be shared between a 
dialect and a wider language without this compromising the integrity of 
either the dialect or the language. In this case, I suggest that as well as 
entering Quaker speech directly from those who use both Quaker and 
another religion, some may have travelled via the wider culture.  
 
As in so many places, there is no clear boundary here: 'Krishna' as a word 
for 'God' might have entered the vocabularies of Quakers through the 
writings of Gandhi, who was (as I noted in chapter 1) widely read and cited 
by Quaker universalists. I take it that Gandhi speaks from within a Hindu 
context (from within 'Hinduism' to the extent that this remains a useful label 
for a collection of the religious traditions of India), but some of his writings 
are clearly influenced by his Western education and encounters with 
Western texts and ideas,
372
 are aimed at a Western audience, and are read 
and quoted by many in the secular/post-Christian sphere. This is not simply, 
therefore, a transfer of a term from one religion to another, although this 
may be one of the effects of the process.  
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Similarly, a number of originally Buddhist terms and ideas have entered the 
wider circle of Western spiritual seekers, a movement we might broadly call 
'New Age'.
373
 This group, seeking inspiration but wary of organised 
religion, has taken material from a wide range of sources – including ancient 
European, Eastern, and worldwide indigenous religions – to form a mix-
and-match collection of beliefs and practices. The present state of the group 
is hard to quantify, but it is probably fair to say that it attracts a diverse 
selection of people, some of whom move on to other, perhaps more 
structured, practices. Many are likely to encounter Buddhist or Buddhist-
influenced forms of meditation. Some become Quakers during or as a result 
of their seeking, or were Quakers anyway. The idea of the 'Buddha of 
Infinite Light', for example, could be encountered in this kind of context, as 
well as in forms more directly descended from Amitābha's home contexts in 
the 'Pure Land' schools of Buddhism. 
 
Setting aside the issue of the origins of the language for a moment, another 
way to view these examples would be to consider them as creating 'pictures' 
– images of the way the world is, specific to the religious viewpoint from 
which they emerge. A proposition like 'Christ is a god-form present in all 
people's consciousness' creates a picture of the world likely to affect one's 
actions, as did the examples which Wittgenstein suggested (as discussed in 
chapter 2). If you already have this kind of picture, and are then confronted 
with the fact of religious plurality, going in search of 'the other names of 
Christ' in other religious traditions would not be unreasonable. It might be 
imperialist, but empires can be founded on clear if morally questionable 
logic. It is not then hard to incorporate these names into your picture, seeing 
that other people are using them: 'Christ, Krishna, [and/or] Buddha are god-
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forms present in all people's consciousness' is then a possible picture. The 
example does not give us any reason to think that it was constructed in this 
order or in this way, but the history of Quakerism as part of the Western 
world, and its interactions with other religions, lead me to argue that 
something like this is the way it happened. 
 
The real question, however, is whether the picture 'Christ is a god-form 
present in all people's consciousness' and the picture 'Krishna is a god-form 
present in all people's consciousness' are different, or significantly different 
enough to warrant their clear separation. Drawing on what I have said 
before about the irreplaceability of pictures, I would argue that they are 
different enough that they should not be swapped one for another without 
further significant evidence of their interchangeability. Although they might 
lead to some similar behaviours, such as treating all people as if they have 
'that of God within them' (an example of the kind of Quaker idea that the 
workshop participant could have had in mind), they would lead to attention 
to different sets of teachings, for example. We would expect this to make a 
more general difference as well. In chapter 5, I will consider arguments 
from a universalist or pluralist perspective in favour of treating such terms 
as interchangeable, and address the idea that different religions all have the 
same moral effects. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taken together, what do these examples tell us about Quaker practices and 
the language Quakers use? Firstly, it is of interest that I was able to find 
examples like these in corporately produced literature – material which 
draws on quotations, submissions, workshops and committees or multiple 
editors. Although there is modern Quaker literature produced by individuals 
(the quoted material draws on this, and we saw a selection in chapter 1; 
more will be discussed in chapter 7), the jointly produced work not only 
suggests the acceptability of the ways of speaking which it records, but also 
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sheds light on the corporate processes which produce it. We see, for 
example, the importance of workshops as practice which enables the 
exploration of issues of interest or concern, and as a way of finding material 
which has both the touch of an individual and is appreciated by the group. 
From this material, editors, whether individually or as a committee or 
Meeting, can then select that which emphasises the diversity or the unity of 
the group – or both, as seems to be the case in these examples. 
 
About the ways of speaking themselves, as modelled in this collection of 
examples, I would say that they demonstrate the ways in which 'the 
language 'Quaker'' has been able to include new words. They also tell us 
something about how the uses of those words have changed in the process: 
Christ, Krishna, and Buddha are brought into a new relation (of exact 
similarity if not identity) which would not be accepted by many Christians, 
Hindus, or Buddhists.
374
 The rules which guide these uses start to become 
visible – one needs more than three examples to be sure 'how to go on', but 
taking these together with others we saw in chapter 1, it is possible to 
generalise about some of them. To go on in the same way, you should 
accept (a claim something like) that all religions are equal and have 
basically the same message.
375
 You should use words which are comfortable 
and acceptable to you, but also try to include words used by others whom 
you perceive to be in your community (whether or not those words are new 
to you). You should try and express your understanding of the 'Truth', which 
is based on your religious experience, as well as possible, while accepting 
and where necessary noting that others may express that same Truth in very 
different ways. These rules embed some claims – not only that all religions 
are equal, which I will discuss in chapter 5,  but also the experience-first 
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assumption which I identified in chapter 1 and other elements of the 
experiential-expressivist positions which I described in chapter 2. 
 
Further to rules of these remarks, we have uncovered more details about the 
motivations for making them. In the second example, we saw that 
discomfort with particular language was a worry, both in Rose Ketterer's 
hints that 'God' as ordinarily used did not capture her feelings about the 
Divine, and in Jo Farrow's explicit discussion of the fact that unfamiliar 
language may make Friends uncomfortable. In the first example, we can see 
that there is a deliberate attempt to include, and even welcome, diversity – a 
consideration which may also be a factor underlying the choice to include 
the second piece in Quaker Faith and Practice, and the editorial decisions 
around the third set of remarks. Both desire for diversity, and desire to 
create comfort or discomfort in the listener, are questionable motives for the 
selection of religious language in a community which also prizes a 
commitment to Truth, although they may be in some ways good reasons. 
 
In the final example, reasons for the selection are harder to discern, although 
they probably include the two just mentioned. However, I think the 
introduction also points us to a deeper reason: all of these pieces wish to 
express as fully as possible, and encourage us to find for ourselves, the truth 
of the matter discussed – even though several views would hold that truth to 
be ineffable. In using many words, the authors point out the inadequacy of 
each of them, in some ways reinforcing the idea of ineffability while 
apparently also affirming its opposite. 
 
Finally, a few things should be said about the light which this analysis of 
real examples has shed on the tools which I explicated in the previous two 
chapters. The view of language as inherently social has been thoroughly 
supported, although we have needed a nuanced view of the ways in which 
languages change and develop; and it still seems that a private language is 
impossible – the creation of new terms relies on the processes of public use 
and reuse. The model of religion as being like a language in analytically 
important ways has been supported. It has proved enormously useful in 
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application to specific examples, illuminating aspects of them which were 
otherwise unobserved. It works together with the Wittgensteinian view of 
how language works to highlight points about religion which are not 
otherwise visible. 
 
The idea that some religious ways of speaking are irreplaceable has been 
challenged, too, by the multiple ways of speaking present in the list-format 
remarks; it can be retained with the addition of a caveat that the 
irreplaceability is operative at the level of the individual rather than the 
community. Any one speaker has their own way of speaking, which cannot 
be replaced or 'translated' into another phrase, but another speaker might 
choose to use another phrase and believe that they 'meant the same thing'. 
The place of irreplaceability in this is strengthened by the observation that 
the two phrases often do not mean exactly the same thing to listeners, 
carrying as they always will different connotations. Finally, the concept of 
the 'fluent elite' has proved useful, although identifying this group continues 
to require care. 
 
The tools from Wittgenstein and Lindbeck which I identified in the previous 
two chapters, then, have all been able to do useful work when brought into 
dialogue with real examples of Quaker religious language. However, there 
are further aspects of the Quaker pattern of belief which, while clearly 
bearing on the assumptions which underlie the examples I have considered, 
have not been fully explained by the tools in use so far. In order to explore 
these in more detail, I turn in the next two chapters to other explorations of 
these patterns – particularly, of the claims of other pluralists and 
observations of other people practising multiple religious belonging – in 
order to return with more tools in hand to some further examples (in chapter 
7).  
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Chapter 5: Pluralisms 
 
I have begun to show that Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks are not made 
randomly – there is an underlying process, of thought and assumptions, 
which informs them. Nor are they simple or unified – one speaker may have 
many motivations for their choice of words, and even within the relatively 
small world of British Quakerism different speakers will have a variety of 
motivations. One of these sets of motivations can be called the pluralist 
model of religions, a model in which all religions are taken to contain at 
least some truth.
376
 This chapter, interested mainly in those pluralisms 
which are close to those found in the Quaker literature and in academic 
writers who are known to and read by Quakers, focuses on kinds of 
pluralism which Rose Drew labels 'monocentric pluralism'.
377
 Pluralism of 
this kind seems to underlie many of the examples of Quaker multi-theəlogy 
remarks, and forms a significant part of the background which supports 
multiple religious belonging, another key factor in the formation of Quaker 
multi-theəlogy remarks (I will be discussing this in more detail in chapters 6 
and 7). Monocentric pluralisms understand there to be one ultimate reality 
to which all religions are, in their different ways, responding,
378
 as opposed 
to a polycentric pluralism which would argue that two religious traditions 
are responding to two different realities.
379
 I shall not be discussing attempts 
at polycentric pluralism, such as that appearing in some work by Roger 
Corless, or pluralism arising from process theology, such as that of John 
Cobb. 
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377
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The aim of this chapter is to clarify the pluralist positions which Quakers 
might take, to look at critiques of them and possible defences. In order to do 
this, I consider the positions of two notable theologians – John Hick, a 
Protestant theologian and philosopher who became a Quaker near the end of 
his life, and Don Cupitt, an Anglican theologian – alongside a consideration 
of the pluralist claims of the Quaker Universalist Group. In passing, I also 
look briefly at Karen Armstrong's work, as she is a pluralist whose popular 
writing on religion is well-known among Quakers at present. Both John 
Hick and Don Cupitt have been fairly widely read
380
 among those members 
of the British public who are interested in religion, including by Quakers. In 
both cases, it is easy to prove that there has been a direct influence of these 
writings on the Quaker community. 
 
Having outlined these three related positions, I move on firstly to look at 
ways in which they can be critiqued, and then to consider possible defences 
of broadly pluralist positions. I conclude that Quakers can find good reasons 
to take this kind of position and that it can be theəlogically defended. In 
doing so, I argue not only that Quakers do, as it happens, have pluralist 
assumptions which help to make sense of multi-theəlogy remarks, but also 
that it is possible to make these assumptions explicit in a way which makes 
it clear that they are both coherent and plausible. This chapter does not 
attempt the next step – to show that this position is correct – but it does aim 
to show why the position is regarded as reasonable and acceptable within 
the British Quaker community. It would still be possible to provide an 
alternative reading of the remarks – perhaps an inclusivist one, in which one 
name is best but others contain a partial revelation – and some Quakers 
might favour this. However, the pluralist approach is numerically strong 
among Friends, has a considerable explanatory power when applied to 
multi-theəlogy remarks (as I will show in chapter 7, my second set of 
worked examples) and has been discussed in theologically nuanced ways 
which help to clarify the position. 
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Part 1: Three Pluralisms 
1A: Hick (and Armstrong) 
 
John Hick (1922-2012) took a long spiritual journey to reach the pluralist 
position with which this section is concerned. In childhood he encountered 
various religious groups, including Methodism, Quakerism,
381
 and 
Spiritualism, before becoming a Presbyterian while at university. At that 
time he decided to train for the Christian ministry, as a Presbyterian, a 
position he retained for most of the rest of his life, although later he would 
explore other religions, including Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism.
382
 In 
the last years of his life, he became a Quaker.
383
 The bulk of his most 
creative theological work was done within the vibrant interfaith context of 
the city of Birmingham.
384
 While working there, he developed a version of 
the pluralist theology of religions which is close to, and perhaps informs, 
much Quaker universalist thought. Although some Quakers assent to Hick's 
position, that assent is often incomplete, both for individuals and for a group 
such as the Quaker Universalists. In this section I suggest a variety of 
reasons for Quakers to reject, as well as be sympathetic towards, Hick's 
work, in order to clarify how much Quaker universalism and Hickian 
pluralism have in common and where their differences lie. 
 
Although Hick worked on many other problems in the philosophy of 
                                                 
381
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religion, such as the problem of evil, religious experience, and fresh 
understandings of the incarnation, it is his work on pluralism which is of 
interest here. Specifically, Hick's form of pluralism seems to lead naturally 
to some multi-theəlogy remarks, as we can see in Hick's own writing. 
Arguing for what has been called monocentric pluralism, namely the 
position that all religions
385
 are in touch with the same core even when they 
express it very differently, he compares religions in ways which stress their 
similarities – "Buddhology and christology developed in comparable 
ways"
386
 – and using terminology from other traditions, saying, for example, 
that his phrase 'The Real' corresponds with the Arabic 'al-Haqq'.
387
 Looking 
at religious traditions as a group, he argues that the same God is at work in 
all of them: 
 
… should our revelation of the Logos, namely in the life of Jesus, be 
made available to all mankind? Yes, of course; and so also should 
other particular revelations of the Logos at work in human life – in 
the Hebrew prophets, in the Buddha, in the Upanishads and the 
Bhagavad Gīta, in the Koran, and so on.388 
 
Although worded with more care than some of the Quaker examples, it is 
not hard to see that there is some continuity between this sort of claim and 
the lists of terms which I discussed in chapters 1 and 4. Hick was clearly 
aware of some of the philosophical problems which this kind of position 
poses. In Problems of Religious Pluralism, he asks: 
 
What is this divine Reality to which all the great traditions are said 
to be oriented? Can we really equate the personal Yahweh with the 
                                                 
385
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non-personal Brahman, Shiva with the Tao, the Holy Trinity with 
the Buddhist Trikāya, and all with one another? Indeed, do not the 
Eastern and Western faiths deal incommensurably with different 
problems?
389
 
 
However, he goes on to argue that we can construct a pluralist position 
which respects the differences between traditions but which also holds that 
all religions are reactions to the same Real – a Real which has both personal 
and non-personal aspects (he lists Hindu, Taoist, Jewish, Muslim, and 
Buddhist versions of this distinction, without going into any of the ways in 
which they might disagree).
390
 This enables him to claim that God, the 
personal Real, is one being, named differently in the various religions: 
 
To take the concept of God first [before the Absolute, the impersonal 
Real], this becomes concrete as the range of specific deities to which 
the history of religion bears witness. Thus the Real as personal is 
known in the Christian tradition as God the Father; in Judaism as 
Adonai; in Islam as Allah, the Qur'ānic Revealer; in the Indian 
traditions as Shiva, or Vishnu, or Paramātmā, and under the many 
other lesser images of deity which in different regions of India 
concretise different aspects of the divine nature.
391
 
 
His description of the impersonal Real uses Hindu, Taoist, and Buddhist 
terminology in much the same way. These examples would be significant 
anyway, as multi-theəlogy remarks which appear outside the Quaker world, 
but they are particularly interesting because Hick offers an explicit 
argument with which to support them and engages with possible criticisms – 
attempting to show that these religions, indeed all religions, have enough in 
common that they can be said to be reactions to a single Reality. 
 
What, then, is Hick's pluralist position exactly? As aspects of it changed 
through his career, and were repeatedly restated in slightly different forms, 
this can be somewhat difficult to pin-point, but an overview can be given 
which will enable us to compare readily with the Quaker universalist 
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position and to consider some of the critiques of it. A useful summary 
comes from Paul Hedges, who links Hick's pluralism to his biography: 
 
Through a series of stages, Hick expanded his vision from seeing 
truth centred in Christianity alone, to being located in a common 
experience of God and then, recognising the non-theistic nature of 
some religious traditions, to what he terms the Real.
392
 
 
This is an experientially centred view of religions, based on our empirical 
(but mainly external) evidence about them: their "common ethical values, 
their capacity for producing 'saints'… as well as the deep conviction, 
devotion and piety that each produces in its followers".
393
 It is located 
against Hick's background of interfaith work, especially in Birmingham, and 
his explorations of other religions, often based mainly on their texts. Many 
Quakers will relate to this – a personal history of 'seeking' or exploration 
through many spiritual paths and involvement in ecumenical and interfaith 
projects are both common among Friends, and those who have not had these 
experiences personally will usually be aware of some in their local Meeting 
who have. There is a tendency therefore for Quakers to be willing to agree 
with these empirical claims, especially in a context where they seek to see 
the best in other people and other religions.
394
  
 
Hick goes on to argue that in order to make sense of the religious diversity 
of the world, we need to accept that "we can rejoice in God’s revelation to 
us through Jesus, without having to assert that God has not revealed himself 
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and drawn people into a new and better life anywhere else than in Jesus".
395
 
In order to get to this point, Hick considers the importance of salvation, 
which he calls "the central business of religion",
396
 suggesting that all 
religions are aiming at salvation and dismissing the idea of implicit or 
anonymous Christian faith – he says that these notions from Karl Rahner 
cannot "stand as more than interim measures" (presumably, interim points 
on the path to pluralism).
397
 Although he develops and nuances this idea in 
his more academically oriented writing, he retains a focus on salvation and a 
dissatisfaction with inclusivist theologies.  
 
Hick's Christian-pluralist position draws on his previous philosophical work 
to some extent, using his idea of eschatological verification to argue that 
although his claims, like those of any religion, cannot be verified now, we 
will be able to obtain verification in the future, after death.
398
 This position 
arises in response to earlier philosophical challenges, especially 
verificationist or logical positivist claims that religious language can have 
no meaning because it cannot be verified – by embracing a different account 
of how meaning is generated, we have already dealt with this problem, and 
do not need to address Hick's solution in detail. It is worth noting in passing, 
though, that Hick's description of the afterlife, including a 
paraeschatological period, involves taking the specific claims of various 
religions mythologically, and synthesises them into a meta-explanation 
about life after death.
399
 We will see later that this is part of a problematic 
pattern in Hick's treatment of other religions. 
 
In one essay, Hick also talks about Wittgenstein's concept of seeing-as (with 
reference to the duck-rabbit picture), and suggests that religious experiences 
may be of experiencing-as: you experience the Real, that is, in the way that 
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your society and religion expect you to, or through the lens of the narratives 
which you have available (and which you consider to be most important).
400
 
This is strongly reminiscent of the position which Lindbeck called 
'experiential-expressivist' (although Lindbeck's version of it is perhaps less 
realist than Hick's form of pluralism) and which I identified in chapter 3 as 
closely related to some key assumptions made by Quakers. Such a position 
does not have to call into question the givenness of the Real – there is 
something there to perceive, just as in the duck-rabbit picture there is a 
drawing, and the doubt arises around what that line-drawing represents. In 
relation to experience of the Real, Hick describes this ambiguity as 
producing a hierarchy of interpretations, of – for example – the life of Jesus: 
 
At the most basic level there was an awareness of the physical 
existence of Jesus as a living organism. Superimposed upon this 
there was, at the human and social level of awareness, Jesus's life as 
a human being interacting with others in the Palestinian society of 
his day. And superimposed upon this there was, for the specifically 
Christian mode of experiencing-as, Jesus as the Christ.
401
 
 
He goes on to say that the third, Christian, level of interpretation is 
ambiguous – Jesus as Christ could be experienced "in a number of different 
ways, as the Messiah, as a prophet, as a rabbi, and so on".
402
 Hick considers 
this kind of ambiguity to be "characteristic of religious meaning" and adds 
that the whole world is religiously ambiguous in this sense.
403
 The term he 
uses for this process, 'superimposition', suggests that rather than there being 
some kind of interaction between the experiencer and that which is 
experienced, an image is in some way projected by the experiencer onto an 
objective reality. Although this fits well into the understanding of religious 
experience as linguistically and culturally shaped – the projection, even if 
from an individual, would be strongly affected by such forces – this is 
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perhaps not what Hick would want to imply. Rather, in his writing as a 
whole, he seems to mean that these levels of interpretation simply exist 
simultaneously.  
 
The possibility, of multiple true or partially true ways of experiencing the 
world
404
 existing at once, is encapsulated in a story which Hick has 
sometimes retold concerning the blind men and the elephant. In this tale, a 
group of blind men are brought to touch an elephant, and asked to describe 
what they discover.
405
 One finds the tail and describes an elephant as like a 
rope, another feels a leg and compares it to a tree, and the third touches the 
elephant's side and says that elephants are like walls. In the pluralist 
understanding of this parable, all the religious traditions are both partially 
right but still blind to whole, like the men in the story.  
 
However, Gavin D'Costa reminds us that there is more to the original.
406
 In 
particular, in some versions there is a Prince – sighted, knowing, able to 
summon blind men to his palace – who sets up this scenario and is able to 
synthesise the impressions of the blind men, together with his own, into an 
accurate idea of an elephant. In Hick's retelling of the story, this character 
has disappeared, perhaps to become the narrator, and by taking him out of 
view Hick also hides his potential bias.  
 
The pluralist, D'Costa suggests, is like the Prince: not accepting that their 
own view is as limited as that of any of the other religious traditions, they 
claim to be able to collate the information provided by the religions into a 
true picture. In his article on the subject, he puts his objection in 
Wittgensteinian terms: he discusses the concept of the 'form of life' (which I 
considered in detail in chapter 2) and reminds us that a detailed 
understanding of how a particular term is used will be required before we 
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can judge how it relates to other terms. D'Costa uses Hick's comparison of 
'karma', a Hindu concept, and 'justice', a Christian one, and points out a 
variety of ways in which the two terms cannot simply be equated – noting 
along the way that the term 'karma' is itself used in different ways by 
different Hindu groups.
407
 He argues that "blind-men-elephant theorists", 
although they "cannot become anthropologists or philologists overnight", 
need to pay much more "careful attention to the work of such specialists", in 
order to ground their "global explanatory theories" and "avoid the dangerous 
spectre of abstraction".
408
 Instead, as he and I have both argued on 
Wittgensteinian grounds, there needs to be detailed attention to the specific 
contexts in which words are used, or we are in danger of assuming that two 
terms relate to the same thing – a rope is not always an elephant's tail, even 
if an elephant's tail feels like a rope – when they are not the same at all. This 
detailed consideration of context is exactly the kind of process which I 
undertook in relation to my examples in chapter 4, and it is a significant 
objection to the practice of making multi-theəlogy remarks. 
 
There are three potential problems here for pluralists. One is that Hick and 
other pluralists of this kind presume to know more about religion than non-
pluralists – this is an attitude common among philosophers of many kinds, 
but still indicative of an arrogance which we might find troubling, especially 
in conjunction with the second potential problem. This second problem is 
that Hick's descriptions of religions do not reflect fairly or fully the 
positions those traditions actually take – inherently, the pluralist position 
treats non-pluralist religious traditions as only having part of the truth, 
where many of those religions themselves would claim to have access to the 
whole truth. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a pluralist 
position while accepting the full and often exclusive claims of other 
traditions, and this gives non-pluralists a real concern that their opinions 
have either not been heard or have been ignored by pluralists. Finally, as 
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D'Costa says, there is the possibility that "a rope will be mistaken for an 
elephant – or karma for justice".409 To decide whether this is the case in 
individual examples is beyond the scope of this chapter but it is a significant 
objection to which pluralists do not pay enough attention. 
 
Someone else who embraces this kind of pluralism, and who might be 
vulnerable to this kind of critique, is Karen Armstrong, a popular 
theological writer and broadcaster who describes herself as a "freelance 
monotheist".
410
 She has a tendency to say things which sound significantly 
like the Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks we have been discussing – and 
which reflect a pluralist approach to religion similar to Hick's. For example, 
in The Case for God she says that the first core principle of the story of 
religion is about "the nature of the ultimate reality, later called God, 
Nirvana, Brahman or Dao",
411
 which implies that these four names in some 
sense refer to the same thing; later in the same book, she also says – more 
carefully but with the same spirit of equality between religious viewpoints – 
that "there are important differences between Brahman, Nirvana, God and 
Dao, but that does not mean that one is 'right' and the others 'wrong'. On this 
matter, nobody can have the last word".
412
  Armstrong's work has been 
popular generally, and Quakers have been among her readers.
413
 In reading 
Armstrong's work carefully, it becomes clear that Armstrong is a pluralist, 
not far removed from Hick's position although her emphasis is on 
experience rather than the Real – in many ways, a step closer to Quaker 
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universalism. When she lays out her position, she is relatively careful, but 
this kind of thought obviously grounds her multi-theəlogy remarks: 
 
The consistency with which the various religions have stressed the 
importance of these qualities [of compassion and "a receptive, 
listening attitude"] indicates that they are somehow built into the 
way men and women experience their world. … That is not to say, 
of course, that all faiths are the same. Each tradition formulates the 
Sacred differently, and this will certainly affect the way people 
experience it. There are important differences between Brahman, 
Nirvana, God and Dao, but that does not mean that one is 'right' and 
the others 'wrong'. On this matter, nobody can have the last word. 
All faith systems have been at pains to show that the ultimate cannot 
be adequately expressed in any theoretical system, however august, 
because it lies beyond the reach of words and concepts.
414
 
 
Whatever we make of that final claim about 'all faith systems', we can see 
that in Armstrong's understanding, religions all have something in common. 
She does not spell out a belief in something like Hick's 'Real', and she has 
not advanced an explicitly non-realist position (like Cupitt's, which takes a 
different view on whether anything can be "beyond the reach of words and 
concepts"). It would in some ways be natural to read terms like 'the Sacred' 
and 'the ultimate' as referring to a reality, although the idea that some 
qualities, taken to be indicative of "the Sacred" are "built into the way 
[people] experience the world" might suggest that there is a non-realist 
perspective present here as well. 
 
If Quakers who make multi-theəlogy remarks are indeed in tune with 
Armstrong's thinking, they may be both aware of the differences between 
the terms they list, and see themselves as unable to make judgements 
between them, as Armstrong refuses to do (rather than actually equating 
them, as D'Costa accuses Hick of doing). If nobody is to have the last word, 
but you still want to say something, everyone must be allowed their own 
word each time, and this naturally produces the kind of lists we have seen in 
the Quaker literature. These seem inclusive, and may also be supported by 
the committee methods which produce some examples. However (especially 
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but not only when there is a single author) this is a somewhat self-defeating 
strategy, since the author or editor of the list gives themselves, in a sense, 
the last word. The very act of creating the list with the narrative claim that it 
implies does itself make a theəlogical statement – one which can come over 
more strongly that the claims implied by any specific term within the list. 
To put it another way, the list-format remark with its series of apparently 
equivalent words is the part which leaves the lasting impression – an 
impression of inclusiveness, but perhaps also vagueness, and a pluralistic 
acceptance of truth from many sources. 
 
 
1B: Cupitt 
 
Don Cupitt had been somewhat in the public eye since his participation in 
John Hick's The Myth of God Incarnate anthology in 1977, but really came 
to fame with his 1980 book Taking Leave of God, in which he laid out the 
motivations for and the basis of a non-realist approach to Christian faith.
415
 
Later, he made several series of television programmes, of which the most 
widely remembered is the Sea of Faith series (1984).
416
 In these shows, and 
the accompanying book, Cupitt explored the current territory of religious 
belief in the West – focusing on Christian belief and the types of 
agnosticism and atheism which appear alongside or in response to it – and 
he made a range of thinkers, including Darwin, Freud, Jung, and 
Wittgenstein, more accessible to the public. In the conclusion of the book he 
explains his non-realist position, reached as a result of this exploration: 
 
Does this [the foregoing argument and/or the thrust of the book] 
amount to saying that God is simply a humanly constructed ideal, 
such that when there are no human beings any longer there will be 
no God any longer? This question is improper, because it is framed 
from the obsolete realist point of view. The suggestion that the idea 
of God is man-made would only seem startling if we could point by 
contrast to something that has not been made by humans. But since 
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our language shapes every topic raised in it, we cannot. In an 
innocuous sense, all our normative ideas have been posited by 
ourselves, including the truths of logic and mathematics as well as 
all our ideals and values. How else could we have acquired them? 
Thus God is humanly-made only in the non-startling sense that 
everything is. That is modern anthropocentrism. But even on my 
account God is as real for us as anything else can be, and more 
primally authoritative than anything else is.
417
 
 
This draws on the work of many scholars, but for the purposes of this thesis 
I will look just at how it uses Wittgenstein. Cupitt says of Wittgenstein that 
"he did not quite succeed in bringing about the full synthesis of faith and 
modernity",
418
 because his "ideas about religion were too conservative and 
nostalgic".
419
 Cupitt, then, wants to go beyond Wittgenstein, but also takes 
some ideas, especially from Wittgenstein's later work, as valuable. He reads 
Wittgenstein's work on language as non-realist, saying that for the mature 
Wittgenstein: 
 
Language comes first, for it prescribes the shape of the various 
'realities' amongst which we move, and not the other way round. 
Reality does not determine language: language determines reality.
420
 
 
This is not, as discussed in chapter 3, an assessment of Wittgenstein with 
which all scholars would agree, but it is a possible reading of the material 
and it suits Cupitt's purposes very well. In particular, a view in which there 
is no pre-linguistic experience, taken together with an assumption that many 
languages therefore create many realities, supports his non-realism. 
Delivered in this aphoristic style, it prompts thought – although does not 
necessarily stand up to detailed examination or awkward questions about 
whether this remark about language is to be understood in or outside 
language itself, or whether this way of speaking about language is in itself 
another language-game (which might not be comprehensible, let alone true, 
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within the structures of other language games). It should also be said that 
the talk about things made by humans is somewhat misleading; ordinary 
language makes a distinction between things named and categorised by 
humans (mountains versus hills), things created through human 
manipulation (blankets, tables), and things which exist only through human 
thought and behavioural patterns (like democracy). We say, for example, 
that a mountain is real, but if a geographer comes and tells us that it is in 
fact a hill, being slightly too short for a mountain, we accept this, knowing 
that the measuring and definition is the work of experts and the definition is 
man-made in a sense, unlike the geographical feature itself. We accept the 
technicality even if we keep calling it 'that mountain' among ourselves; two 
different uses of the term 'mountain' can be operative in different parts of 
the language. Mountains, though, are not man-made, simply defined by us; 
in the case of a blanket, there is both the act of defining a piece of cloth as 
such (which generally accompanies a form of life, using a blanket as such 
by, for example, putting it on a bed) and the act of weaving the cloth in the 
first place. Pacifism is an idea, and as such is more like 'the idea of God', but 
it would seem very strange or even ungrammatical to call pacifism man-
made – although it can hardly be 'natural' either, because we do not 
generally apply the distinction in this way. Indeed, I think that this would be 
'ungrammatical' to say 'pacifism is man-made' in the sense in which 
Wittgenstein tells us that it is 'ungrammatical' to say 'I know that I am in 
pain'. Amid these many senses of the term 'man-made' it is not clear to what 
extent and in what way "the idea of God is man-made" (or whether, in 
Wittgensteinian terms, it is worth saying at all). 
 
Cupitt accepts that this position will lead many, "not yet moved over to the 
new point of view" to call Wittgenstein "an 'atheist'", something which is 
also often said about Cupitt, but Cupitt argues that Wittgenstein actually 
"does carry a great deal of what is most precious in religious belief through 
with him into his new outlook".
421
 Cupitt in another book uses the human 
genome as a comparison: "realists," he says, "think we have decoded the 
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genome, but we haven't: we've encoded it, expressing it as a chain of 
signs".
422
 
 
Don Cupitt himself traces reaction to his work – before the founding of the 
'Sea of Faith' network, which followed the TV series – in a way which 
captures something significant about both general and Quaker responses. 
Taking Leave of God was condemned by the Church Times and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, and "the entire ecclesiastical and academic 
establishment had now been told what to think, and they duly thought it".
423
 
Cupitt goes on to say that: 
 
There were only two exceptions to this sheeplike conformity: John 
Robinson and a number of people who had been his fellow-travellers 
in the sixties gave me encouragement, and the book was 
immediately and warmly welcomed by many Quakers. Cambridge 
gossip had it that I'd become a Buddhist, but Quakers assured me 
that I'd been a Quaker for years.
424
 
 
Many years after the publication of Taking Leave of God, in March 1997 
Cupitt gave the opening lecture at the annual conference of the Quaker 
Universalist Group, and "was amused to find that at least one fifth of those 
present were members of both" QUG and the Sea of Faith network.
425
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Further evidence of the close link between Cupitt's work and the thought of 
some Quakers can be seen by looking at the work of David Boulton, a 
prominent, outspoken, and consequently influential non-theist Quaker and 
founder of the Nontheist Friends Network, whose position is very similar to 
Cupitt's non-realism. The Sea of Faith network's website includes a review 
by Boulton of Cupitt's book Mysticism After Modernity, in which he says 
that it is "lucid and a delight to read", and a review, already quoted above, 
by Cupitt of Boulton's book The Faith of a Quaker Humanist in which he 
praises Boulton for "(in my view, rightly) reject[ing] semi-realist ideas 
about the spirit, the spiritual dimension, spirituality and the like".
426
 In The 
Faith of a Quaker Humanist Boulton describes a non-theist or non-realist 
faith not at all dissimilar to Cupitt's, saying for example: 
 
If it is insisted that [in Meeting for Worship] I worship something, I 
worship God, understanding God as the symbol and imagined 
personification of mercy, pity, peace and love – the values which, 
though they can hardly be anything other than wholly human in 
origin and expression, I choose to treat as if they were absolute and 
transcendental.
427
 
 
To be fair, any Cambridge gossip which suggested that Cupitt was a 
Buddhist was not entirely unfounded, either, as Cupitt does draw heavily on 
Buddhism and, much later, went on to describe his ideal religion as that of a 
"Christian Buddhist".
428
 We will be returning to the issue of combining 
religions in a single life, or one individual belonging to multiple religions, in 
the next chapter. 
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Taking Leave of God is in many ways a natural follow-on from John 
Robinson's Honest to God,
429
 and in the early chapters Cupitt refers 
repeatedly to Robinson's work. They have much in common, rejecting the 
metaphysical claims of religion but also rejecting the conclusion that they 
are therefore atheists. Rather, they want to retain some things from religion. 
For example, Cupitt says that: 
 
… even if Robinson's religion is very different from the theism of 
earlier times, it may still be better to have some religion on 
Robinson's terms than to have no religion at all.
430
 
 
Although he himself is proposing to "have some religion" on a model very 
different to previous theisms, it has to be said that Cupitt does not, at this 
point, make the total absence of religion sound like a complete disaster. He 
is writing, too, for much the same audience as Robinson: in the opening 
paragraphs of his first chapter, Cupitt specifically addresses himself to 
people who like religion but can't stomach many of the claims it has 
traditionally made, who say about "traditional religious belief" that "I can't 
live with it and I can't live without it".
431
 He is mounting a public defence of 
something previously thought to be "too paradoxical, too whimsical to be 
publicaly defended", namely the act of being simultaneously "quietly 
agnostic or sceptical about Christian supernatural doctrines, while 
nevertheless continuing to practise the Christian religion to strikingly good 
effect".
432
 
 
Other terms Cupitt uses to describe the position he is advancing include 
'expressivist' and 'demythologising'. These help us to link his ideas to those 
of other thinkers discussed previously. Although Cupitt is not quite arguing 
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for the 'experiential-expressivist' position to which George Lindbeck 
contrasted his 'cultural-linguistic' perspective, for example, or for the 
position which Hare ends up constructing under the name 'expressivism' 
(discussed in chapter 3), it is easy to see that such a position could be 
constructed by combining the work of Hick and Cupitt – we can see that in 
some areas they already have much in common. Specifically, Hick would 
contribute the experiential element, while Cupitt is expressivist about 
religion.
433
  
 
Hick has also used the idea of demythologising religious belief.
434
 In 
Cupitt's case, it is taken further than Hick is prepared to go, because Cupitt 
does not stop short with 'the Real' still in place but goes on to argue for a 
fully "non-factual" account of religion
435
. I note that Cupitt is not arguing 
that we should abandon God, but rather that, seeing that we have made God, 
we can recreate God in new ways. Cupitt's demythologised religion is non-
realist (which is in itself a metaphysical position), and takes all religious 
language to be merely expressive of emotion or attitude – whether it knows 
it or not. To define this view, he contrasts it with realism before going on to 
describe it: 
 
Realism is a doctrine about the meaning of talk about God, 
which is why it is held by sceptics. If you are to count as a believer 
in God, say the sceptics, then that is what you have to believe. 
Sceptics are fond of laying down the law in this way. 
The other group, the expressivists, hold that the God of 
realism does not in fact exist but is an illusion created by a 
misunderstanding of the nature of religious language. They hold that 
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religious language is basically expressive in force, not descriptive. 
God's reality is not a matter of facts and evidence, but of the 
unconditional authority of religious categories in a person's life.
436
 
 
(Or perhaps in the life of a community.) This position has a distinct appeal 
for those who are, like Cupitt and many Quakers, in the position of wishing 
to maintain a religious practice but struggling with the realist interpretation 
of religious talk. It should be noted that, although some scholars have read 
Lindbeck as leaving room for realism,
437
 the cultural-linguistic view can 
also come across as a position with very similar negative claims, in which 
we judge religious language by a kind of grammatical correctness, rather 
than what the realist would recognise as 'factual' correctness. Although both 
Cupitt and Lindbeck use Wittgenstein in differing ways, in this thesis I take 
no position on which of these is a 'correct' interpretation of Wittgenstein – if 
indeed there is any single 'correct' position. Rather, I find both positions  
useful for understanding the Quaker position. Cupitt comes close to the 
Quaker assumptions which I described in chapter 1, and hence provides a 
helpful contribution to understanding that position – especially when used 
with Hick as well – while Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model contains 
more clues about how multi-theəlogy remarks work in their community 
context. Thus, Lindbeck provides tools which help to build an insightful 
analysis of Quaker religious language use, while Cupitt, by offering a theory 
based on related premises, sheds light on the Quaker usage and the 
assumptions which underlie it. 
 
 
1C: Quaker Universalists 
 
Having discussed the positions of two individual theologians who take 
pluralist positions, I now turn to a Quaker group to try and uncover the 
details of one position found within the community. There is a strong streak 
of pluralism about truth in much modern British Quaker writing. This has 
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been visible in the material quoted in chapters 1 and 4, and will become 
even more obvious in chapter 7. Quakers tend to describe their pluralist 
position as 'universalist', and that term will be used in this chapter to refer to 
Quaker pluralism.
438
 
 
As an organisation, QUG are a Listed Informal Group, attached to, but 
outside the structures of, Britain Yearly Meeting.
439
 They came into 
existence in 1978, arising "from John Linton's experiences in India of 
meetings where Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians worshipped together 
in Quaker silence",
440
 shortly before the formation of their American 
counterpart organisation, the Quaker Universalist Fellowship.
441
 Ralph 
Hetherington describes the aims of QUG, and seeks to dispel some myths 
about them, in the introduction to Universal Quakerism: 
 
There continues to be some misunderstanding as to what universalist 
Quakers are saying and a widespread fear that they are trying 'to 
change the Society'. It is hoped that this section will do something to 
dispel this fear and to show that a universalist view is, in fact, an 
essential ingredient in Quakerism. Thus no change in the nature of 
the Society of Friends is being advocated, but rather a clearer 
understanding of the implications of the mystical basis of 
Quakerism.
442
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The phrase 'mystical basis of Quakerism' points us back to the work of 
Rufus Jones and others, discussed in chapter 1.  
 
QUG's aims are further explored in QUG's publications, and I want to look 
here especially at the pamphlet series, which has enabled a range of authors 
to discuss in more detail their Quaker Universalist positions. In terms of 
language, the pamphlets display the three Quaker assumptions – experience-
first, unity-of-religious-experience, and ineffability – quite clearly, and they 
are revealing in terms of theəlogy and non-Quaker influences. Two 
examples will be sufficient to display the assumptions about language 
discussed above, and to tell us something about the other traditions of 
religious thought with which QUG members are engaging. (I will be 
returning to the topic of Quaker universalism in chapter 6, where it is set in 
the context of other forms of pluralism about truth.) 
 
Firstly, John Linton's seminal 1977 piece, Quakerism as Forerunner is an 
obvious starting point since it is also the historical origin of the QUG as an 
organisation, and a useful one as it lays out clearly the basis on which QUG 
began.
443
 This was originally a talk – the talk which led to the founding of 
QUG, and which QUG published as their first pamphlet. On the website 
where they re-published it in 2004 they call it "the talk which led directly to 
the formation of the Quaker Universalist Group."
444
 Linton was not a 
scholar of religion, but his experience of living and working in India and 
holding Meeting for Worship in multi-theəlogy groups there was taken to be 
valuable by the Quakers who heard him talk about it. In the pamphlet, 
Linton is dismissive about language in ways which clearly display the 
experience-first assumption – for example, he responds to a suggested 
Christian argument that Jesus was not just a prophet, and that Christians 
therefore disagree with Muslims, thus: "Son of God or Prophet, what 
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difference does it make: it is just a matter of words"
445
 – and steers close to 
the pluralist position of John Hick (which will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5).
446
 He also takes a lead from certain formulations of Hindu 
thought, saying that: "Quakerism should abandon its claim to be part of the 
Christian church, and move towards a universalist position. It should take 
the line of Hinduism that Truth can be approached from many quarters."
447
 
This conception of the nature of Truth, often supported with a quotation 
from Gandhi, is found in several of the QUG pamphlets and seems to enable 
support for multi-theəlogy remarks. It is in some ways a correlate of the 
experience-first assumption, in as much as both positions claim that there is 
a fact of the matter, a Truth or at least a direct experience of the Truth, 
which can be accessed by individuals but is not fully representable in words. 
 
Secondly, it is useful to be aware that some Quaker Universalist writers 
nurtured an aspiration that Quakerism should be welcoming to people with a 
range of theəlogical positions some decades before it appeared in the 1994 
Book of Discipline. This is not merely the on-the-ground observation that 
Meetings are welcoming the unchurched and former or present members of 
non-Christian religious communities, but an active desire that the Society of 
Friends adapt, affected by changes in wider society, to better provide "a 
home for sincere seekers who come to us by different paths".
448
 Jan Arriens' 
1990 pamphlet, The Place of Jesus in Quaker Universalism, ends with a 
consideration of "The way ahead", looking to the future of the Society of 
Friends, having earlier expressed a belief that many of the people who are 
seeking spiritual solace in paths such as Zen, Transcendental Meditation, 
Hare Krishna, Psychosynthesis, Insight Seminars, and other (assumed to be) 
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similar sources would also "feel at home in a Quaker meeting".
449
 This 
seems to be typical of Quaker approaches to people on other religious or 
spiritual paths – it is rooted in Rufus Jones' re-envisioning of Quakerism as 
"not a denomination or a sect… [but] a spiritual movement".450 In both these 
ways, then, QUG publications have continued the trend begun early in the 
20
th
 century and which is visible in more recent, late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 
century, Quaker publications. 
 
In the rest of this chapter I am going to talk about Quaker universalism as if 
it is singular and monolithic. Although Quakers as a group take a wide 
range of views and even though amongst those who self-identify as Quaker 
universalists there is a spectrum of opinion on all of the topics which I am 
about to discuss, I find sufficient similarity between a range of authors to 
discuss them coherently together – and insufficient detail and depth of 
development in any particular author to be able to satisfactorily discuss 
them separately. It is not feasible to represent all of these complex 
perspectives: even if they had all been published or I could interview every 
individual, it would not be possible to reflect all the nuances in a single 
document. Instead, I am going to try and piece together a picture of the 
Quaker universalist position from a variety of sources, choosing to quote 
people who are known as leading lights of the Quaker universalist 
movement and publications which were written and are widely read by 
Quaker universalists. I talk about 'the' Quaker universalist position, which is 
no more than a rough average taken between the many Quaker universalist 
positions, many or most of which have never been articulated in writing or 
at all. The writings which I use here are mainly from the 1990s, a time when 
the Quaker Universalist Group was quite visible among Quakers in Britain.  
 
To look at the Quaker universalist position in more detail, then, I will revisit 
some ground first visited in chapter 1, beginning with the first four items in 
John Lampen's list of twelve "suggestions for finding the words we need": 
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1. There is something more in reality than whatever we can perceive 
with our senses and measure or hold in our minds. 
2. This "something more" is not merely the object of belief; it is 
experienced by the individual as a presence — and an absence. Some 
of us experience it as an encounter with something personal. It is not 
simply an individual experience since we can also meet it as a group. 
3. We believe that all people have the potential for this experience. 
4. This is the experience which has been given such names as "God", 
"The Light", "The Tao", "The Inward Christ", "The Spirit", and "that 
of God in everyone". It is not the naming which is important but the 
experience.
451
 
 
Previously, I discussed the assumptions about language implicit in Lampen's 
items 5 and 6 as well, and the multi-theəlogy remark in item 4; here, I want 
to focus on the logic of these first four items, and see how they create a 
pluralist position. Like Hick's pluralism, Lampen begins with an 
observation; but unlike Hick's pluralism,
452
 the observation is not of the 
fruits of other religions in people, especially 'saints', but rather of what 
might be called 'religious experience' – an experience of direct contact with 
'something more'. This observation on its own does not create pluralism; 
religious experience of this kind, for both individuals and groups, can easily 
be taken alongside a discounting of 'religious experience' from other people 
or groups. Point 3, however, is well on the way to producing pluralism. If 
"all people have the potential for this experience" then we need to take 
everyone's reports of religious experience seriously, even if they are 
apparently different. In point 4, Lampen confirms this. His multi-theəlogy 
remark makes the claim that there is only one kind of religious experience, 
and that throughout history and around the world it has been given a range 
of different names. To be precise, the names he lists are not for the 
experience itself, but the thing which people take themselves to be in 
contact with during such experiences – what he earlier called the "something 
more" – but his meaning is clear enough, as is his dismissal of any idea that 
the different names we give to the "something more" are significant. We 
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saw these themes emerging in other Quaker writing in chapter 1, as the key 
assumptions of the primacy of experience and the inadequacy of language. 
Here I want to develop the idea that Quaker universalism is a distinctive 
kind of pluralism, which has much in common with the pluralism of Hick, 
and something in common with Cupitt's pluralism, but also some unique 
features.  
 
The main distinctive feature of Quaker universalism compared with other 
possible forms of universalism (such as the pluralism of John Hick) is that it 
puts experience first, or in other words, it takes direct experience as central 
– as the Quaker Universalist Group puts it, they believe that "spiritual 
awareness is accessible to everyone of any religion or none".
453
 They see 
this as the core of Quakerism. Ralph Hetherington quotes William Penn's 
1669 book The Christian Quaker to argue that Penn's belief in "Gentile 
Divinity" (glossed as 'heathen spirituality') is what we would now call 
universalism. Hetherington goes on to frame this in the pluralist or multi-
theəlogy terms with which we have become familiar, and link it to the 
Gospel of John, always a Quaker favourite: 
 
[Penn] asserted that the inward Light of Christ was present in all 
men and women everywhere. It was this light that led to spiritual 
insight, redemption and salvation. If this is so, it would be hard to 
argue that this light is not equivalent to the Buddha Nature of 
Buddhism, the Brahman of Hinduism, and the Tao of Taoism. 
Moreover, it is directly in line with the teaching of the Fourth Gospel 
which refers to the 'true Light which lighteth every man that cometh 
into the world'.
454
 
 
This quotation grounds the Quaker universalist view deeply in the Christian 
background from which Quakerism arose (it is hardly surprising that Penn is 
in line with the Fourth Gospel, since that was his source for this idea), but 
also makes the claim that equivalent ideas can be found in other religions – 
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although it is worth asking why Hetherington would find it "hard to argue" 
that the Light is not equivalent to the other concepts he lists. Following my 
previous line of argument – derived from Wittgenstein but also very similar 
to that used by D'Costa in the piece quoted in the discussion of Hick above – 
it is in fact relatively easy to argue that the Light is not equivalent to the 
Buddha Nature. The two phrases have different origins, different uses, relate 
to different forms of life, and only the pluralist assumption that all religions 
contain some truth could encourage us to treat them as the same. In this 
piece, though, Hetherington also hints at the role of "spiritual insight, 
redemption and salvation", suggesting a kinship with Hick's fruits-of-
religion model of pluralism. It is plausible to think that he is at least 
somewhat attracted to both positions and I would not say that they were 
necessarily incompatible. 
 
Although the Friends involved would rightly deny that their universalist 
position was a Quaker doctrine (because nothing can have the status of a 
doctrine within Quakerism), it can nevertheless be thought of as taking the 
kind of second-order role which Lindbeck, as discussed in chapter 3, 
ascribes to doctrines – in other words, it tells you what kinds of things can 
correctly be said within the language-game at hand.
455
 Later in the 
pamphlet, Hetherington argues that this inward Light can be – indeed, 
should be, if we are reading George Fox correctly
456
 – understood as 
equivalent to 'that of God in everyone' or 'that of God in all consciences'.
457
 
Whatever the understanding of 'God' at work here, and it does sometimes 
seem that there is truth in Alistair Heron's charge that 'that of God' has 
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become no more than a "vague catchphrase",
458
 the mechanism for 
universalism has become clear. All religions (not even all major or world 
religions, but all religious traditions and movements) are likely to contain 
some measure of truth if they reflect the genuine spiritual experience of the 
participants, since that experience has been brought to them by the same 
inward Light which guided Quakers historically and which can guide people 
today – including, but not only, Quakers. 
 
The belief in the universal potential for spiritual experience, and for 
unmediated access to the Divine, marks Quaker universalism out as 
different from Hick's pluralism insofar as Hick accepts the Kantian proposal 
that we cannot have any such access to the Real. Since Hick also argues that 
all religions are responses, in various forms, to the Real, it is not quite clear 
how such responses come about unless they are all happening entirely in the 
absence of contact or evidence. Although Hick does sometimes speak of 
experiencing the Real, this is through the "schematizing" of "basic concepts" 
into "more concrete forms" – in particular, personal and non-personal 
forms.
459
 The claim of universal potential for spiritual experience may also 
present some conflicts with the Cupittian or non-realist approach to 
pluralism, since many Quakers would hold that there is indeed something to 
access – although as we saw above, non-theist Friends such as David 
Boulton appear to be solving this problem to their own satisfaction. For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is most important to take from my discussion of 
Hick the idea that pluralism may be grounded in either the fruits of the 
religious life (as Hick does) or in direct access to the Divine (as most 
Quakers do) or in both (as some Quakers seem to); from my discussion of 
Cupitt the idea that non-realism and pluralism are compatible and that the 
Quaker community can and does contain both; and finally from my 
discussion of Quaker universalism the understanding that pluralist ideas 
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work well with other Quaker assumptions and underlie the practice of 
making multi-theəlogy and list-format remarks. 
 
Having laid out three possible pluralist positions in some detail and 
considered the similarities and differences between them – and noted the 
possibility of multiple overlaps and permutations of the positions described 
– I now move on to look at them from a more critical angle, discussing 
some possible critiques of pluralism (which mostly apply to all three, 
although I will clarify those cases where one form is capable of a stronger 
response than others). This exercise has two purposes: examining critiques 
helps to explain the positions themselves more fully, and considering 
possible critiques which could be brought against Quaker universalists helps 
to clarify that although these comments make sense within the community, 
they are not always going to be readily accepted outside that context. 
 
 
Part 2: Critiques of pluralism(s) 
 
The main lines of critique of pluralism in the theological and philosophical 
literature are that the theory is implausible or not as universal as it claims to 
be – in particular, some religions seem to be excluded from it – and I will 
consider this first. However, some other more minor critiques are still 
important, being enough to render the theory problematic even if it is found 
to be initially plausible, and I go on to consider some of these. Sinkinson, 
for example, has argued that not only does Hick's pluralism not allow for the 
possibility of revelation – generally important to a religious movement 
which accepts a form of continuing revelation – but also suffers from a flaw 
which it deplores in other theologies of religion, namely arrogance and 
intolerance.
460
  
 
The core claims of pluralist positions run deeply counter to the theologies 
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and intuitions of many non-pluralists. Obviously, someone who believes 
that their religious tradition contains the unique truth and that this truth is 
not present in other religions is likely to find pluralism unappealing, and to 
seek to defend their exclusivist position from charges such as arrogance and 
not taking other religions seriously (either by denying that this is true, or 
especially for the latter argument, by biting the bullet and arguing that 
taking untrue religions seriously would be a mistake). Similarly, both 
Cupitt's non-realist form of pluralism and Hick's demythologised pluralism 
seem to offend against the strong claims of believers who hold realist 
positions. Even for those who do not hold such positions, the claim that all 
the world religions are accessing the same source – in the Quaker 
universalist understanding, the same Divine – may seem implausible in the 
face of irreconcilable differences between the world religions. Attempts 
such as those by Hick and Armstrong to argue that all the religions teach the 
same guidelines really, perhaps at a deeper level than the superficial claims 
which seem to be in direct and obvious conflict, or that the parts which are 
in apparent conflict are less important (because, for example, they concern 
metaphysics rather than morals), tend to fall somewhat flat not least because 
we may not agree that the conflicting claims can be de-emphasised in these 
ways. They may also be falsely assuming that all the moral teachings of 
different religions are equivalent – in Hick's case, on the basis that the moral 
effects of the different religions are sufficiently similar as to be regarded as 
equivalent.  
 
There are also counter-examples to specific parts of Hick's claim which 
seem to make it less universal. For example, much of Hick's hypothesis is 
based on his study of sacred texts from the 'world religions', and this 
excludes the many religious traditions which have no text, or which do not 
have a single sacred text, although the possibility remains open that this 
non-textual work could be completed by another writer. Furthermore, Hick's 
notion that all religions aim at some kind of salvation or at least personal 
transformation seems to be dubious in light of those which have no such 
idea. In his 2012 PhD thesis, Wai Yip Wong argues that Chinese folk 
religion provides a counter-example to many of Hick's claims. In particular, 
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his study of Chinese Folk Religion shows that the 'Golden Rule', held up by 
Hick as the key ethical teaching which all religions have in common, is in 
fact contradictory to the central theme of Chinese Folk Religion.
461
 This 
observation suggests that, although Hick is striving to be neutral towards all 
religions, he is in fact biased by his own confessional position. In trying to 
maintain that position, then, Hick or his follower faces a dilemma:  
 
If he tries to argue that what this religion teaches is indeed mistaken 
because it is inconsistent with the core teaching of other religions, 
such an approach would be identical to that of the exclusivists whom 
he strongly opposes; and if he suggests that this religion is 
syncretistic, superstitious, non-salvific and thus unreliable, we have 
seen that such classical viewpoints are unfair (i.e., non-pluralist) 
because the said religiosities only imply differences, not inferiority – 
the pursuit of earthly fortunes at the present, for example, can be 
seen as a different yet equally legitimate conception of salvation.
462
 
 
Wong ultimately argues, however, that the benefits of Hick's neutral 
position can be maintained by accepting multiple criteria for valid religions. 
This involves rejecting some of Hick's claims about what constitutes an 
'authentic religion' in favour of a less simplistic and more accurate view of 
the religions which actually exist in the world – Hick did not take Chinese 
Folk Religions into account in his original pluralist perspective, but they, 
and other neglected traditions, can be incorporated into a version which 
allows religions to speak for themselves rather than relying on texts.
463
 
There may be an ongoing concern about whether a particular version of 
pluralism has incorporated all of, or enough of, the world's many religious 
traditions, but it seems theoretically possible to continue such an expansion 
until it meets the required standard.  
 
Keith Ward's extensive response to Don Cupitt's Taking Leave of God, 
called Holding Fast to God, focusses on the issues around non-realism, but 
also discusses Cupitt's pluralism – drawing out, though without referring 
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directly to, its similarities with Hick's pluralism
464
. Like D'Costa, he 
critiques the use of "the old story of the men feeling different parts of an 
elephant, which is usually trotted out at this point", saying that it "rarely 
leads people to draw the obvious conclusion, which is that it really is an 
elephant, after all".
465
 Ward also objects to having his words, the words of a 
practising Christian, reinterpreted – something akin to what D'Costa 
critiqued as 'mythologising' in Hick's work.
466
 Ward says that Cupitt: 
 
… may very well invent for himself, autonomously, an ideal way of 
life, and get on with it. He may, if he wishes, tell himself false 
stories about non-existent gods to help him follow his ideal (though 
that sort of help seems rather dubious). What he cannot do is tell 
people like me what I really mean when I speak of God. Words 
mean what fully educated, competent language-speakers intend them 
to mean. I intend the word 'God' to refer to the perfect creator of the 
universe, and the dictionary assures me, if in doubt, that it does mean 
just that.
467
 
 
Ward provides no references to tell us whose thought in philosophy of 
language he might be drawing upon when he makes such claims, but on the 
face of it they sound plausible, and it is worth pausing to see how this 
differs from the Wittgensteinian view of language which I considered in 
chapters 2 and 3. The key word in the paragraph is 'intend'. Despite the 
references to education, competence, and the dictionary (which could be a 
tool of community-created meaning), Ward implies that meaning is 
something issuing from the mind of the speaker and checked by the 
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dictionary in cases of doubt, rather than by the use of the word in particular 
contexts by a community of speakers. He also confuses sense and reference 
– 'God' could mean what he intends it to mean without referring to that to 
which he intends it to refer (if, for example, that referent does not exist). 
This serves to confuse his following point. He says that since he does intend 
to refer to an existent being: 
 
… if C[upitt] insists on using the word 'God' expressively and non-
referringly , he is involved in a factual dispute with me and all my 
fellow-believers. We say that there is a God, and he says there is not 
(or that we could not refer to one, if there was). It is not just that we 
are using words in different ways (though we are). We are 
disagreeing about the facts, about the nature of the world.
468
 
 
Unfortunately, Ward has left the key point here in parentheses. In Taking 
Leave of God, Cupitt does indeed argue that the concept of God, like all 
other concepts, exists within our language system and that we cannot access 
God aside from this human linguistic perspective.
469
 Because of this, he is 
not disagreeing with Ward and others about the nature of the world, but 
about what we can know about the nature of the world – about 
epistemology, rather than about 'facts'. Cupitt actually thinks that this issue, 
about whether God 'really exists' or not, is irrelevant, something he would 
say that he has in common with Kant. Cupitt says that the "crucial point" 
about the question "does God exist outside faith's relation to God, or is the 
concept of God just a convenient heuristic fiction that regulates the religious 
life?" is that "it is of no religious interest": 
 
There cannot be any religious interest in any supposed extra-
religious reality of God, and I have argued all along that the religious 
requirement's authority is autonomous and does not depend on any 
external imponent.
470
 
 
From Cupitt's perspective, then, the objections made by Ward and others are 
missing the point. 'God' is "an incorporating or unifying symbol connoting 
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the whole of what we are up against in the spiritual life", useful enough that 
we should keep the term, but not something around which we should try to 
build a metaphysics.
471
 There is something distinctly postmodern about this 
detached or even ironic kind of position. 
 
Without wishing to digress into a detailed discussion of Kant here, it is 
worth noting that while Cupitt takes Kant's phenomenal/noumenal 
distinction to say that God's 'real existence' is irrelevant, and that there is no 
reality 'out there' for God to exist in, Hick would argue that Kant says that 
there is a reality in which God could exist.
472
 As we have seen with the 
many uses of Wittgenstein discussed in this thesis, the work of a single 
philosopher can often be interpreted to support more than one position. Both 
Cupitt and Hick – and, less directly, the Quaker universalists – are drawing 
on the same tradition of European thought but are employing it in different 
ways. 
 
Even if we accept that Hick's pluralism is plausible, there are further reasons 
why we might find it objectionable. For one thing, if our reason for rejecting 
exclusivist and even inclusivist Christian claims about salvation is that we 
find the Christian claim to know best to be arrogant and support imperialist 
behaviour of which we disapprove – and this is one of Hick's reasons for 
developing another way of thinking about non-Christians – it is disturbing to 
find that the pluralist proposal, which claims to replace and improve upon 
those positions, has much the same effect.
473
 This, restated, is precisely what 
Sinkinson argues: that followed through, Hick's proposals lead to the very 
intolerance that he condemned in others. This is because the assumptions for 
which Hick critiques inclusivism and exclusivism, "about others regarding 
the validity of their beliefs", he also "cannot avoid making".
474
 Sinkinson 
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says that: 
 
… the philosophy of language embedded in the pluralist hypothesis 
demands a constant reinterpretation of the claims religious people 
make. The pluralist interprets the doctrines of all traditions as, 
substantially, mythological. The only religious claims that escape the 
mythological treatment are those that the pluralist herself makes.
475
 
 
D'Costa and others have made the same point, arguing that Hick's position 
"has the effect of claiming that there are no true religions, for all 
misunderstand themselves until they embrace the pluralist hypothesis".
476
 
This can be traced to the influence of Enlightenment thought on Hick's 
work: Hick mirrors the Enlightenment pattern which, by "granting a type of 
equality to all religions" ends up "denying public truth to any and all of 
them".
477
  
 
After this clarification, which problems remain? Pluralism may well be in 
conflict with prior commitments, including some commonly held by 
religious believers, and this remains an issue to be addressed in the next 
section. The claim that pluralism has missed out some religious traditions is 
true historically, but does not stand as a persistent problem because it can be 
rectified with further work. Arguments that pluralism misrepresents 
religious truth-claims tend to miss the point, especially of non-realist 
pluralisms, because they have missed the lack of metaphysics which comes 
with that kind of position. A related claim, that pluralism(s) exhibit an 
attitude of arrogance and knowing best about other people's religions, 
remains problematic, and might be particularly troubling to Quakers given 
the Quaker emphasis on primacy of personal experience. I consider this 
reason for opposing pluralism in more detail in the next part. 
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Part 3: Responses 
 
In this part of the chapter, I aim to give some pluralist responses to the two 
substantive points from the last part; I have set aside those which were 
adequately responded to above. The purpose of this section is not to validate 
pluralism entirely, but to show how it can be coherent enough for 
individuals to accept within the context of a community where most if not 
all others also accept it. In chapter 7, I will go on to show how these 
assumptions – already hinted at in chapter 1 – form an important part of the 
background which makes the Quaker list-format and multi-theəlogy remarks 
intelligible. 
 
In response to non-pluralists who find pluralism implausible based on their 
intuition or previous commitments, pluralists are free to point out that 
pluralism is in line with their own intuitions and previous commitments. 
Maybe the pluralist is right. Indirect evidence can be produced on both 
sides, and both sides can claim some direct evidence (from revelation, for 
example) which would simply be dismissed by the other.
478
 Pluralists can 
accept that Hick's work was incomplete, and look to adapt their position to 
incorporate other religions with which Hick was not familiar into their 
theory – for example, a move like the Quaker one, which puts the emphasis 
on the universality of human experience of the Something Else and not on 
the universality of any particular form of morality, might be able to 
encompass Chinese traditional religion, and perhaps others which Hick 
omitted, alongside the 'world religions'. Indeed, this move can be taken as 
shifting the focus from the tradition, something which functions at the 
community level, and towards the individual, so that even individuals who 
do not belong to a religious tradition, or who belong to a tradition whose 
teachings Friends would find objectionable, can be acknowledged to have 
some access to 'the Real'. Furthermore, the emphasis on the 'inner Light' 
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found in modern British Quakerism would tend to complement the trend 
towards focusing on the individual. 
 
The concept of 'something else' becomes increasingly thin as this line of 
argument is followed, and there may come a point at which it is no longer a 
useful concept. However, within a specific form of life even the vaguest 
concept may continue to be used if it happens to fill a need: in a situation 
like the 'beetle-in-a-box' scenario discussed in chapter 2, the term 'beetle' 
might be effectively very vague, covering anything unseen in a person's box, 
but still useful as the word applied to things in boxes. Similarly, Quakers 
obviously continue to need to refer to 'that which we worship in Meeting for 
Worship', and while list-format remarks meet some of this requirement, 
terms like 'something else' and 'the Real' may have a role to play in 
generalising over the contents of that list. It is clearly the case that these 
terms tell us little or nothing about the beliefs Quakers hold about that to 
which they thus refer; however, this only reflects a pre-existing reluctance 
to make any such beliefs an irreplaceable part of Quakerism. 
 
Although it might seem that pluralism plays into a secularising tendency 
which rejects the real and public truth of specific religions, it can also be 
argued that it allows religious traditions to be accorded more truth in multi-
faith contexts than is permitted by other perspectives – religious exclusivism 
or inclusivism and secular reductionism all tend to deny truth value to 
religions generally or from all religions but one. Pluralism can allow 
individuals to continue to use their religious concepts and language, in 
public, as an important part of their thought – so long as they also accept the 
pluralist doctrine that religions other than their own also contain truth. If we 
accept that Hick's pluralist position is, as Geoff Teece says, a "religious but 
not confessional interpretation" of religion, then we might consider it a non-
secular but otherwise neutral way of bringing religion into the public 
sphere.
479
 If we do not accept that, then there is still the possibility that 
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Hick's pluralism, although confessional in a way, can bring people together 
across lines formed by religious and denominational affiliation. Even if this 
does not work in the wider public sphere, I would argue that it is one of the 
processes which is taking place within Quaker spaces – and which 
underpins the ways that Quakers are at present inclined to speak about God.  
 
Another reason to look at pluralism in this way would be that it respects 
other religions precisely because it does not require conversion away from 
them. It does, however, offer perspectives and in particular claims about the 
truth-status of other religions which are foreign to many traditions, and so 
might be thought of as a kind of add-on to one's existing beliefs: Hick is a 
Christian and also a pluralist, rather than a Christian (pluralist type).
480
 
Similarly, Cupitt is a Christian (of a non-realist type) and also a pluralist, 
since that position arises from his other beliefs. Pluralists might, then, be 
creating a new multi-theəlogy religious tradition – or they might look at 
Quakerism and feel that they have already found one.  
 
For Quakers, who find themselves in a community which already contains a 
wide variety of theəlogical viewpoints, pluralism is both plausible, in that 
these Friends may have different theəlogies but also seem to have much in 
common including a shared practice of worship, and desirable, because it 
provides a theəlogical explanation for the diversity and the unity of the 
community. Meeting, in the context of interfaith work generally, people 
who are interested in interfaith work and learning about other religions – 
typically, who are themselves predisposed towards inclusivist or pluralist 
perspectives – would often serve to reinforce rather than undermine a 
Quaker pluralism, and the strength of universalism as a position in Britain 
Yearly Meeting today seems to support the idea that many Quakers do 
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accept basic tenets of pluralism. Although there may still be work to be 
done on the philosophical implications and sociological scope of this kind of 
pluralism about religious beliefs, in the context of the Quaker community it 
can be seen to be make a great deal of sense as a working position. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Quakers have good reasons to accept a form of pluralism as a way of 
looking at what is happening within their community. Quaker universalism, 
the form of pluralism which is most widely accepted among Friends, 
incorporates other core Quaker ideas such as equality of access to the 
Divine.
481
 Discussions about which beliefs can be accepted as 'authentic' 
religions and debates about which theəlogical positions can be accepted 
within the Quaker community will need to continue, but the combination of 
a pluralist approach to religions with the Quaker method of valuing personal 
experience and also testing it against communal experience will provide 
some guidelines under which these conversations can be conducted. The 
widespread acceptance of pluralism already goes some way towards 
explaining the widespread use of multi-theəlogy remarks, and we have seen 
that non-Quaker pluralists are also quite inclined to make them.  
 
In the following chapter, I discuss in detail a practice which in some sense 
embodies the pluralist perspective – and which is usually accompanied by it 
– namely, multiple religious belonging. In engaging in multiple religious 
belonging, individuals often find support for their own pluralist perspectives 
and offer support for a pluralist view even in those who do not engage in 
multiple religious belonging directly, and they also work on and often 
enable  the construction of a series of equivalencies or translations between 
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one religion and another. Taken together, the pluralist assumptions 
alongside the practice of multiple religious belonging contribute to the 
context in which the Quaker list-format and multi-theəlogy remarks make 
sense, and which I will consider again in detail in chapter 7, my second set 
of worked examples. 
  
192 
 
Chapter 6: Multiple Religious Belonging 
 
A rabbi losing members of his congregation to the Meeting house 
next door is said to have complained: some of my best Jews are 
Friends!
482
 
 
Having looked at the historical development of pluralism and its interactions 
with Quakerism, in this chapter I turn to consider the phenomenon of 
multiple religious belonging, both within Quakerism, where hyphenated 
identities (such as Quaker-Buddhist, Quaker-Pagan, and Quaker-Anglican) 
are not uncommon, and in the scholarly discourse about religion, where 
some dual identities (especially Christian-Buddhist) have received some 
attention.
483
 Looking at the approaches which are taken to the topic of 
multiple religious belonging, and the aspects of the practice of dual 
belonging which are found to be positive or problematic, I aim to dig deeper 
into the issue of how we should understand dual or multiple religious 
belonging and to consider how it fits with the models of religion discussed 
earlier in this thesis – in particular, the pluralist model will be found to 
underlie much existing thought on multiple religious belonging, and the 
cultural-linguistic model is also relevant. Ultimately, I argue that multiple 
religious belonging is a coherent course for a significant number of people 
in today's world, and that multi-theəology remarks will be more readily 
comprehensible in a context which includes multiple religious belonging as 
well as pluralism. 
 
This chapter, then, undertakes the following tasks. In the first section, I 
show that multiple religious belonging is already happening (a relatively 
easy job), and then in the second review the literature on the subject, before, 
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in the third section, considering one of the major issues arising, namely the 
question of the criteria for multiple religious belonging. I then go on to 
argue in the fourth and largest section that although multiple religious 
belonging can be problematic at times, it can be a reasonable and positive 
choice, for ordinary people and not just for an elite who are peculiarly well-
placed for it. In the process, I seek to relate the insights produced from the 
fact of multiple religious belonging to models of religion previously 
considered, especially religion as language. In the two final sections I 
consider the effects of multiple religious belonging on patterns of speech 
and show how widespread multiple religious belonging provides a 
welcoming background for multi-theəlogy remarks, even for speakers not 
themselves actively practising more than one religious tradition. The chapter 
has a strong descriptive element but also makes normative claims about the 
possible positive value of multiple religious belonging as a form of 
interaction between communities. 
 
 
The existence of multiple religious belonging 
 
That at least some people claim to belong in some sense to more than one 
religious tradition is not hard to establish. Gideon Goosen's 2007 paper 
found thirty-three in Sydney, Australia, in a short time by word-of-mouth, 
and many writers include in their considerations of the topic an anecdote 
about someone or a list of names of people who are in this position.
484
 It is 
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difficult to provide any statistical idea of how many people in a given place 
find themselves in the position of practising some kind of multiple 
belonging, not least because most surveys and censuses do not recognise the 
possibility and only record individuals under one religion. Furthermore, it is 
not always clear in what sense people belong – of Goosen's thirty-three 
participants, only four gave hyphenated identities, and the rest were 
influenced by more than one tradition but now clear about which provided 
their 'home'.
485
 This means that he counts, for example, someone who grew 
up in a Roman Catholic family but is now a Zen Buddhist as being 'both 
Christian and Buddhist' in some sense, although they may never have 
identified as both at once.
486
 Similarly, Rose Drew's 2011 book, Buddhist 
and Christian? An exploration of dual belonging, draws on in-depth 
interviews with and the published writings of six participants, all of whom 
she identifies as having dual Buddhist and Christian belongings – although 
it should be noted that not all of them would use this terminology, and by 
the end of the book, she has begun to argue that not all of these six people 
are equally fully members of both religious traditions.
487
 Other examples, 
including cases of more than two religious identities claimed at once, occur 
in passing; for example, Meredith McGuire mentions a woman who 
"considers herself a 'spiritual but not religious' Jew-Buddhist-Wiccan", 
noting that in practice this seems to mean "that she does not try to observe 
many traditional Jewish religious practices at home or synagogue, but she 
draws on meaningful parts of her Jewish upbringing for her personal 
spiritual life" – it is not clear in McGuire's account of this case how the 
other aspects of her identity factor in.
488
 
 
Other, less academic, texts on dual or multiple religious belonging suggest 
that it is, if not common, then at least recurrent: The Jew in the Lotus 
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focusses on dialogue between representatives of several Jewish 
communities and the Dalai Lama, but also discusses belonging to both 
Judaism and Buddhism.
489
 An essay in the third-wave Jewish feminist 
anthology Yentl's Revenge, 'Challah for the Queen of Heaven', describes the 
author's spiritual journey and her attempts to belong to both Wicca and 
Judaism (which were, at the time when she was writing, partially successful 
but not without discomfort).
490
 Online, discussion can be found of most 
possible combinations: many people are discussing their experience of 
combining Buddhism with Judaism, Buddhism with Christianity, 
Christianity with Neo-Paganism, Christianity with Hinduism, and so forth. 
Some combinations – Christianity or Judaism combined with an Eastern 
religion or a New Religious Movement – seem most common, and are more 
likely to be spoken about in terms of dual belonging (as opposed to, say, 
conversion).  
 
While I am establishing that multiple religious belonging exists in the West, 
it might also be worth saying a few things about its origins.
491
 Carlson notes 
that at the 1993 and 1999 International Parliaments of the World's 
Religions, "many participants needed hyphens or dashes to list their 
religious affiliations when they registered".
492
 There is some evidence – 
Carlson's observation and other anecdotes, as well as Rose Drew's in-depth 
study of six participants who engaged in Buddhist-Christian dual belonging 
– to suggest that dual or multiple belonging often begins with or is 
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associated with processes of interreligious dialogue.
493
 Some people might 
be children of interfaith couples, in which case their dual religious 
belonging – if they are raised in both their parents' traditions – would be 
interlocked with their parents' navigation of any interreligious difficulties.
494
 
Most, however, are raised in one tradition and then begin to engage in 
another, which they encounter through reading, personal contact, or travel 
(or a mixture of them). When people are seeking contact without 
conversion, which is a common feature of the explorations of those who end 
up belonging to multiple religious traditions,
495
 interfaith dialogue settings 
have obvious attractions. 
 
 
Literature on multiple religious belonging 
 
The academic work on multiple religious belonging in Western contexts is 
to be found in a relatively small number of places, has a distinct focus on 
Buddhist-Christian dual belonging at the expense of other interactions, and, 
taken as a whole, does not differentiate clearly between normative and 
descriptive claims. The main academic sources are: a considerable number 
of articles in the journal Buddhist-Christian Studies, an edited collection by 
Catherine Cornille called Many Mansions?, a book by Gideon Goosen 
called Hyphenated Christians, and a book by Rose Drew called Buddhist 
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and Christian?.
496
 A few articles have appeared in other places, and Susan 
Katz Millar has written a book which focuses on raising children in Jewish-
Christian families,
497
 but overall this is a small literature.  
 
There are also a number of practitioner sources, which overlap or interact 
with the academic material to some extent; for example, Roger Corless has 
described his personal practice in articles for Buddhist-Christian Studies, 
and Jeffrey Carlson has responded academically to Thich Nhat Hanh's 
practitioner-centric philosophy.
498
 Rose Drew's thoughtful and detailed 
discussions take advantage of this overlap and the number of practitioners of 
dual belonging who have published on the topic, and takes as her 
interviewees people who are willing to be publicaly identified so that she 
can incorporate their previously written and published views alongside their 
interview responses. Although she only has six case studies, a significant 
amount of progress is made through her careful discussions of them. 
Autobiographical material from practitioners also allows us to extend the 
range of dual-belongings included, from a clear focus on Christianity-and-
Buddhism to include, for example, Judaism-and-Buddhism, Judaism-and-
Paganism and Christianity-and-Paganism.
499
 These autobiographical sources 
are useful contributions to the overall picture of multiple religious 
belonging, even when what they reveal is primarily confusion, but they do 
not always provide either the overview or the analysis which this chapter 
requires. 
 
Besides Drew's, the other book-length study of multiple religious belonging 
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is Gideon Goosen's Hyphenated Christians: Towards a Better 
Understanding of Dual Religious Belonging.
500
 Again, the key focus is on 
Christians, although there is a wider range of religions paired with 
Christianity – Goosen includes Hinduism and other religions as well as 
Buddhism which other literature leads us to expect. Goosen's book follows 
on from his previous empirical study of 'dual religious belonging',
501
 and 
considers a wide range of circumstances under which a practitioner of 
Christianity might incorporate ideas or practices from other religions into 
their personal religious life. Some of these are relatively minor and would 
not necessarily be considered 'dual religious belonging' by others. Overall, 
Goosen's book is useful for my work but somewhat lacking in analysis; as 
John D'Arcy May says in a review, it uses "straightforward didactic prose 
and clear explanations of terms [which] should be accessible to Christians 
with or without a theological background".
502
 The downside of this is that it 
does not dig as deeply into the issues it raises as might be desirable. 
 
The other book which focuses on multiple religious belonging is the 
collection edited by Catherine Cornille, Many Mansions? Multiple Religious 
Belonging and Christian Identity.
503
 Pre-dating Drew's and Goosen's books 
(the first edition was published in 2002), Cornille's anthology considers the 
topic in a world-wide perspective, with essays focussing on – for example – 
Japan, Sri Lanka, and Christian identity. Cornille's introduction to the book 
and her 2003 article "Double Religious Belonging: Aspects and Questions" 
both illustrate an attitude which has clear doubts about the practicality and 
usefulness of multiple religious belonging.
504
 In particular, as I will discuss 
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in the next section, Cornille has a very high standard for belonging which 
makes multiple belonging seem especially difficult. Many of the 
contributers to her book do not share this view – for example, the standards 
of Christian belonging described in Raimon Panikkar's essay "On Christian 
Identity" are quite different from Cornille's.
505
  
 
Outside the journal Buddhist-Christian Studies and the aforementioned three 
books, discussion of multiple religious belonging is rare, and mainly 
sociological – for example, Klaus Huber's article "Questions of Identity 
among 'Buddhist Quakers'" focusses on survey results.
506
 However, Peter C. 
Phan has addressed some of the theological issues in his 2003 article,
507
 and 
I will be discussing his contribution in more detail below, and Tilley and 
Albarran's essay "Multiple Religious Belonging: Can a Christian Belong to 
Other Traditions Too?" also addresses some of the theoretical issues.
508
 
Very little of the material focuses on British contexts – Huber does, but 
Drew, Phan, and Tilley and Albarran are working primarily within an 
American context, and Goosen's empirical work was done in Australia – 
however, at present the situations of the traditions involved (mainly 
Christianity and Buddhism) seem to be sufficently similar across the British, 
American, and Australian contexts that the key points will stand.  
 
The literature has yet to address thoroughly a number of issues relating to 
multiple religious belonging, especially those concerning the specific 
differences between various combinations of religions, issues about the 
nature of membership in a particular tradition, and whether at a theoretical 
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level multiple religious belonging should be regarded as a positive 
development. In relation to the latter, there is a clear struggle in the 
literature between those who regard syncretism (itself a much contested 
term) as dangerous or at least unwanted, and those who see it as useful or at 
least inevitable. Although I cannot address all of these in this chapter, I 
consider some of the factors relevant to debates about whether an individual 
'really' belongs to a religion, and also those which affect our perspective on 
the desirability of multiple religious belonging. 
 
 
Criteria for belonging 
 
I have established that multiple religious belonging does exist, and 
described previous work on the subject. The literature so far raises, but has 
yet to answer, a more detailed question about multiple religious belonging, 
however, which could be put as: under what conditions should we say that 
someone is actually practising multiple religious belonging? It is noticeable 
that those who think that true dual religious belonging is very rare or even 
impossible tend to have a very high standard for belonging, and of those, 
Catherine Cornille's is probably the hardest standard to achieve: she 
demands a "complete surrender" to a particular tradition and argues that one 
cannot surrender completely to more than one religion.
509
 If you accept this 
as the standard of religious belonging, then Cornille may well be right; 
certainly, her picture of what one "might rightly" call "an experience of 
double religious belonging", in which one takes two different traditions as 
normative over different areas of life, so that Buddhism may "be believed to 
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be true and normative in certain fundamental questions and Christianity in 
others" seems like a plausible form of syncretism.
510
 However, I also 
suspect that her model of complete surrender to a religious tradition would 
be distasteful to many modern religious people – those whom Don Cupitt 
mentioned, for example, who value and wish to retain the individual 
freedom they have gained.
511
 Submitting "to the absolute authority of a 
Buddhist teacher on some issues and to a Christian teacher on others"
512
 
hardly seems like a step forward if you do not wish to submit to the absolute 
authority of a human teacher at all, even if you get to choose the issues. Nor 
is it a widely-recognised Christian standard of belonging; churches do not, 
and have never, generally requested surrender to the absolute authority of an 
individual Christian teacher, and so it seems to be a strange choice for a 
criterion of belonging in the first place. Because of this, I find it unlikely 
that many practitioners of multiple religious belonging would be upset by 
their failure to reach Cornille's standard.  
 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what would be involved in this 
surrender. Elsewhere Cornille mentions "unswerving and single-minded 
commitment to"
513
 one's own tradition
 
and says that: 
 
Religious belonging implies more than a subjective sense of 
sympathy or endorsement of a selective number of beliefs and 
practices. It involves the recognition of one's religious identity by the 
tradition itself and the disposition to submit to the conditions of 
membership as delineated by that tradition.
514
  
 
The issue of reciprocal recognition of religious identity is an important one, 
to which I will be returning later in this chapter. The other criterion given 
here, submission to the conditions of membership given by a religious 
tradition, is perhaps intended to come close to the 'full surrender' model 
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described earlier, but actually confuses the issue. Any particular tradition 
may have very demanding or very light conditions of membership, and may 
focus on different aspects of belonging – attendance, specific practices, 
financial contributions, belief, a particular ritual – and accepting authority, 
central to the 'full surrender' might not feature at all. Furthermore, there are 
examples where there is disagreement within a religion about what the 
conditions of membership should be.
515
 In such cases, are some people 
members of one part of a religious tradition but not the whole religion? To 
whose authority should they – and we as observers – submit on this 
question? In such cases, there seems to be an important and continuing 
space for individual self-definition, which is in turn likely to be based on a 
"sense of sympathy" and "endorsement of … beliefs and practices";516 that 
the endorsement will be more or less selective is de-emphasised when we 
have noted that most religious practitioners are selective to some degree, not 
managing to attend every event or agree in equal measure with all claims 
(this is a point to which I will return when considering Carlson's 
perspectives on the nature of religious identity in the next section). 
 
Indeed, many people who belong to only one religious tradition will not 
give it the authority in their lives which the term 'full surrender' suggests as 
an ideal. As Rose Drew says in discussing the authenticity of the Christian 
identity of a Roman Catholic- Buddhist dual belonger:  
 
Were one to insist that honouring the objective dimension of Roman 
Catholic identity demands that one's theology be precisely aligned 
with the Vatican's in every regard, one might well find oneself hard 
put to find any authentic Roman Catholics among ordinary 
believers.
517
 
 
A somewhat lower standard for true religious belonging would therefore be 
reasonable. By accepting that it is enough for someone to be fulfilling 
general criteria for multiple religious belonging – such as participating in 
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more than one community, working with more than one theəlogy, engaging 
in more than one form of religious practice, or any combination thereof – 
some other writers on dual or multiple belonging have found ways to 
consider those who regard themselves as practising more than one religion 
as actually doing so. Many acknowledge that there are different levels or 
ways of belonging to more than one religious tradition. Robert Schreiter has 
usefully suggested that people might engage in sequential, dialogical, or 
simultaneous belonging.
518
 The first will involve moving from one tradition 
to another, and will qualify as dual belonging if the person keeps some 
aspects of their previous belief. The second will involve dual belonging and 
a kind of conversation between the two traditions, and the third brings the 
two (or, one supposes, potentially more) traditions onto an equal footing, as 
when someone who has belonged sequentially to more than one religion 
turns back to an older one and makes it important in their life without 
downgrading the role of the newer religion. This threefold typology of 
belonging offers a recognition of the complexity of the situations in which 
people find themselves, and clarifies some of the different conditions which 
have been labelled 'multiple religious belonging'. There may be other kinds 
of multiple religious belonging – where one part of the belonging is not 
recognised by the person who belongs, for example – and these would 
demand an extension of the typology. I do not undertake this here because it 
adds little to my present argument, but would consider it a worthwhile 
project for future study. 
 
Overall, Quakers are likely to accept a form of belonging somewhat short of 
'full surrender'. Membership in Britain Yearly Meeting is mostly focused on 
attendance and participation, with desire to belong and harmony of belief 
taking significant but secondary roles, and dual belonging is formally 
accepted in some cases.
519
 Although aware of different conditions in other 
religious traditions, there is probably a desire to take this on trust – to 
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believe that those who say they are Buddhists are Buddhists in some sense, 
for example – and all three of Schreiter's kinds of multiple religious 
belonging are found among Quakers. I draw from this consideration of the 
criteria for multiple religious belonging the conclusion that not only is it 
possible but that it should not be regarded as extraordinarily difficult or 
restricted only to people in highly unusual circumstances. On the contrary, it 
can be reached by several routes and there is no theoretical reason to be 
surprised if it is relatively common. 
 
 
Desirability of multiple religious belonging 
 
What are people doing when they understand themselves as actively and 
presently belonging to more than one religious tradition? One common 
image offered in the literature is of 'pick and mix' or 'supermarket' 
religion;
520
 Peter Phan talks about "multiple belonging" as: 
 
a contemporary, postmodern form of syncretism in which a person 
looks upon various religions as a supermarket from which, like a 
consumer, one selects at one's discretion and pleasure whatever myth 
and doctrine, ethical practice and ritual, and meditation and healing 
technique that best suit the temperament and needs of one's body and 
mind, without regard to their truth values and mutual 
compatibilities.
521
 
 
In this image, people – presented with the many religious options available 
in today's world – select those bits which appeal to them and create an 
individual kind of syncretistic religion. Phan would regard this syncretism 
as a negative, despite the neutral way in which some sociologists and 
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Buddhists use this term. There is no doubt that some people do treat religion 
in this way. Perhaps the classic example is of the 'eclectic neo-pagan', who 
takes bits of this and that, usually beginning with a form of Wicca but often 
including material from Native American, Hindu, Buddhist (especially from 
Tibetan and Zen Buddhism), Taoist, Egyptian, and Celtic sources.
522
 It can 
be misguided, in the sense that it may neglect key parts of one of the 
traditions involved or require the denial of a central claim, there is the 
possibility of harm to cultures whose language or practice is appropriated, 
and it can be threatening to mainstream traditions who think of themselves 
as having clear-cut boundaries.
523
 
 
It also, as Phan argues in the quotation above, does not always pay attention 
to truthfulness, where this seems to be understood as attention to a single 
truth, or to coherence. Ironically, we sometimes find something of the kind 
advocated, even by the same people who condemn it in one form: when 
Peter Phan praises those who "out of love and loyalty" to the church 
"undertook interreligious sharing in order to enrich the Church with the 
spiritual resources of other religions",
524
 there is a temptation to compare 
such behaviour to buccaneering, piracy undertaken out of loyalty to the 
crown. Perhaps by the term 'sharing' he means to indicate that this 
enrichment works in both directions – he writes from a Christian standpoint 
for good reason, but it makes it more difficult to judge whether the 
exchange is mutual. 
 
Another aspect of this critique is the idea that in a process of selecting bits 
from multiple traditions, one may choose only those parts which are 
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charming or appealing to the individual, and thereby miss core teachings or 
perhaps fail to grapple with the challenging parts of a religious teaching, no 
more than a "merely convenient and easy eclecticism".
525
 However, Jeffrey 
Carlson defends the practice from this charge, arguing that any one tradition 
is "itself the product of a process of selective reconstruction", in which 
individuals have already "selectively appropriated aspects of a vast array of 
practices and beliefs that have been identified by those who came before as 
'Christian' or 'Buddhist'".
526
 Carlson speaks here of individuals, but there is 
also a similar and related process by which a community undertakes much 
the same process – a church community will have a communal or delegated 
process by which it chooses which elements to offer in a service, for 
example, and indeed chooses which services to offer and when, since the 
single religion 'Christianity' can be presented in a variety of forms.  
 
At the most basic level, it is clearly true that an individual chooses how to 
interact with a tradition – which worship or meditation sessions to attend, 
which branch of a tradition to align oneself with, which books or webpages 
to read, and which if any practices to take on in private or when away from 
other members of the tradition. Even in religious communities where there 
is allegedly a high level of agreement on belief, perhaps because it is said to 
be 'all in the book' or because a single authority cannot be ignored, we find 
that individuals actually dissent even when they are committed to living 
with parts which they dislike. Similarly, some groups within a religion may 
have more trouble with particular tenets; Drew discusses the way in which 
some of her participants 'hold back' from belief in particular claims, such the 
Buddhist ideas of karma and rebirth. She acknowledges that some of her 
participants find their hesitation over such matters reason to question, as 
Cornille would, their full commitment to the tradition, but goes on to note 
that there may be other factors involved. She says that one participant, Sallie 
King, attributes her "lack of positive acceptance of rebirth" less to her dual 
belonging (King does not accept the "traditional Christian position" either) 
and more to her status as a Western Buddhist, saying that American 
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Buddhists "don't… intuitively have the assumptions about… living a series 
of lives" which might come more readily to someone brought up in another 
culture.
527
 She also notes that even if King belonged to only one of these 
two traditions, she might "anyway reserve judgement about whether there is 
one life or many" because "in the light of her present experience" it is not 
possible to be sure about this.
528
 Both the cultural and the epistemic 
considerations might, for various reasons, arise for someone practising 
within a single religion, and so these are not problems specific to dual 
belonging. 
 
Discussions of these matters, including my foregoing paragraph, tend to 
frame the issue as one of adding or subtracting bits of a religion, as if people 
were putting items into a shopping basket or mixing bowl – and I return to 
consider this metaphor below. It is useful, however, to also think of this in 
other terms. For example, an individual might be seen as re-telling a story 
with their own interpretations, selections, organisation, and priorities. 
Alternatively, it would be possible to describe a person (or group) as 
improvising a performance, using some pre-learned elements, some created 
spontaneously, and perhaps also some learnt or copied from other members 
of the cast. These models continue to centre the individual and their agency 
in religious participation, but reframe their relationship to the community or 
communities with which they are in dialogue.  
 
Others have defended the 'supermarket' model for other reasons. Thich Nhat 
Hanh, a Vietnamese Zen Buddhist master who founded the Community of 
Interbeing while living in exile in France, writes that "fruit salad can be 
delicious!"
529
 His variant of the metaphor is from a conference speech given 
by an Indian Christian, who had spoken about the dangers of making a fruit 
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salad, rather than merely "hear[ing] about the beauties of several 
traditions".
530
 Nhat Hanh is keen to stress that he is willing to engage fully 
in more than one religious tradition – for him, Zen Buddhism and 
Christianity – and illustrates this by describing the experience of taking 
communion. He does note that Buddhists "were shocked to hear I had 
participated in the Eucharist, and many Christians seemed truly 
horrified".
531
 Nhat Hanh finds this at best puzzling, because: 
 
To me, religious life is life. I do not see any reason to spend one's 
whole life tasting just one kind of fruit. We human beings can be 
nourished by the best values of many traditions.
532
 
 
In this metaphor, the mutuality of exchange seems much more explicit, and 
this is matched by Thich Nhat Hanh's teaching life, in which he is keen to 
share the wisdom and practices of Zen Buddhism with those of all religions 
and none. Two things might helpfully be noted about this: firstly, that the 
roots of this attitude might be found in the location of Buddhism in Asia, 
where a kind of 'multiple religious belonging' has been normal for 
centuries;
533
 and secondly, that the openness of some teachers of Buddhism 
in particular to multiple religious belonging might explain why it is such a 
popular candidate for combination with Christianity or Judaism.
534
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Not all Buddhists are so convinced that this is a good idea, however. The 
Dalai Lama has criticised people who try to be "half-and-half", Christian 
and Buddhist, saying that we should not "try to put a yak's head on a sheep's 
body".
535
 In particular, in a conference about Buddhist views on the 
Gospels, the Dalai Lama: 
 
… gently and quietly reassured his listeners that the last thing he had 
come to do was "sow seeds of doubt" among Christians about their 
own faith. Again and again, he counselled people to deepen their 
understanding and appreciation of their own traditions, pointing out 
that human sensibilities and cultures are too varied to justify a single 
"way" to the Truth. He gently, but firmly and repeatedly, resisted 
suggestions that Buddhism and Christianity are different languages 
for the same essential beliefs.
536
 
 
The use of the term 'Truth' – capital T, a single concept without a "single 
'way'" – could imply a kind of pluralism, which goes somewhat against the 
other claims made in this passage. However, this could be a transcription or 
translation error, since this is not the voice of the Dalai Lama himself; there 
is a distinct tension between this use and the final sentence, which can 
perhaps be best reconciled by assuming that the Dalai Lama considers there 
to be a real and ongoing difference between the content of Christian and 
Buddhist teachings, even if both might in one way or another enable people 
to reach "the Truth" – perhaps seen as lacking this kind of content, a pre- or 
non-linguistic experience rather than an intellectual understanding.  
 
The illustrations from Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama are sufficient, 
though, to demonstrate that Buddhists are hardly of a single mind on this 
topic. Thich Nhat Hanh's 'fruit salad' metaphor makes it clear that he is in 
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favour of dual belonging in some cases, and this is strengthened by another 
of his teachings, namely that Buddhism and Christianity are already 
mixed.
537
 
 
Just as a flower is made only of non-flower elements, Buddhism is 
made only of non-Buddhist elements, including Christian ones, and 
Christianity is made of non-Christian elements, including Buddhist 
ones.
538
 
 
This claim requires some unpacking and a broader view of Nhat Hanh's 
teaching is useful before we can understand what is being said. He does not, 
I think, mean that there are separate 'Christian' elements which form parts of 
Buddhism, but is trying to get, through paradox, at a difficult concept, 
namely that all 'religions' or 'traditions' interpenetrate to some extent, or in 
the terminology of 'interbeing', they 'inter-are'. The reference to the flower at 
the beginning of the quotation points to a broader teaching about the nature 
of physical life which Nhat Hanh has given in several places. One 
formulation concerns a flower which, as we look at it more closely, turns 
out to be made of many things which are not, themselves, the flower – the 
"non-flower elements" (each 'element', in turn, has no essence, being made 
up of other 'elements').
539
 Carlson's paper draws inspiration from a related 
teaching in which Nhat Hanh describes an autumn leaf, resting on the floor 
of the woodland, as 'pretending' to be dead; in actuality, all the parts of a 
leaf (which were 'non-leaf elements' anyway) will go on to be parts of other 
leaves, other trees, other beings.
540
 Because traditions like Buddhism and 
Christianity are not physical entities such as flowers or leaves, the analogy 
can be hard to see, but in other ways the core of the teaching is easier to 
grasp in relation to a religion: as we look more closely at a religion, we find 
that it is made of many elements none of which are either inherently part of 
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that religion (they could be found in another religion), and which do not 
singly encapsulate the whole religion. Nhat Hanh's ease with syncretism and 
movement of ideas, practices, and practitioners between religions seems to 
stem from this perspective on the illusory nature of boundaries. 
 
To return to the Dalai Lama's imagery, Nhat Hanh would say that yaks 
already contain non-yak elements, including sheep elements, and vice versa. 
Carlson picks up this idea and uses it to challenge some notions of different 
types of double or multiple religious belonging which assume that we begin 
with "unmixed, pure traditions, prior to any sequential, dialogical, or 
simultaneous doubling up of them", arguing that this is not possible because 
"unmixed traditions are not to be found. Traditioning is indeed the verb in 
which we live, move, and have our becoming".
541
 This is especially visible 
in the religion as language metaphor:
542
 natural languages exist in families 
with more or less in common, borrow words from other languages when it 
suits them to do so, and adjust those words as necessary, as when, for 
example, speakers of English Anglicise the pronunciation of a previously 
foreign word. It is also relatively common for individuals to speak, and 
often be fluent in, more than one natural language.  
 
We can see from the foregoing material that multiple religious belonging is 
already happening in many contexts, and that its existence is not a great 
surprise within the general view of religion suggested in this thesis. Another 
reasonable question, which is addressed several times in the literature, is: 
should limits be placed upon it? 
 
For Carlson, definitely not. He argues that all religions are formed from 
syncretism at some point, in a way which implies that to reject this obvious 
truth is to be in denial about the nature of religions. He deals first with the 
term 'syncretism' and its connotations, then moves on to talk about the 
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nature of religious identity; this quotation is from his introduction to the 
relevant section of his paper, and summarises his argument: 
 
While for most social scientists, syncretism is a relatively neutral 
term, for most theologians this "religious mixing" is seen as a threat 
to the "purity" of orthodoxy. I would argue that all religion is, 
ultimately, syncretism. To have a religious identity is, inevitably, to 
be a "syncretic self", the product of a process of selective 
appropriation, internalising elements drawn from vastly varied pools 
of possibility. We are this amalgam, this ever-changing assemblage 
of diverse elements, brought together out of freedom and amid a 
certain destiny, an array of cultural-linguistic influencing factors we 
cannot control completely.
543
 
 
At this juncture, it should be asked whether, if everything is already a form 
of syncretism, the term syncretism loses sense because there is no stable 
tradition with which or from which to syncretise anything. This returns to 
my interpretation of Nhat Hanh's point above, in which I suggested that the 
theory of interbeing gives a worldview in which boundaries – even between 
'flower' and 'not-flower' – are in some sense illusions, perhaps because they 
are humanly created in the first instance. From this perspective, it is no 
surprise that the boundaries between religions cannot be maintained. 
Although the descriptive claim that syncretism is everywhere does not 
automatically lead to the normative claim that syncretism is good, a 
normative claim does seem to underlie Carlson's article: because syncretism 
is so pervasive, it is useless to fight it and we should therefore accept it if 
not celebrate it.
544
 This might be one reason why Carlson, heavily 
influenced by Nhat Hanh, moves towards terminology of appropriation, a 
relation which can stand between individuals and loose groups as well as 
self-defined traditions or religions. Generally speaking, I am inclined to 
agree with this perspective, while still finding 'syncretism' a useful term in 
the context of the mixing of religions where one or more of the religions 
involved does not have this worldview, especially if there is an attempt to 
maintain a boundary between 'orthodox' and 'heterodox' forms. 
                                                 
543
 Carlson, "Pretending to be Buddhist and Christian: Thich Nhat Hanh and the Two Truths 
of Religious Identity," 118-19. 
544
 Ibid., 124. 
213 
 
 
It seems possible to work too hard to avoiding mixing traditions – in Drew's 
discussion of Roger Corless's life, work, and dual belonging, it becomes 
clear that his attempts to maintain a distance between his Christianity and 
his Buddhism have neither entirely worked nor been helpful to his peace of 
mind or spiritual growth.
545
 In her initial profile of Corless, she describes his 
undertaking of Buddhist, Christian, and a mixed practice: 
 
As well as his Tibetan practices and his Christian prayer and 
meditation, Corless devised a special 'Buddhist-Christian 
Coinherence Meditation' to acknowledge both traditions as "two 
Absolute Systems coinhering on the same planet (in humanity as a 
whole) and in your own consciousness", which he practised in 
various forms over many years.
546
 
 
Coinherence, though, is not for Corless a form of integration; rather, Corless 
has a "fear of integration and an unwillingness to relativise the traditions 
with relation to a single ultimate reality" because he is convinced that "when 
he practised as a Buddhist he must be exclusively Buddhist, and must 
assume Christianity to be inferior", and vice versa when practising as a 
Christian.
547
  
 
The conviction that Christianity and Buddhism must be kept separate in the 
ways just described seems to have arisen from the incompatibility of 
Christian and Buddhist teachings. Drew does not state this outright, but it 
seems likely that the metaphysical implications of the two systems are clear 
to Corless and he could not accept both at once, while also being "equally 
convinced" by both sets of teachings.
548
 Corless was unable to resolve this 
conflict by philosophy or psychotherapy, but found a solution to his 
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existential dilemma in de-emphasising "an 'I' that must… [do] the 
choosing".
549
 Although this is formed from a worry like Cornille's, that 
"attempting to be both Buddhist and Christian entails a less than complete 
commitment to either of them", Drew argues that it also works to undermine 
the traditions, because the practitioner is considering "each to be inferior to 
the other half of the time".
550
 In practice, Corless does not manage to keep 
his Christianity and his Buddhism separate; having read his work and 
interviewed him, Drew says that "Despite his attempts to 'quarantine' his 
Buddhist practice from his Christian practice and vice versa, evidence of 
mutual influence and cross-fertilisation can easily be found" in Corless's life 
as in the lives of her other participants, most of whom were more open to 
the possibility.
551
 
 
Among the several approaches to multiple religious belonging which are to 
be found in the literature, some seem to have concerns in common with 
George Lindbeck, whose views on doctrine and the nature of religion I 
explored in chapter 3. For example, Peter Phan, generally supportive of 
multiple religious belonging as a practice,
552
 has concerns about those who 
should undertake it. Having described some people who have succeeded in 
practising what he considers to be an acceptable form of multiple religious 
belonging – he dwells on their depth and breadth of knowledge, long 
experience, academic achievements, and devotion to masters trained in the 
'second tradition' – he goes on to say: 
 
While it has been made more acceptable by recent theologies of 
religions [pluralisms], its practice by people, especially the young, 
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who do not possess the necessary qualifications that were present, to 
an eminent degree, in those pioneers, can easily lead to the 'nebulous 
esoteric mysticism' and 'Nietzschean neo-paganism' that we have 
been warned against [in Dominus Iesus].
553
 
 
This seems reminiscent of Lindbeck's concern about whether practitioners 
are truly fluent in their religious tradition, not least because to maintain 
Phan's model of good multiple religious belonging we would need also to 
preserve a core of 'masters', a 'fluent elite' who are trained very thoroughly 
in their tradition and able to teach it to others with confidence. It could also 
be argued that if a tradition preserves a pure elite, it is 'safe' and need not 
worry about others being syncretistic; but if Nhat Hanh and Carlson are 
right to think that all traditions are already engaged in a form of syncretism, 
then that elite may not be so pure and is certainly not as far removed in form 
from the non-elite syncretists.  It is not clear from Phan's writing whether he 
thinks that members of this fluent elite could also be knowledgeable about 
other religious traditions, but it is clear that he thinks that without sufficient 
training in each religion, people can go astray – and so because of the time 
and effort required to achieve this level, multiple religious belonging should 
remain a rarity.  
 
However, to return to the language metaphor, we can accept that it is 
difficult to become fully fluent in multiple languages, and still encourage 
people to try. Terrance Tilley and Louis Albarran use this metaphor to 
confirm their observation of the existence of multiple religious belonging, 
saying that "Just as one may know two languages fluently, so one may come 
to know and accept two (or more) faith traditions".
554
 In languages, we do 
not think that there is much if any harm in someone knowing a very small 
amount – it is not generally considered dangerous to have a few words of 
Spanish and be able to order a drink in German as well as speaking English 
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as a first language.
555
 And yet, in the religion-as-language metaphor, this 
would be analogous to the kind of situation which people are keen to avoid 
with regards to religion. Sometimes this is due to exceptionally high 
standards for belonging, as we saw with Cornille above.  
 
It should also be said, though, that it is possible to have a standard of dual 
belonging which is too low, and that this also leads to problems. In his book 
Hyphenated Christians, Goosen suggests that adopting a single word, 
practice, or symbol
556
 from another religion might be enough for a kind of 
dual belonging, a kind which does not violate the precepts of the person's 
first religion. He focuses on the idea that if a practice works for an 
individual, if it makes someone feel closer to God or the transcendent, that 
person might as well use it. For example, he describes the gestures used in 
Islamic prayer and then says: 
 
If Christians find this symbolic act more meaningful than what they 
normally do, why could they not use it in prayer? If it leads them to 
God in prayer, why not? To some extent they are 'belonging' to 
Islam but without adopting any incompatible act.
557
 
 
The scare quotes suggest that Goosen agrees with me that this is not a full 
dual belonging, and other scholars take the same line. Thinking about the 
American context, Tilley and Albarran mention interreligious dialogue and 
the availability of information about other religions as important factors in 
the increase of multiple religious belonging – although they also note that 
there will be much borrowing which is not true belonging: 
 
Reading Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance on a Sunday 
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afternoon, having attended a Catholic mass that morning, or 
engaging in Zen meditation or yoga during a Christian retreat does 
not constitute multiple religious belonging.
558
 
 
The way in which Goosen talks about using small parts of other religions in 
the context of one's main practice also points to a problem with this 
approach – not only that it advocates a kind of 'supermarket religious 
practice', although it does approach that model, but also that, even though 
Goosen says that this use will be "respectful",
559
 it does not follow a model 
of sharing or reciprocal borrowing. His concern – given that his book is 
about Christians – is whether other religious practices can be borrowed 
without contravening Christian teaching, but more widely I have concerns 
about whether such borrowing is fair. For example, Goosen suggests that 
Christians might use the holy syllable 'OM', "a most sacred [sound] used at 
the beginning of Hindu prayers".
560
 He does not mention whether Hindus 
approve of this or not; probably some wouldn't mind and some would have 
objections, but it would be interesting to know what forms their arguments 
took. Some might, for example, find it offensive, especially if the Christians 
concerned did not understand how and why the sound is regarded as sacred 
within Hinduism.
561
 If the practice became widespread, some might feel that 
their religious practice had been taken away from them and perhaps 
weakened or cheapened by the Christian use. Awareness of the relationship 
between Christianity and Hinduism in the post-colonial context – a 
relationship marked by historical imbalances of power and the presence of 
an exoticising and often spiritually hungry Orientalism – also complicates 
this, giving further motivation to objections to the decontextualized or 
careless use of Hindu practices, words, and artefacts in Christian, especially 
Western Christian, settings. 
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Goosen might simply not know what would be said in this specific case, but 
an analogy with other cases of cultural or religious appropriation suggests 
some of the points which the discussion would be likely to include.
562
 One 
of the most significant points which has occurred in other related 
conversations, both academic and less formal, involves a concern about 
maintaining the dignity and integrity of a tradition when words and practices 
from it are routinely used without much if any understanding by members of 
another culture – especially if that culture is, in the context, a dominant or 
hegemonic one.
563
 The appropriation of language and practice has been an 
acute problem for and articulated by many Native Americans; for example, 
in 1993 the Lakota Summit V issued a declaration of war, saying that: 
 
…for too long we have suffered the unspeakable indignity of having 
our most precious Lakota ceremonies and spiritual practices 
desecrated, mocked and abused by non-Indian "wannabes," 
hucksters, cultists, commercial profiteers and self-styled "New Age 
shamans" and their followers.
564
  
 
Hinduism has sometimes been treated in a similar way, as when images of 
Kali or Ganesh are used as decoration without respect for their origins or 
meaning to believers (being printed on tins of mints, t-shirts, or toilet seats, 
for example), although the largest debate about appropriation from 
Hinduism is about the use and teaching of yoga as non-religious.
565
 With 
these cases in mind, it is clear that Christians using 'OM' at the beginning of 
prayers are also appropriating something which is not theirs to use and 
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thereby engaging in a practice which, especially because they are likely to 
misunderstand the importance of the syllable when it has been transported 
into this new context, is likely to be offensive to Hindus and members of 
other religions – such as Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism – which use it 
regularly.  
 
Sometimes objections to multiple religious belonging are focussed on a 
worry about people taking a consumerist attitude to religion – Drew's 
participants often "explicitly criticised 'supermarket' spirituality or New Age 
religiosity, and the superficiality they perceived in it".
566
 Drew goes on to 
say that one element of this critique is "an objection to the exercise of 
personal choice", which is "clearly evident if one commits oneself to beliefs 
and practices beyond those prescribed by one's home tradition".
567
 She does 
not find this convincing, however, since (in line with Carlson's observation 
quoted earlier) it is "erroneous to assume that those who are only Buddhist 
or only Christian do not also exercise personal choice"; King, one of Drew's 
participants, points out – rightly, in Drew's opinion – that "the fact of 
diversity both within religious traditions and among them makes choice 
inevitable, even if one does not choose consciously".
568
 Issues of 
superficiality, lack of time, and coherence are not faced solely by dual 
belongers, either, although they may need to work harder on balancing their 
commitments especially in relation to the latter problem. However, as more 
dual belonging pioneers, especially those like Drew's participants whom she 
characterises as "highly reflective individuals with backgrounds in academic 
theology and religious studies", undertake the work of establishing 
coherence and the points of incompatibility between sets of beliefs, this 
burden is likely to be lessened.
569
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Another issue in the 'pick and mix' or 'supermarket' objection might relate to 
these images of food, in which one is buying, consuming and being 
nourished by religious ideas or practices, but not belonging to a religious 
community. There might be discomfort with the idea that one is paying for 
religion or spirituality, or assuming that one is entitled to it and taking 
without even paying, and also with the disconnect or alienation that it 
implies. This, again, is not an issue restricted to contexts of multiple 
religious belonging – treating religion as an object for consumption is 
problematic in single-tradition settings as well. However, it is so frequently 
associated with multiple belonging that it is worth addressing here, and it is 
the case that multiple belonging can include a consumerist attitude to 
religion. It is also true that the supermarket seems a long way from a shared 
meal. Of course, actually at a community meal such as a 'bring and share', 
one exercises a considerable amount of personal choice – in what to bring, 
what to eat and what to leave (just like on the pick and mix counter), and 
even where to sit – but the metaphors suggest not just the choice but the lack 
of context. Supermarket food is wrapped and removed from its origins, 
whereas at a shared lunch Mary's casserole is accompanied by Mary's dish 
and usually Mary herself. John Hull also suggests that people talking about 
mixing of religions (in his case study, in the context of changes to the 
British national curriculum for religious education) are invoking disgust by 
making comparisons to disgusting food combinations – the pick and mix 
image may in part be linked to this, although it is not as direct as some of 
his examples, such as one where the proposal to teach six world religions 
equally is called "a mess of secular pottage".
570
 These comparisons are 
themselves culturally shaped but very widespread within the culture and 
deeply affecting the emotions of those involved.
571
  
 
Sometimes, however, worries about dual belonging are based in concerns 
about the incompatibility of religions, and this is a place in which the 
metaphor of religions as language comes under strain. Being able to order a 
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drink in German does not prevent me from being able to do so in English, 
but holding that it is "non-dual realisation of emptiness which liberates 
people" does seem to prevent me from simultaneously holding that it is 
God's grace which provides redemption.
572
 Obviously, there are many 
debates here – within Christianity and Buddhism as well as between them, 
and about the nature of reality as well as what people should do for the best 
– but many of them seem to involve the Christian-Buddhist dual-belonger in 
trying to hold two opposing positions at once. Throughout her book, Drew 
discusses examples of these, and finds that in every case at least some of her 
participants have managed to reconcile the two positions. It is not clear 
whether this is a testament to the compatibility of Buddhism and 
Christianity or to the ingenuity of people who find themselves trying to 
practice both, but the reader is left with the impression that all such 
difficulties can be surmounted eventually.
573
 Not being able to foresee what 
all the possible difficulties would be, it is difficult to know whether this is 
the case; it does seem to be the case that for all difficulties discovered so far 
in the practice of dual Christian-Buddhist belonging, at least some 
practitioners are able to solve or dissolve any given one. 
 
If the process of negotiation between positions is ongoing, we might think 
that dual religious belonging has an important place in today's world – for 
example, we might see it as a very deep form of interreligious dialogue, 
perhaps the more likely to succeed because those involved support or affirm 
both traditions involved in a very personal way. The two traditions might 
also benefit from learning from one another; in Drew's book, some of her 
participants argue that Buddhism might do well to learn from Protestant 
approaches to hierarchy and authority within the community, and that 
Christians can learn much from Buddhism about meditation techniques.
574
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 King, Drew's Quaker-Buddhist participant, points out that many American Conservative 
Friends are already using methods learnt from Buddhist sources in Quaker contexts, such as 
focussing on the breath as part of the centring down process in Meeting for Worship, and 
this seems likely to hold true for British Quakers. Ibid., 174. 
222 
 
 
Furthermore, accepting that some individuals, including some within the 
Quaker community, are successfully practising multiple belonging will 
begin to not only explain the existence of Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks 
but also to suggest that they can make sense in their context.  
 
 
Effects of multiple religious belonging on religious language use 
 
Only a few authors in the relatively small literature on multiple religious 
belonging have touched on the issue of the uses of religious language, and 
although they will be mentioned in this section I am mainly concerned to 
look back to chapters 2 and 3 to see how the view of religious language 
outlined there will respond to the existence of multiple religious belonging. 
 
I said in chapter 2 that it is plausible to think that the meanings of words are 
created by the ways in which people use them within specific contexts, and 
hence that religious language gains meaning from the religious contexts in 
which people use it (as well as, for those words which have secular uses too, 
from those contexts). Initially, this raised a caution about patterns of use 
which involve taking religious language from one specific context – a word 
which has a technical meaning within Buddhism, for example – into another 
setting. Similarly, the important role played in preserving and correcting a 
faith tradition by people who are fully fluent in it, as discussed in chapter 3, 
gives a reason to want some people to maintain a very high level of facility 
with one tradition; and although this may not be incompatible with knowing 
something of some other religions, the time and effort required is likely to 
be difficult to maintain under conditions of dual belonging. Furthermore, for 
some religious groups in which an exclusivist theology is an important part 
of their doctrine, dual belonging of any kind may be incompatible with the 
high level of (a kind of) knowledge and involvement required for entry into 
the 'fluent elite'.  
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It should be noted, though, that not all religions do make this demand, and 
that some authorities within those traditions can practice dual belonging – if 
we accept that to be a Zen Master is to be part of the fluent elite within Zen, 
which does not seem an unreasonable proposal, then Thich Nhat Hanh's 
dual Buddhist-Christian belonging shows that it is possible. Not all 
Christians would judge him to be fully fluent in Christianity, though, and to 
argue that he is more fluent than an ordinary Christian believer would be 
difficult and might require a (clearly problematic) assumption that his 
expertise in Zen Buddhism in some way carries over to other religious 
traditions.
575
 Although it is relatively easy to point to some people who are 
certainly part of the fluent elite within a tradition, it is much harder to draw 
a lower boundary on the category, as it shades gradually into ordinary 
fluency. Fluency, similarly, shades gradually into disfluency and lack of 
knowledge; one learns a language or a religion by small steps and there is 
no single moment at which one becomes fluent. 
 
It is important to remember, though, that the kind of fluency under 
discussion here is about knowing-how as much as or more than it is about 
knowing-that. Contrary to Phan's implication, holding a doctorate in a 
religion is not the highest form of fluency. He is right to say that 
competency in "the classical languages of these religions" (the religion 
towards which one is moving) and familiarity "with their sacred texts" are 
useful and important respectively, but they are not necessarily the most 
important way of knowing a religion. Because in practice, interfaith groups 
often find that sharing practices is as important as, if not more important 
than, sharing apparently straightforward claims about beliefs and theology, I 
tend to agree with the pioneers he mentions that "interreligious sharing" 
must, or at least should, be "predominately in the areas of ethical and 
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 Or to make a pluralist metaphysical claim about the power of Buddhist insight or 
enlightenment to provide insight also into Christianity. This seems to me to be a misguided 
move, however, and given Nhat Hanh's general views on metaphysics, I don't think he 
would approve of it either. 
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monastic practices and prayer and even mysticism".
576
 Furthermore, those 
traditions within the world religions which have most in common often 
seem to be the 'mystical' or 'contemplative' aspects – it may be that silent 
practices or repetitive chanting are less disturbed by theological differences 
and so the more easily shared.
577
 Even outside these parts of the religion, 
though, practices of prayer and community behaviour are a significant 
background without which a theəlogy cannot be fully appreciated. Knowing 
how to behave, how and when to pray or meditate, and what actions are in 
line with the ethical code of your religion are all important aspects of 
religious fluency, which can be overlooked if we are too focused on 
academically visible knowledge. This does not change much in the context 
of multiple religious belonging, but it does again provide a reminder that 
such fluency, 'bilingual' or not, should be within reach of ordinary believers. 
 
It is also worth considering here the claims about religious experience which 
are made – or, in fact, mostly not made – by this understanding of multiple 
religious belonging. Although the Quaker Universalists whom I discussed in 
chapter 5 do make claims to the effect that all religious experience is of one 
kind though described in different ways, most of the practitioners of dual or 
multiple belonging who are discussed in the literature do not seem to be 
making this claim. They talk mostly about practices, and when they do 
mention religious experience, it often seems to be specific to the setting in 
which it occurred – so that Reuben L. F. Habito, although also a Roman 
Catholic, seems to describe his experience of kensho (initial insight into the 
Buddha Nature in oneself) in the terms of the Zen Buddhism which 
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 His pioneers happen to have been working with two religions which both had strong 
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the examples with which I am familiar (e.g. Buddhism and Quakerism are comparatively 
open to multiple religious belonging; those who engage a form of Islam in dual belonging 
are usually involved in Sufism rather than other schools of Islamic thought), but evidence 
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provided the context for it.
578
 In the light of Lindbeck's view, discussed in 
chapter 3, that it is religious language which makes certain religious 
experiences possible rather than religious experiences which demand 
language in which to describe them, this is what we would expect to see in 
people taking up multiple religious belonging: as someone learns a new 
religion, new religious experiences become possible for them which could 
not have taken that form previously. 
 
The idea of the irreplaceability of certain religious 'pictures' and ways of 
speaking also seems to make sense within the context of multiple religious 
belonging. At times people talk in a way which seems to directly contradict 
the idea of irreplaceability, and yet on digging deeper we find that there is 
an agreement at the base of it. For example, Goosen talks at length about 
people using symbols (which he understands in a broad sense to include 
language, practices, and artefacts) from other religions to help them connect 
with the divine: 
 
… in regard to other faiths, a ritual, a picture, a drawing, a statue, a 
place, can all be religious symbols if they make present something of 
the transcendent for a person. … symbols can be taken from religion 
A or B and used by someone who is an adherent of religion C.
579
 
 
Although the use of an item from religion A by someone who is an adherent 
of religion C does not necessarily mean that the item has 'moved into' 
religion C, this description of the process makes the process seem 
unproblematic, which is unlikely to be the case. I do not know what the 
underlying assumptions are here, and they will in any case vary depending 
on which religions are being borrowed from and by whom. Two possible 
cases are that some people might be working within a pluralist 
understanding, in which there is only one "transcendent" which might be 
made present for an individual by any of a variety of means, while someone 
else might say that, for example, Christ revealed in all religions can be 
                                                 
578
 Drew, Buddhist and Christian? An exploration of dual belonging: 26. 
579
 Goosen, Hyphenated Christians: Towards a Better Understanding of Dual Religious 
Belonging: 98. 
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experienced through a picture of Krishna, or that Christ is a guru or avatar 
while Vishnu remains supreme. Either of these can take place without any 
kind of dual belonging. However, those who continue to practise two 
religions over a considerable period of time, like most of Drew's 
participants, do not think that they are replacing one picture with another but 
rather adding to their collection of many irreplaceable pictures. Returning to 
the quote from Goosen above, it can also be read in this way: the adherent 
of religion C wishes to add to their practice a symbol or 'picture' from 
religion A, and in doing so they may take on more or less of religion A 
along with that symbol. Depending on how much of that second religion 
they take on, they may find that they are practising a form of dual 
belonging. 
 
This raises once again the issue of what it takes to belong to a religious 
tradition. Religious belonging is sometimes described as if it were only an 
issue of self-identification, something which people determine for 
themselves. There are Christian communities which accept this and no 
more, taking personal faith in Jesus to be the only entry criterion. Even 
when it is not regarded as only a matter for self-identification, belonging can 
be reduced to belief only. A person is a Christian, according to this model, if 
they believe the correct series of propositions, and if they do not hold those 
beliefs they are not a Christian even if they go to church sometimes and try 
to help the poor. Alternatively, belonging can be reduced to practices which 
are done alone – so that praying to Jesus and reading the Bible, without any 
involvement in a church, would qualify someone as a Christian. At other 
times, however, it seems that a community involvement is required; for 
example, the ritual of baptism is often seen as the marker of 'becoming a 
Christian', and in general it requires someone else to perform it, thereby 
establishing a small but necessary community. Furthermore, if the analogy 
between religion and Wittgensteinianly-understood language holds, it would 
be reasonable to expect – based on the interpretation of the 'private language 
argument' which I provided in chapter 2 – that parts of religion which seem 
to be private (such as writing, praying, or 'believing' while alone) are 
modelled on and cannot exist apart from their communal forms. It might be 
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possible to practise alone, or to maintain a personal faith in Jesus in the 
absence of a Christian community, but these things have to be learned from 
a community in the first place, even if this community is of a minimal size 
(one other person, even one encountered remotely, as through a book). This 
suggests that belonging to a religion is also in that sense a public matter, 
something in which at least one sub-section of the community is involved, 
however individual it seems to be.  
 
Overall, there seems to be no reason to conclude that multiple religious 
belonging automatically decreases (or increases) fluency in any of the 
specific religions involved or their language. Instead, I have returned in this 
section to the idea that religion, like language, needs to be understood as 
communal and considered within the relevant community context. Only 
with the aid of this contextual information – the way other people speak, 
behave, and believe – will it make sense to ask whether someone is 
speaking, behaving, or believing grammatically, in the correct way for that 
language or religion. 
 
 
Does multiple religious belonging help a community make multi-theəlogy 
remarks? 
 
Accepting that it is possible to belong to two or more religious traditions at 
the same time – to be fluent in multiple religious languages – suggests that 
some people are in a position to use language from more than one religious 
tradition in a single remark. This is the core of the multi-theəlogy remark, 
and there seems to be no reason to think that multiple religious belongers 
are wrong to bring their traditions together in this way. Indeed, trying to 
have multiple religious belonging but keep the religions apart is likely to 
lead to personal and philosophical struggles. Therefore, if people who 
belong to both Buddhist and Christian traditions, and are working within a 
monocentric pluralist framework, choose to speak about Buddha and Christ 
as equals, or even as incarnations or representations of the same reality, this 
could be both coherent with their belief system and need not involve an 
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ethically dubious appropriation – if you genuinely belong to a tradition, it 
cannot be theft to use the words and tools which that tradition provides.
580
 
 
For many of the Quaker examples which I have considered in this thesis, it 
will be difficult to determine whether or not the speaker has full 
membership in both or all the traditions whose words they use. Especially 
for those who are anonymous, a principle of charity seems best – the 
Kindlers' workshop participant who talked about "Krishna, Christ, Buddha" 
may be a Hindu-Christian-Buddhist, since I have argued in this chapter that 
such things are possible. However, I want to address another possibility 
here: that such speakers are not themselves in full membership of all these 
traditions, but that there is a sufficiently high level of dual belonging in the 
Quaker community as a whole that some common words have become part 
of the Quaker way of speaking, not entirely divorced from their original 
contexts but exploring, as it were, pastures new.  
 
Because the Religious Society of Friends emerges from a Christian 
background and is historically Christian, Christian-Quakers are not 
generally thought of as having a dual belonging;
581
 the language and culture 
of Christianity is there for Friends to draw upon and use (or not) as they 
will. As discussed above, some religious traditions seem to lend themselves 
to dual belonging, and Quakers who also identify as Buddhist or who have 
explored Buddhism are easy to find.
582
 Some have been accepted by a 
Buddhist community, although the presence or absence of this relationship 
is not always recorded in the literature. Friends who have explored Neo-
Paganism or Goddess worship are not so numerous, but do exist: the 
QuakerPagans (worldwide) email list has 124 members – including some 
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who are not fully members of both traditions, but excluding dual belongers 
who have not found or choose not to join an email list for whatever 
reason.
583
 
 
Numbers for dual or multiple belonging are hard to generate, as discussed 
above, especially because of the vague boundaries of the category and the 
tendency, of some religions more than others, to have ethnic and cultural 
aspects as well as points of strictly religious practice and belief. For 
example, Friends who have come from a Jewish background, having been 
born to Jewish parents and/or raised Jewish, may well still feel that they are 
Jewish, without necessarily continuing to participate in the Jewish 
community and practices.
584
 It is not clear to me, and it may not be clear to 
them, whether this qualifies as dual belonging or not; indeed, it may not 
matter what we call it so long as we can see it clearly.
585
 It does, however, 
seem clear that whatever the case with this specific example, any attempt to 
generalise from this answer to other cases will need to be provided with a 
stronger justification than is made by the conventional practice of treating 
Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and other 'religions' as similar phenomena 
falling under a single umbrella.  
 
That said, although the confusion is especially clear in the case of Judaism, 
similar circumstances may be present in the case of other traditions – for 
example, a Quaker with a Roman Catholic upbringing and family may still 
experience themselves as having a Catholic aspect to their identity even if 
their personal involvement in Catholicism is now minimal.  Fortunately, my 
account of multiple belonging can tolerate such grey areas, because there is 
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no need for a sharp line between success and failure, or multiple and single 
belongers – a person's status as, and ways of, belonging or not belonging are 
likely to change throughout their lifetime, and may also shift with changes 
in the tradition(s) to which they are closest. In some traditions, there will be 
formal and less formal ways of belonging, for example, so that 'belonging' 
will not be a single simple category.  
 
The real question is about what effect widespread dual or multiple 
belonging has on a religious community such as the Religious Society of 
Friends. There is no doubt that Friends learn from each other, usually but 
not always through relatively informal or participatory methods, and it 
seems probable that one of the things transmitted between Friends is choice 
of language. I showed in chapter 1 that many Quakers are inclined to talk 
about 'translating' between language from different religious traditions, and 
this metaphor presupposes a working knowledge in these multiple religious 
languages. I have shown in this chapter that dual or multiple religious 
belonging would provide that fluency to some individuals, and those writers 
who use traditional language (for Quakers, this is frequently Christian 
language) or the language with which they are most comfortable and decline 
to provide translations, but rather invite the reader to translate if it seems 
necessary or useful, are fitting neatly into this way of thinking about the 
problem.  
 
In short, the practice of multiple religious belonging, even if it remains a 
minority practice within a particular community, works to normalise the use 
of multi-theəlogy remarks. The presence of some individuals who can, do, 
and wish to move smoothly and regularly between religious languages not 
only enables them to make remarks which draw on their multi-theəlogy 
perspectives, but awareness of their existence and hearing their practices of 
speech enables and encourages others to do likewise. Over time, multiple 
individuals with multiple affiliations import a wide range of theəlogical 
terminology from a diversity of sources, as found in the examples in chapter 
4 (and to be seen again in the next chapter).  
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That being so, understanding the practice of multiple religious belonging, 
and the pluralist perspective which, although separable, is often found 
alongside it, helps us to make more sense of Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks 
by giving us a richer picture of the Quaker forms of life within which they 
are made. If anything, British Quakerism as practised today seems to 
support multiple religious belonging – it is not only open to the possibility, 
but the presence of others who practise multiple religious belonging and the 
incorporation of their preferred terminology into the communal way of 
speaking is actively supportive of it. Thus, a two-way process of 
encouragement can be seen: multiple religious belonging practised by 
Quakers encourages the making of multi-theəlogy remarks, and as multi-
theəlogy remarks become common in the community the practice of 
multiple religious belonging – already obviously attractive to some who are 
in or wish to join the community – is supported by their widespread 
acceptance.  
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Chapter 7: Further worked examples 
 
In this chapter, I will examine three further examples of Quaker talk about 
God, contextualising them in detail and considering how they are 
illuminated by our understandings of pluralism and multiple religious 
belonging, as well as the Wittgensteinian and Lindbeckian ideas which 
informed the analysis of examples in chapter 4. In this process, I draw 
together the threads which have run throughout this thesis and show how 
examples can be read in these broader social, theəlogical, and philosophical 
contexts. The examples are diverse, and differ somewhat from those given 
in chapter 4; in particular, these three are very clearly individuals speaking 
for themselves, without or with less of the formal corporate acceptance 
which characterised the examples in chapter 4. Although these examples 
may not be fully representative of the Quaker literature as a whole, they 
typify a strand within it.  
 
The first is from a book by Jim Pym, who practises dual belonging in the 
Quaker and Buddhist communities and has published books on both 
religions.
586
 The Pure Principle: Quakers and other faith traditions deals 
specifically with the issue of religious traditions other than Quakerism, and 
engages directly with issues around pluralism, arising from conflicts 
between worldviews, and multiple religious belonging (chapter titles include 
'Mutual Irradiation', 'What of God?' and 'Quakers and Buddhism').
587
 His 
ways of speaking about a Pure Principle are illuminated by our insights into 
pluralism/universalism from chapter 5, and are clearly informed by his life 
as a dual practitioner, which allows us to bring in perspectives gained in 
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chapter 6; in turn, a more detailed consideration of a real example will shed 
light on these theoretical perspectives. 
 
The second is from an edited collection produced from work done as part of 
the Quaker Quest project – not dissimilar to the context of one example in 
chapter 4, which was from Journeying the Heartlands, an edited anthology 
produced through the Kindlers. This collection, New Light, contains longer 
extracts, each produced by an individual Friend in a format based on the 
practice of giving presentations at Quaker Quest (enquirers or outreach) 
events, but as in the Kindlers collection they are all anonymous.
588
 Although 
it has been produced by a communal method, the anthology does not give 
any kind of community stamp or agreement to particular pieces within it. 
Despite this, the extract I have chosen for analysis offers significant clues 
about those religions and religious terms which Quakers can accept, and 
also – which is rare in the literature – about those which the Friend writing 
specifically cannot accept. In chapter 5, we saw pluralism trying to spread 
its net as widely as possible, and in this extract we will see some snags in 
which it may become entangled. 
 
Finally, the third extract is from the afterword in Alistair McIntosh's book 
Soil and Soul.
589
 As a whole, the book tells the story of his involvement as a 
Quaker and an expert on environmental sciences in campaigns to protect the 
Hebrides from various forms of outside control, especially where they 
would be environmentally detrimental. As part of this work, he calls on the 
religious expertise of non-Quakers, including a Protestant minister and a 
Native American spokesperson, and he handles their distinctive views 
carefully, aware of the ways in which he has many commonalities with them 
but also many differences from them. In the afterword, he offers a classic 
multi-theəlogy remark which may not reflect the care he took with other 
religious beliefs earlier in the book. I will use this final example to reflect on 
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234 
 
how he, as a Quaker who does not identify as occupying a position of 
multiple religious belonging, is able to make such a remark in the context of 
a generally respectful pluralism. I find that his comment is typical of many 
made by Quakers, having many of the same features as other examples 
discussed in this thesis, and can therefore stand as a case study which allows 
a consideration of the whole trend. 
 
Example 1: The Pure Principle 
 
The Pure Principle to which Jim Pym's title refers is, he says in the first 
chapter, "not unique to Friends". He has drawn the name from John 
Woolman's affirmation that "there is a principle which is pure, placed in the 
human mind, which in different places and ages has had different names; it 
is however pure and proceeds from God".
590
 Woolman's remark can be read 
as supporting the Quaker universalism which we examined in chapter 5, and 
indeed Pym – who might identify himself as a universalist – goes on to echo 
very closely Ralph Hetherington's list of names as quoted in chapter 5:
591
 
 
Christians call [the Pure Principle] "The Mind that was in Christ 
Jesus", or "The Cosmic Christ". In Buddhism, it is the "Unborn 
Buddha Mind" or our "Original Face". In Hinduism, it is the Atman, 
in the sense of the Self that is One with God. In China, it was known 
as the Tao, while the other monotheistic religions speak of "the 
Soul" or "the Spirit" or use phrases similar to the Quaker term "That 
of God".
592
 
 
Most of these names and phrases are familiar from previous lists which we 
have discussed in the course of this thesis, and so I am not going to examine 
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each one individually in this case.
593
 However, there are some distinct 
features about Pym's list which are worth considering in detail. Firstly, the 
choice to name Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and China,
594
 but to 
generalise over all "the other monotheistic religions" is interesting: I 
presume that Islam and Judaism at least are intended to be included in this 
group, and that despite the sentence structure Christianity is the previously-
mentioned monotheistic tradition to which these are 'other'. It is not clear 
whether Pym's generalisation is true – the Hebrew Bible makes use of 
'Spirit', but it is not obvious that this is a synonym for 'Soul' (indeed, there 
are reasons to think that it is not), and nor is 'Spirit' such a common term in 
Islam. Furthermore, in many contexts there would be a clear distinction 
made between the soul or person's spirit, which is part of the individual 
human, often understood to persist after bodily death, and the Holy Spirit, 
which is in some way divine or from God (for Christians, one of the persons 
of the Trinity; for Muslims, the angel Gabriel). This observation seems to 
trouble Pym's treatment of the terms as synonyms, and points back towards 
the idea, discussed in chapter 5, that combinations like this are artificial 
ones which seek to impose a pluralist world view onto other religions. In the 
conclusion to this chapter, I will be returning to this and asking whether this 
seeming failure to find actual synonyms is an inevitable part of (this kind of) 
pluralist position, or whether it is restricted to this remark. 
 
The second feature might seem obvious but, in the context of the discussion 
of synonymity, is vital: the paragraph begins with a claim that this thing, the 
Pure Principle, is called one thing by Christians, but in other religions it is 
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something else. A usual reading in English would provide the elided 'known 
as', so that the single item is called different things by different people, 
while remaining the same thing; it would be awkward although just about 
possible to read Pym's paragraph as saying that this thing, which is called 
the Pure Principle by some, is in some material way different in other 
religious contexts. It seems clear that, whether this reading is correct or not, 
it is Pym's assumption that the terms listed are synonymous, alternative 
names for a single 'Pure Principle'. There is some slippage here, too, 
between the naming of the Pure Principle which, Woolman says, "proceeds 
from God" – is from God rather than is God – and the naming of God 
Godself. Quakers often seem to use 'the Spirit' to name God, and other 
forms of Christianity name the Holy Spirit as one of the three Persons of 
whom all three are God. In other settings and indeed in some Christian 
traditions, however, 'spirit', like 'soul', can be used to indicate something 
which is part of the human even if it also has a non-material dimension. The 
references to the 'Unborn Buddha Mind', 'Atman', and 'Tao' do not seem to 
settle this argument; a considerable number of uses of these terms are 
possible across their historic, current, and many geographical contexts.  
 
Interestingly, although this passage conflates 'Soul' and 'That of God', in 
chapter 8 of The Pure Principle, on 'Quakers and Buddhism', Pym does note 
that some people draw this distinction: Buddhism is appealing to Quakers 
because, like Quakerism, it "does not talk about the Soul (another subject 
[Quakers] find difficult) (this from people who see "That of God" as 
different from the classic conception of the Soul)" (his emphasis).
595
 
Whether Pym's claim about Buddhism is true is debatable: it may well be 
the case that modern Buddhism as taught in the West, where British 
Quakers are more likely to encounter it, does not dwell on or speak about 
the soul often; historically, many Buddhist texts have talked a good deal 
about the soul in the process of denying that various components of human 
beings are in fact the soul; and most Buddhists would not affirm the 
existence of a permanent human soul. It is also not clear that Quakerism 
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'does not talk about the Soul' – some Quakers, such as Joycelin Dawes, have 
made extensive and non-traditional use of the concept of soul.
596
 Pym, in 
contrast, seems content with the conflation of 'Soul' and 'That of God'. 
 
Another point which needs to be made here concerns Jim Pym himself. In 
my framing of the key question earlier in this section I used the phrase 'other 
religions' to refer to religions other than Quakerism onto which a pluralist 
world-view might be imposed. However, in at least one case, Pym could 
reasonably respond that he is not imposing a world-view onto another 
religion, because he is not working from an outside perspective. In fact, 
Pym was a Buddhist before he became a Quaker. In a brief article called 
Buddha and God he begins by reviewing his personal religious history: 
 
Having been a Buddhist for some 40 years, and having come to 
Buddhism after rejecting Christianity, I eventually returned to 
Christianity (without leaving Buddhism) having found Sangha 
within a group that is essentially Christian, but which is open enough 
to accept a person like myself. This is the Religious Society of 
Friends, otherwise known as the Quakers.
597
 
 
This story has many of the elements common in the narratives of dual 
belonging which were discussed in chapter 6 – in particular, Rose Drew's 
case studies identify people who move between Buddhism and Christianity 
and end up finding themselves members of both religions.  In the context of 
the list which includes many other religions besides Buddhism, it is an open 
question whether this dual belonging status maintained by Pym makes any 
tangible difference to the way in which his remark is assessed, whether by a 
Quaker audience who tend to value experience anyway, or a 
philosophically-attuned audience who consider the writer's experience a 
relevant part of the context for Wittgensteinian reasons. In some situations – 
                                                 
596
 Joycelin Dawes, "Choosing Life: Embracing Spirituality in the 21st Century," (Quaker 
Universalist Group, 2008).  
597
 Jim Pym, "Buddha and God,"  The Buddhist Christian Vedanta Network 
Newsletter(2007), http://c-c-n.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/April-2007-
Newsletter1.pdf. Accessed 23rd May 2014. A Sangha, in the usual Western Buddhist use, is 
a community of practice. 
238 
 
his chapter on Quakers and Buddhism, for example – it does seem relevant; 
when he writes about Buddhism or Quakerism, it seems important to take 
his personal experience into account when assessing the claims that he 
makes. This point applies not just to the case of discussions of direct 
experience (when he says, "In my life I can honestly say that I have 
experienced the truth in the teachings of both the Buddha and Jesus",
598
 I 
take this – as I would with any other author – as a description of experience 
and feel no need to challenge it at that level even if I want to ask questions 
about the metaphysical ideas which are embedded in it
599
), but also affects 
the way that we read claims about the religions. For example, he says that: 
 
In Buddhism, the teacher is often seen as requiring a degree of 
respect and obedience which involves the suspension of the 
disciple's reason and even conscience… This is not something that 
Quakers can easily accept, and, to be fair, neither can all 
Buddhists.
600
  
 
The latter part of this remark especially seems – to judge from the rest of the 
paragraph and the chapter as a whole – to be based on his personal 
experience of a range of Buddhist groups. Although it would be easy 
enough to verify from written sources, in this case it is based on Pym's 
extensive experience which includes his dual membership. Within the 
Quaker context in which experience is given a particular weight, and the 
Wittgensteinian mode in which the experience of the author is a feature of 
the context of the remark, it is an important feature of his writing. 
 
It is worth giving some further attention to Pym's chapter on 'Quakers and 
Buddhism' in the light of the potential role for dual or multiple belonging 
which I outlined in chapter 6 – and because this in turn can shed light on the 
persistence, also noted in chapter 6, of Buddhism and Quakerism or 
Christianity as a pair of religious traditions which are frequently combined 
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in the dual-belonging mode. He provides, for example, a list of the features 
of Buddhism which Friends have found attractive – he calls it "a fairly 
comprehensive list, though not an exhaustive one" and notes that it "applies 
not only to Quakers, but to many other Christians as well".
601
 It was 
produced informally, without a survey, on the basis of the things Friends 
said to him when he began to talk about Buddhism with them. I give it in 
full here with Friends' comments in square brackets and Pym's in italics, as 
he chose to print it: 
 
 Buddhism is essentially experiential [and so is Quakerism] 
 It does not ask us to believe those things which we find 
impossible to believe [and neither does Quakerism] 
 It does not talk about God [and I find talk of God difficult] 
 It does not talk about the Soul [another subject that I find 
difficult] (this from people who see 'That of God' as different 
from the classic conception of the Soul) 
 It has practical techniques of meditation (probably the most 
popular reason) 
 It does not matter that I continue to be a Quaker (this would not 
be true of all Buddhist groups) 
 It is non-violent like Quakerism (mostly true, but not in all 
cases) 
 It is closer to science 
 It has a different view of 'sin' from the classic Christian one 
 It is more tolerant in matters of sexuality and sexual orientation 
 It does not have 'eternal hell' (Buddhism does have hells which 
are every bit as horrible as the Christian ones, but they are not 
eternal) 
602
 
 
We can see that Quakers in Pym's experience, as we might expect, tend to 
generalise about Buddhism and base their generalisations on the way in 
which Buddhism has historically been presented in the UK. Pym has noted 
several places where their conceptions might not be accurate, and it would 
be possible to add such caveats to other items in this list – to comment on 
some of the Buddhist traditions with more restrictive views of sexuality, for 
example, to question whether it is really 'closer to science' (than what?) and 
to ask whether the things many Buddhists believe are really that easy for 
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Quakers to accept. Often there is an emphasis on points of commonality, 
such as the focus on experience and the practice of non-violence; Pym does 
not add 'sitting in silence' to this list although it is clear from his 
autobiographical account of his coming to Quakerism that this was a 
significant point of commonality which facilitated his entry into the Quaker 
community from the Buddhist one.
603
 Where the attractions are points of 
difference, they are often from traditional Christianity rather than from 
Quakerism – which is already open-minded on matters of sexuality and, as 
just noted, does not emphasise eternal hell – although there is talk of God 
relatively often. The fact that some Friends find the lack of such talk an 
appealing feature of Buddhism points us once again to the discomfort some 
Friends feel with God-talk which, as discussed in chapter 4, can drive a 
movement towards making list-form remarks which seek to include a 
multitude of theəlogies, with Buddhism frequently included.  
 
The other positive attraction which is listed here – and which Pym notes is 
probably the most popular – is the presence in Buddhism of "practical 
techniques of meditation". If this is intended to draw a contrast with 
Quakerism, implying that Quakerism does not include practical techniques, 
this points to a failure of teaching among Friends. It is clear from the work 
of, for example, Rex Ambler, that historically Friends have a significant 
tradition of step-by-step methods, and perhaps his recent work on making 
these available to modern Friends in an accessible form is also a response to 
identifying this lack of teaching.
604
 The other possibility is that Friends, 
already equipped with practical techniques for use in waiting worship, also 
wish to develop skills of meditation – although other evidence seems to 
suggest that many Friends find techniques from Buddhist sources, such as 
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focussing on the breath, useful in the context of Meeting for Worship.
605
 In 
any particular case where meditation is mentioned, it is not necessarily clear 
whether the method has been learned from Buddhist sources. The breath is, 
after all, a universal human experience, and explicit discussions of the 
practice of focusing on it are now common enough among Friends that it 
could easily be picked up by a new attender at Quaker Meeting from another 
Quaker. Although some methods such as the silent repetition of a mantra are 
discussed in places, references to other Buddhist forms of meditation are 
relatively rare in the Quaker literature – less common than, for example, 
references to Buddhist philosophical concepts such as the Inner Buddha 
Nature. Sometimes, however, someone does acknowledge that they have 
learnt a technique directly from Buddhism. In the introduction to You Don't 
Have to Sit on the Floor, Pym's book on Buddhism, he writes that: 
 
In Listening to the Light I sought to give readers a taste of Quaker 
spirituality, and suggest things that they could practise within their 
own lives. I was not trying to convert anyone to Quakerism. This 
book has similar aims. … Buddhist practice can co-exist with much 
of Christianity, for example, and actually does so in many ways 
today. I personally know of many Christian priests and laity who 
practise meditation of various kinds which they have taken from 
Buddhist sources. This does not mean they have become 
Buddhists.
606
 
 
(Although he goes on to mentioned that some have, and does not tell us 
what he takes to be the boundary on 'becoming Buddhist'.) Here we see the 
idea that people can learn something from Buddhism, something – probably 
about meditation, focussed on techniques rather than metaphysics – which is 
useful in their lives and which does not entail conversion to another religion. 
There is, then, both a feeling that Buddhism is particularly compatible with 
Quakerism, and a recognition that it has particular things to teach which can 
be useful to Friends. Given the evidence discussed in chapter 6, it may well 
                                                 
605
 King, one of Drew's case studies, mentions it; see also Pym's chapter 5. Drew, Buddhist 
and Christian? An exploration of dual belonging; Pym, The Pure Principle: Quakers and 
other faith traditions. 
606
 Pym, You Don't Have To Sit On The Floor: Bringing the insights and tools of Buddhism 
into everyday life: 16. 
242 
 
be the case that Quakerism and Buddhism are an easier pair of religions in 
which to practise dual belonging than some other, hypothetically possible, 
pairings. 
 
Pym also devotes some, smaller, amounts of space to considering other 
pairings, however. In his chapter 7, 'Coming Together', he looks at Quaker 
relations with the Hindu traditions of Ramakrishna and Gandhi (taken 
separately), Sufism (but not Islam as a whole), Judaism, "Sikhs, Jains, 
Zoroastrians and Baha'is" (all at once), Taoism, other Christian traditions, 
and New Religious Movements. In each case he looks for what Quakerism 
may have in common with the other tradition, and in every case he chooses 
he succeeds in finding something – even where this requires a restriction to 
a particular tradition within a religion, as with Sufism within Islam and the 
Namdharis within Sikhism.
607
 Although he does not articulate it explicitly 
here, being more concerned with the historical facts of Quaker interactions 
with each tradition, the underlying determination to find something in 
common between Quakerism and as many other traditions as possible points 
back to a belief in the universal accessibility of the 'pure principle' and the 
idea that people seeking the truth will have something to learn from all of 
the many ways in which that pure principle has been expressed. In other 
words, Pym's approach already embeds universalist ideas and does not look 
for or discuss evidence which might trouble this. A very rare Quaker author 
who does consider the issue of what should be rejected from a universalist 
approach is one of the anonymous writers discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Example 2: New Light 
 
I use many names for the Divine, sometimes lingering with one 
sacred name, but wary of becoming territorial, my god shrinking to 
mere possession. …  
My experience is that God is beyond all our imagining, bigger than 
any one name we humans use. Dios, Gott, El, Yahweh, Allah, Ahura 
Mazda – I could never learn enough languages to pronounce all the 
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names of God; I cannot in this life explore all these 
understandings.
608
 
 
This paragraph was written by an anonymous Friend (henceforth known 
here as the author of passage 11) initially for the Quaker Quest booklet 
Twelve Quakers and God and republished in the edited volume New Light: 
12 Quaker Voices. Quaker Quest is a recently developed and quite specific 
template for running public meetings with the aim of engaging those who 
are interested in Quakerism but perhaps know little about them; an evening 
session includes presentations on a topic, such as God, Jesus, evil, or social 
action, from three Friends who will usually demonstrate thereby some of the 
internal diversity within the Society, a short Meeting for Worship, small 
group discussions, opportunities to ask questions, and time to socialise. The 
authors of the Twelve Quakers pamphlets were all active as presenters in 
early Quaker Quest events, mainly in London, and according to the preface 
to New Light, they "agreed that no one should see anyone else's contribution 
until all twelve were complete, and all pieces remain anonymous".
609
 The 
resulting pieces, as we would expect, show something of the theəlogical 
diversity which is present among Friends. We are told that the Friends did 
not read one another's piece before all were finished, but not anything about 
how the Friends who wrote them were selected – except that they were all 
active in the work of Quaker Quest at the time. There seems to be, then, no 
particular editorial process, and Jennifer Kavanagh's work in producing the 
anthology seems to have focussed on technical aspects rather than content. 
 
Before I return to the first section quoted in more detail, it is worth noting 
some of the clues to Quaker attitudes which can be found in other passages 
in this part of the book (all by different authors, although anonymous). 
Passage 7, for example, says that: 
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Quakers use many words for God – Spirit, the Divine, etc. – perhaps 
because they have associated the word with some, now 
unacceptable, picture of a vengeful old man in the sky.  I have 
always used God because that is the word with which I am most 
comfortable. It represents for me in its many translations the way 
humans have sought to give a name to explain the spiritual and the 
moral. So I shall use God, and I hope it will not be a barrier for 
you.
610
 
 
The Friend writing this does not find this choice a barrier to exploring 
Hindu concepts or finding "deep unity in our encounter with God" with a 
Muslim friend.
611
 The fact that the Friend felt the need to say this, however, 
points to an awareness of widespread discomfort with the word – perhaps, 
as this Friend speculates, because of the association of the word 'God' with a 
particular, quite limited and among other things patriarchal, picture of what 
God is. This is reminiscent of the motives behind some of the examples I 
discussed in chapter 4, but it also throws interesting light on the way in 
which the 'unwritten rules' of discourse about God are treated by Quakers: 
sometimes a potential rule, obeyed by many in the community and for 
reasons which are visible to others, does not suit a particular Friend or does 
not seem applicable in a particular instance, and in that case they feel free to 
break it – but often they do not simply ignore it, feeling the need to explain 
why they are not following the guideline. In a sense, this makes the 
existence of the guideline even clearer – although I note that although this 
Friend feels that the word 'God' is unacceptable to many, it is actually one of 
the more common terms in the lists I have found, although 'Spirit' is also 
extremely common. It is not clear, then, that 'avoid the word 'God'' is in fact 
a guideline in the Quaker community – a large number of Quaker 
publications, including and perhaps even especially official documents, 
continue to use the word frequently – but there is enough discomfort around 
it that speakers in less formal contexts do feel the need to explain or justify 
their use of it.
612
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Many of the twelve writers focus on experience of God rather than belief in 
God, and conceptualise God as energy or a force rather than in 
anthropomorphic terms – in keeping with the rejection of the picture of the 
"vengeful old man in the sky" which the author of passage 7 mentions, even 
if they have not in fact rejected the word 'God'. Most acknowledge that there 
is a variety of religious experience, and for example the author of passage 5 
writes that: 
 
Another metaphor for God [besides "God as energy, force, 
direction"] is a ball of many mirrored facets. We all see a part of it, 
and what we see reflects back to us a unique perspective, which is a 
true reflection yet only part of the whole. In this way, I can accept 
that others will have a different view of God, different words for 
God, different experiences of God, and yet all these are but glimpses 
of fragments of the same thing, which is greater than anything we 
can comprehend.
613
 
 
The image of God as "a ball of many mirrored facets" is a clear expression 
of pluralism, and in particular stands in close relation to the 'blind men and 
the elephant' story which I discussed in relation to the work of John Hick 
(and the objections of Gavin D'Costa). It seeks, like that parable, to explain 
how different people can have very different experiences which they 
describe in different ways, and yet be in fact having and describing 
experiences produced by the same underlying reality (the disco ball, the 
elephant). The image of the mirrored ball, however, has the potential to add 
an extra layer of complexity to this, a layer which I think brings the pluralist 
position into closer alignment with the cultural-linguistic position I 
discussed in chapter 3: the many facets of God not only show us something 
of God,
614
 but also the reflections can be seen to contain – to reflect – 
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something of ourselves. Our personalities, backgrounds, and previous 
experiences will affect the things we see in the divine disco ball.  
 
'Talking about God' might be thought of as a language-game or set of 
language-games, as described in chapter 2, and these authors are playing it 
by the distinctive Quaker rules. In American football you can do things 
which would never be allowed in association football, and similarly in 
Quaker God-talk you can say things which would sound strange, if not 
simply wrong, in another context. The list of names presented in the 
quotation at the beginning of this part of the chapter – "Dios, Gott, El, 
Yahweh, Allah, Ahura Mazda" – is curious for philosophers of religious 
language in a couple of ways. Firstly, it does come closer than many other 
examples given in this thesis to being a list of translations of the word God, 
including as it does Spanish, German, Hebrew, Arabic, and Avestan. The 
first five seem to be words which could reasonably be used by Christians or 
other Abrahamic monotheists. One, 'Yahweh', has a particular role in 
Judaism (although not, it is important to note, generally used and certainly 
not read aloud in the form given here) but is also used in various ways by 
Christians (and 'El' is also from Hebrew). Two, 'Dios' and 'Gott', are from 
European languages where the majority of the speakers will be Christian, 
but there seems to be no theological issue with Jews or Muslims using those 
words for God – in fact, these words are more like genuine translations than 
many other terms which are offered as such. Another, 'Allah', is especially 
associated with Islam although it is also used by Arabic-speaking 
Christians.
615
 In this sense, the Old Iranian/Zoroastrian name Ahura Mazda 
seems to be the odd one out in this list, and because the author of the 
passage does not give us any clue about how they came by it, it is difficult 
to know in what context it should be taken – except the general Quaker 
setting in which deity names or descriptions from a wide variety of sources 
are cheerfully and sometimes uncritically absorbed under the assumption 
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that all, or almost all, such names reflect real religious experience of a single 
Divine. 
 
In chapter 1, we saw some of the underlying assumptions about language 
which inform the ways in which Quakers talk about their own patterns of 
speech about God, and in this passage we can see them in action. Of the two 
main assumptions I identified there, the experience-first assumption – the 
idea that experience is primary over words – is not a main theme in this 
passage, although it is visible when the author says that, "I want to express 
my awe before the greatness of God, but have not – yet – found the 
vocabulary".
616
 The other key assumption, the unity of religious experience, 
is found here as an implied claim – when the author treats a string of names 
as all naming the same thing, a move which would not be permitted in many 
religious language-games outside the British Quaker context – but is also 
challenged with the idea that "some gods are not-God". The author of 
passage 11 writes that, "I cannot accept the Maya and Aztec god, who 
demanded human sacrifice… I have difficulty even learning from this view 
of God".
617
 The experience-first assumption, then, is tempering the 
universalist view here, so that the author of this passage can say, "The God I 
find to be real and whom I worship is just, loving, ethical, and much, much 
more, but not capricious or cruel".
618
 Despite the intervention of an ethical 
criterion which in most cases seems absent or unspoken, the author retains 
here an underlying confidence that we have what might be called an 
"agreement in judgement" about the Divine.
619
 We might get into debates 
about borderline cases (such as: is the Aztec god really God?
620
 is that a 
chair or a stool?) but there is sufficient community agreement on the rules 
                                                 
616
 Kavanagh, New Light: 12 Quaker Voices, 24. 
617
 Ibid., 25. 
618
 Ibid. 
619
 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? , ed. Peter Winch (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 63., quoted from Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: 242. 
620
 Or: are the Aztec gods really God? The Friend writing in New Light uses the singular but 
historically the Aztecs had many deities many of which were not worshipped with human 
sacrifice. 
248 
 
for the use of the terms, a kind of rule-following stability as discussed in 
chapter 2, that after the thoughts about the limitations of the universalist 
view outlined in chapter 6, the author of this passage can still conclude: 
"This has turned into a love song to the One Who is my Life and my End 
(God is clearly Capital Letters too!)".
621
 In the setting of twelve collected 
passages from a group of authors, it is clear that there is an assumption that 
they can and will speak about the same thing even if they name and describe 
it differently.  
 
The challenge posed by the Mayan and Aztec gods evidently does not put 
the author off universalism as a whole, perhaps because such universalism is 
grounded in a cultural context which accepts that personal experiences – or, 
in this case, lack of experience – are the foundations of the perspective. The 
author of this passage cannot learn from the Aztec and Mayan gods, and this 
is taken as enough basis on which to reject them in favour of those 
portrayals of the Divine from which the author does gain something 
positive. This returns to the issue of the relationship between experience and 
the interpretation of it through religious viewpoints, which we saw in 
chapter 3 is a more complex relation than sometimes supposed. In the 
Quaker setting, which provides forms of life such as the Meeting for 
Worship as a background, the universalist interpretation is widely supported 
by apparent experience, especially of people with quite different theəlogies 
worshipping successfully together, and so this interpretation is strongly 
appealing to many Friends even in the face of some conflicts around the 
issues of naming.  
 
The passage does acknowledge exactly these conflicts in the form of 
considerable differences in emotion towards different terminologies. The 
author says that "Light is probably the word I use most of all", citing the 
early Quaker use of it, and picks out favourite images from the Bible: "I do 
like God as mother hen…, God as artisan, delighting in Wisdom (who is 
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also God, and female)".
622
 On the other hand, some words do not appeal at 
all: "Some cannot bear God as father or mother, for only cruelty and 
betrayal come to mind; perhaps those who have suffered need Friend, 
Comforter, Healer, Ground of Being, or Truth to me feel cold and abstract, 
yet feel warm to others – how wonderfully odd!"623 This final comment, 
"how wonderfully odd!", points to another significant feature of Quaker 
multi-theəlogy remarks; there is a distinct sense that diversity (within 
certain boundaries) is to be celebrated. Other people's preferences may seem 
odd, but this strangeness is wonderful, part of the splendour that is God 
(remember the mirror ball) rather than a negative.  
 
 
Example 3: Soil and Soul 
 
Unlike the books from which my other examples have been drawn, Alastair 
McIntosh's Soil and Soul: People Versus Corporate Power is not primarily a 
book about religion. It is a book about the environment, ecology, and the 
economy, which focuses on the stories of two Hebridean islands: Eigg, 
whose inhabitants became the first in Scotland to be lairds of the estate in 
which they lived, and Harris, where the community found themselves 
fighting back against a superquarry, the proposed removal of an entire 
mountain. Within these stories, however, religion becomes a recurring 
theme. Alistair McIntosh is a Quaker, and in the course of his work he seeks 
partnerships with people from other religious backgrounds: notably, Donald 
Macleod, a Calvinist theologian, and Sulian Stone Eagle Herney, a leader 
among the Mi'kmaq people of Canada. McIntosh repeatedly returns to 
theological themes, talking, for example, about the appeal of religion for 
activists in a way which clearly reveals his pluralist presuppositions as well 
as his own Christian background: 
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… an understanding of the cross is essential to the work of 
liberation. Similar understandings of divine suffering are found in 
other faiths, even if reactionary Christians would rather fit their God 
to the Bible than the Bible to God. These [points about the power of 
the cross, such as "that nonviolence can cut sharper than the sword"] 
are truths common to the human condition because they are 
foundations of human psychology. It is not that the activist 
necessarily wants to be a Christian or a Buddhist or a Wiccan or a 
Baha'i or however it is that God reaches out to their particular 
cultural and historical context.* Rather, it is that if your courage is 
really tested, if you are really exercised… then you will unavoidably 
find spirituality speaking to you. Authentic spirituality offers the 
activist a very deep and practical strength. The point is that this 
strength, this courage, comes not from the ego but from that of God 
(or the Goddess) within.
624
 
 
His endnote, marked here as *, responds to the kind of objections which 
McIntosh envisages might be made to this passage. It says that: 
 
The reactionary fundamentalist Christian who objects to this 
syncretism must demonstrate in what ways we are not entitled to see, 
for example, Christ as Buddha nature and Buddha nature as Christ. 
That is to say, before condemning syncretism he or she must show 
that it is not possible for the Holy Spirit to have been operative in 
other cultures at other times in history, and for there to be many 
'masks of God'.
625
  
 
This shifting of the burden of proof from the pluralist to someone trying to 
take a more exclusivist position is not a move which we have seen before – 
rather, pluralists such as John Hick have tried to provide reasons to actively 
adopt such a position – but it is not an unexpected move and at the same 
time it reveals the extent to which such pluralist positions have become 
accepted among Quakers and other liberal Christians. The way in which 
McIntosh phrases his response also serves to 'other' people who might 
object to pluralism, or what he calls syncretism: the term 'reactionary 
fundamentalist Christians' uses words with negative connotations to define 
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'that other kind of Christian, not like me'. This might be regarded as a kind 
of ironic exclusivism. 
 
The broader pluralist perspective in McIntosh's passage is founded on the 
idea that the activist may not want to be 'religious' at all, but finds 
themselves drawn to a religious tradition – specifically, to whichever 
religious tradition is used by God as a channel to their particular historical 
and social circumstances – as a result of their activist work. It could mean 
that one chooses to be Christian over other religions when several are 
available, or it could mean that needing religion and finding only 
Christianity, one is a Christian by default. In this view, religious affiliation 
is not a choice as such, nor is it simply an accident of birth (compare some 
of the claims made by Hick and discussed in chapter 5), but it is something 
given to an individual by a God who can appear in many guises and go by 
many names. Although generally McIntosh is careful with the religious 
positions of others and does not try to subsume them under the general 
banner of pluralism, pluralism does form part of his own personal 
background. He is willing to use the religious language of others to 
emphasise his urgency or message, as when he says to Stone Eagle, "The 
eagle is my totem too. And I tell you… The eagles request that you come 
and help us".
626
 It works; Stone Eagle does indeed decide to support the 
campaign to save the mountain on Harris from the superquarry. 
 
McIntosh is also, though, willing to draw contrasts between his position and 
that of others: in an initial meeting with Donald Macleod, McIntosh admits 
to being "a wild character" but adds, "I have to confess that my own version 
is more of a pagan-leaning Quaker variety than a Calvinist one".
627
 Later in 
the conversation as reported, they draw out both the similarities and 
differences between their respective positions – their co-operation forms 
something of a contrast with McIntosh's dismissal of 'reactionary 
fundamentalist Christians' quoted above; perhaps here, as in so many cases, 
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there is something of a bias towards those with whom one agrees politically 
if not theəlogically. If Macleod rejected the pluralism assumptions which 
McIntosh accepts – and he very probably would – he would presumably be 
the bad kind of Christian; and yet he is a useful ally in a particular cause, 
and McIntosh is, like any pragmatic activist, willing to work with people in 
those circumstances. It does not mean that he (or Macleod) is required to let 
go of any assumptions. 
 
At the very end of the book McIntosh says something which fits very neatly 
into the pattern of Quaker multi-theəlogy list-form remarks with which I 
have been concerned throughout this thesis. Discussing the "community of 
the soul", he says that: 
 
Whatever our religion or lack of one, we need spaces where we can 
take rest, compose and compost our inner stuff, and become more 
deeply present to the aliveness of life… We need to remember that 
when we let loose our wildness in creativity, it is God-the-Goddess – 
or call it Christ, or Allah or Krishna or the Tao – that pours forth.628 
 
This is the final quotation which I am going to discuss, chosen because it 
incorporates so many of the significant strands of thought considered in this 
thesis. Although McIntosh does not specifically claim a dual belonging, it is 
clear that his Quaker theəlogy has been heavily influenced by Neo-Pagan 
thealogies (themselves in turn part of a broadly feminist movement in 
religion) – revealed in this quotation by his creation and use of the phrase 
"God-the-Goddess"; to McIntosh, the God of whom Quakers speak and the 
Goddess of whom Pagans speak are seen to be one and the same. His 
position of having sympathies if not whole feet in two camps is held more 
comfortably against a background of pluralist assumptions, especially that 
the names by which other people know the Divine are all in the end naming 
one thing – we can "call it" Christ, Allah, or something else, rather than 
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either experiencing the one thing differently or having some completely 
different thing "pour[] forth" through us.
629
 
 
One way to consider the pluralist position is as a kind of 'translation' 
between religions which are each like languages. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
this metaphor is not without flaws, but it does provide some structures 
through which we can view the kinds of comment which I have been 
discussing. In particular, the idea that those who are deeply grounded in a 
religion can acquire an internal and intuitive sense of the grammar of that 
religion, just as native speakers of a language have a sense of the things 
which can and cannot be called grammatical within that language, gives us a 
way to discuss the general acceptability of such comments among Friends. 
Although not every Quaker would say something like this, and not all 
Friends would feel comfortable with similar remarks, in the course of this 
thesis we have seen these comments coming from such a range of 
experienced Friends – sometimes, especially in the examples in Chapter 4, 
in collectively sanctioned contexts, and in all these examples in contexts 
designed for publication – that it is safe to say that those who are fluent in 
Quakerism accept these ways of speaking as grammatically correct within 
the religion-as-language-game. The underlying principles which inform 
Quaker grammar – pluralism in particular – have already been discussed.  
 
Finally, I turn back to the actual contents of McIntosh's remark. I am not at 
all confident that many Christians, Muslims, followers of Krishna, and 
Taoists are likely to concur with it, unless they also happen to have an 
underlying understanding of religion which includes the basic presumptions 
of pluralism, which can co-exist with any of these religious traditions but is 
not generally included as an integral part of them. As I described in chapter 
1, the meanings of words are shaped by the aggregate effects of their many 
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nonviolent life are in touch with the source of power, call it what you will; the Light, the 
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uses in particular contexts over time; in such cases, if we simply took the 
words in their original uses – Krishna as used in the Indian context, for 
example, and Tao in the Chinese context, or even their use in European 
settings heavily informed by these traditions, such as the use of the name 
Krishna by ISKCON
630
 – and tried to describe them, we would find that 
they have quite different uses. For example, Krishna is an individual, both 
the incarnation of Vishnu in a human form, and also the ultimate form of the 
Godhead,
631
 while the Tao is a more abstract principle, translated into 
English in a variety of ways but usually indicating 'way' or 'path'; although 
individuals might have, say, mystical experiences of either of them, we 
would reasonably expect those experiences to be quite different in content. 
However, it is not the case that these terms have come straight from their 
original traditions into this remark, even if McIntosh has encountered some 
of their original uses through reading or other research. Rather, it seems that 
they have become part of a general pluralist tradition in which such words 
are acceptably included in lists of this kind – without necessarily being the 
words which the individuals speaking would ever choose to use in their 
personal religious lives. The list of words stands as a symbol of the 
inclusive intent of the statement. 
 
 
Overview of examples 
 
Looking over the three examples in this chapter and the others discussed or 
mentioned in this thesis, it is often hard to say that the terms included in the 
lists are really used synonymously. Indeed, there is often a sense that one or 
more items are there to prove or demonstrate the diversity which the speaker 
is willing to include – there are items which we do not find in these lists, but 
there is also a genuine diversity of items which are included. Often, there 
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seems to be an 'odd one out' which cannot be found in other lists. In the 
three examples given here, these would be: 'the Tao', given last in example 3 
at the end of a list which seems to move from the speaker's preferred term 
through ones presumed more familiar to the audience to those with more 
distant geographical origins even if they in fact appear more often in Quaker 
literature; 'Ahura Mazda', as discussed in the section on example 2; and, 
oddly, probably the term 'Cosmic Christ' in example 1, which although in 
use in some Christian and even other Quaker material is a rare term in the 
list-form remarks which usually favour single words over phrases. It seems 
possible that, as well as using the list format to include the diversity of 
Quaker theəlogy – still important, especially when there is a sense in which 
the speaker is representing other Friends or wishes to be confident that all 
Friends reading the remark will feel included by it – there could be two 
other dimensions to the remarks: to support the inadequacy of language 
claim which is a correlate of the experience-first assumption, and to show a 
kind of theəlogical daring or risk-taking behaviour.  
 
The three examples support the idea that the Divine is unnameable by a 
paradoxical method, over-naming in order to demonstrate that even all the 
acceptable namings are inadequate. This is different from the refusal to use 
certain names, as discussed in relation to the author of example 2 who was 
willing to disclose some specific theəlogies which they found impossible to 
reconcile with their impression of God; many other authors whom I have 
considered in the course of this thesis find some such images equally 
difficult – although some may not be so conscious of it – but they are very 
rarely discussed, indeed I have only found the one example discussed here. 
Other authors prefer to focus on the positive, supporting their pluralist 
position only with those parts of other religious traditions which they find 
conducive to their own way of thinking. This is not a new point about 
pluralism, and as we saw in chapter 5, looking at religions which have been 
left out – as John Hick ignored some significant Chinese traditions – can 
provide devastating counter-evidence to the claims which pluralists are 
inclined to make. Here, the underlying pluralist claim is actually about the 
incompleteness of any single religious viewpoint, which might be put as 
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follows: we must use a variety of names, from a range of theəlogies, 
because no one religious tradition can (rather than, historically, does) 
contain the whole Truth. 
 
What is the purpose of the theəlogical risk-taking? As hinted above, it seems 
to have acceptable boundaries; the lists often contain items drawn from 
religions not well-understood among Friends and with which dual belonging 
is difficult and rare,
632
 and yet there are items from some other traditions – 
the presence of Taoism and the absence of Chinese Folk Religion suggests 
that ignorance is not the only factor at work. Two aspects seem possible, 
although all these are implicit and hence hard to demonstrate conclusively 
from texts. Firstly, the inclusion of something which is 'far out' may make 
some Friends who are accustomed to, and/or fearful of, receiving 
unwelcome looks or comments if they discuss their theəlogies openly in 
Meetings, feel safer in the hands of the author. This seems especially likely 
to be a concern in a text like the Pym book which provides my first example 
in this chapter, where the named author is dealing with religious matters and 
interreligious relations as the central topic. Secondly, such an inclusion may 
be another way to support, albeit in a more roundabout way, the pluralist 
claims: in pushing the boat out, authors may be trying to suggest that their 
pluralism is completely open, without boundaries (although, as I just said, 
this does not in fact appear to be the case). By including 'exotic' items – and 
perhaps this factor is especially strong for terms drawn from Eastern 
religions – the author may be saying 'look how many religions I can include, 
how many I have knowledge of' (enough knowledge to choose a more or 
less appropriate sounding term, in any case). It is also possible that the 
underlying claim is somewhat weaker – not 'there is no boundary to my 
pluralism', but 'the boundary is fuzzy, and to find it I have to push it, 
knowing that some of my audience will find that uncomfortable'. There 
could also be less honourable reasons for seeking to evoke discomfort in the 
audience but these are not named in the texts. 
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Another, potentially conflicting, desire present in the texts is a wish to avoid 
causing discomfort. The second example given in this chapter, in which the 
author engages more than most with possible names for God which do 
create discomfort for the author, hints at an ethical consideration which may 
be informing the choices made by others – Aztec gods, for example, are not 
in fact named in this positive, inclusive, list-format remark in any of the 
examples I have found in the Quaker literature. It could be that a principle 
something like John Hick's 'fruits of religion' principle – discussed in 
chapter 5 – is in fact in operation in the selection of terms for inclusion in a 
list. Other factors, such as familiarity, are also at work, and these can 
intersect in various ways. In the examples given in this thesis, 'Allah' is used 
as often as 'Buddha', and so although people practising both Buddhism and 
Quakerism are much more common than those practising Islam and 
Quakerism,
633
 multiple belonging is not the only factor at work – a desire to 
be seen to be inclusive, and the prominence of Islam in British national 
discourse in the early 21
st
 century, might also be at work. In other cases one 
choice might seem more obvious – 'Krishna' occurs several times in the 
remarks quoted, while, for example, 'Kali', does not. Such a choice is likely 
to result both from factors of familiarity – the accessibility of texts relating 
to Krishna and the influence of Gandhi on publicising this part of Hinduism 
especially among pacifists would be among the explanatory factors here – 
and similarity, since even someone not seeking an exact synonym would be 
likely to perceive a continuity – of gender, for one thing – in the list 'Jesus, 
Buddha, Krishna' and a more distinct odd one out in the list 'Jesus, Buddha, 
Kali', but there may also be ethical (and other) considerations at work.  
 
Taken together, the various pressures – pluralism, inclusion and the desire to 
display it, and ethical concerns – combine to make the list-format remark 
seem like an obvious choice if not the only possible solution. However, 
other factors which are also at work – ignorance, discomfort, desire to take 
risks, and the imperialist or dogmatic potential of pluralism – conspire to 
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complicate considerably the task of making sense of such remarks. These 
factors seem to be so widespread that even if they are not inherent in the 
situation, they are a normal part of the situation as it exists.  
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis has laid out for consideration a number of questions around the 
Quaker practice of making multi-theəlogy remarks, and built up a collection 
of tools which help to answer some of them. In this final chapter, I review 
those questions and their potential answers, and consider how much 
progress has been made on each of them. I will also spend some time 
looking at the implications of this thesis for the wider bodies of scholarship 
to which it relates – both in terms of Quaker studies and philosophy. 
 
Quaker questions 
 
At the start of my discussion, in the final section of chapter 1, I asked three 
main questions about multi-theəlogy remarks: 
 What are the unwritten guidelines for this language usage, for the 
multi-theəlogy and list-format remarks made by British Quakers in 
the literature I have examined? Or, to put it another way, in what 
ways do Friends generate that community sense of correct language 
use which enables them to see that terms such as 'light' and 'seed' 
belong on a list of synonyms for 'that which we encounter in 
Meeting for Worship' but would make them laugh at 'potato'? 
 What are the criteria on which these forms of Quaker language, 
especially the multi-theəlogy remarks, might be judged and how 
does this depend on the position of the person judging? How do 
ethical, pragmatic, coherence, and truth considerations figure in the 
construction of these criteria? 
 Do any of the remarks under consideration make truth claims? If so, 
what claims do they make and do they succeed on their own terms? 
To these I would add a question which has emerged from the first one in the 
course of my explorations, especially in the work on pluralism and multiple 
religious belonging in chapters 5 and 6, namely: 
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 What sources and practices give Friends confidence in using 
language which is not traditionally Quaker in contexts which are 
distinctly Quaker? 
 
Quaker Question 1 
 
 What are the unwritten guidelines for this language usage, for the 
multi-theəlogy and list-format remarks made by British Quakers in 
the literature I have examined? 
In seeking to answer the first question, I have turned to philosophical 
understandings of language and religion, especially to Wittgenstein's idea 
that our words are given meaning by the ways we use them in particular 
contexts, and to Lindbeck's idea that religions have a kind of grammar 
which allows the fluent 'speaker' of that religion to detect acceptable and 
unacceptable ways of proceeding (including ways of speaking), even if she 
or he cannot always describe the grammatical rules which apply. With that 
in mind, I would make the following points in answer to the question. 
Firstly, the unwritten guidelines which Quakers use when speaking are just 
that – unwritten and probably also unspoken. They seem to arise out of 
other Quaker concerns. For example,  Friends sometimes use specific and 
sometimes newly created language in order to try to speak as truthfully as 
possible, reflecting a traditional Quaker concern with truth and truth-telling 
– a concern which overrides other issues such as familiarity of words and 
social expectations.  
 
Quakers also frequently reflect a general Quaker understanding that 
language is secondary and relatively unimportant when compared with 
(what they assume to be) direct experience. Such an understanding is 
somewhat complicated by the clear presence of an opposite understanding, 
that words matter deeply both to the speaker, who is trying to communicate 
clearly and honestly, and to the listener, who may be much moved by them 
either positively or negatively. Friends strive to speak in ways which will 
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produce positive responses, even when this requires some casting around for 
the correct range of vocabulary.  
 
If I were attempting to write these unwritten guidelines – a potentially 
useful attempt even if, like an archaeological dig, it runs the risk of 
destroying what it hopes to study
634
 – I would include these suggestions: 
 use words which create for you emotional resonances similar to 
those created by experiences you associate with that which you are 
trying to describe, 
 be mindful of the range of connotations those words might have for 
others, 
 offer others the opportunity to seek words which create for them the 
emotional resonances they perceive you to be experiencing, even if 
your words do not create that for them directly and their words do 
not bring those emotions to you. 
I think this latter guideline is, or is akin to, the thought which lies at the 
heart of Quaker talk about 'translating' God-language. Translation is in some 
ways an inadequate metaphor for this process, although it does also capture 
something about the nature of the problem – especially if we are thinking of 
a dynamic rather than word-for-word style of translation. Within the broader 
framework of the religion-as-language metaphor it could be misleading 
because it suggests that Friends may be moving between discrete religions 
in their translating. Friends also frequently seem to move only between 
terms which are both traditional within Quakerism, such as 'God' and 'the 
Light'.  
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Two of the three guidelines suggested above are very focussed on the needs 
of the audience. There might also be a further pair of guidelines which relate 
to the needs of the speaker directly, something like: 
 use words which you can speak honestly, which seem to you to most 
closely fit your experience, and 
 do not say that which you do not believe. 
These may at times come into conflict with the previous set; it may be that 
Friends who report anecdotally that they feel they cannot speak about 
theəlogical matters in Meeting are often caught between these two impulses. 
If you know that many in your Meeting find Christ-language difficult, but 
also know that you cannot share your spiritual truths without talking about 
Christ, it may seem better not to speak about such things at all. Although 
these further guidelines can be evidenced from the literature – in chapter 4, I 
looked at Rose Ketterer's attempt to use those words which most closely fit 
her experience, and non-theist Quaker literature offers example of Friends 
who refrain from using words, especially 'God' – the struggle is not very 
much discussed in writing, or indeed in public, in Quaker circles.
635
 There 
could also be a link to general guidelines about speech operating in British 
English, which point to considerations about politeness, turn-taking, and 
appropriate topics and lengths for contributions, among other things. 
Overall, there is a need to balance the requirements of the speaker with 
those of the audience, and Quaker authors are clearly seeking to be inclusive 
of a range of theəlogical perspectives while accurately representing their 
own – which may not itself be fully summarised and expressed by a single 
word or even a few words. Such requirements push Friends towards list-
format remarks – which give the message 'I like the word x but accept that y 
and z are acceptable as well' – some of which are then multi-theəlogical 
given that Friends have access to terms from other religious traditions. 
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Looking kindly upon the practice of offering lists of terms, we might 
compare the exercise to buying sweets for all your friends: Al doesn't like 
chocolate, but Bobbie only eats chocolate, and Chris prefers Jelly Babies… 
one rapidly ends up with a shopping basket full of different kinds, and even 
then there is a danger that someone feels left out (especially when you are 
handing out sweets to people you have never met). This is the attraction of 
the token or 'please translate' strategy: I use the word 'God', or hand out 
Mars Bars, with a disclaimer that anyone who doesn't like it, or who has an 
allergy to it, can trade it in for something else. 
 
Over time, a body of acceptable answers has been developed, which 
includes some words brought in from other religious traditions as well as a 
range of traditional Christian and specifically Quaker terminology. There is 
no sharp dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable words; I joked 
earlier that 'potato' is unacceptable, but perhaps it could become acceptable 
if used in some metaphorical ways. A piece of ministry at Yearly Meeting 
2013 compared worshippers to water-beetles in a surprising way, with the 
bubble of air collected and carried by the beetle representing the Light 
encountered in Meeting for Worship and carried out into the world, so such 
innovation is clearly possible.  
 
Similarly, many Quakers can manage a little 'God the Father' in some 
contexts – singing the words of John Greenleaf Whittier in community 
settings would be a common example – but would find that it contributed to 
their discomfort in other Christian settings. Others are comfortable with 
traditionally Christian language in traditionally Christian contexts such as 
liturgy, but would not want to use that language in Meeting for Worship. 
Even within Quaker contexts (words written by a Quaker, like Whittier, 
quoted or sung by Quakers), there may be a tendency for modern Quakers to 
regard it as 'borrowed' language. Some words are under debate; some Sufi 
or Sufi-influenced Friends are strongly inclined to use the word Allah while 
other Quakers are equally strongly against it, a matter which is clearly 
influenced by the current perceptions of Islam among the demographics 
from which British Quakers most often come: white, middle-class, middle-
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aged or older, and left-leaning (Guardian reading). Changes over time, not 
fully tracked in this thesis but visible both directly and as comments about 
change found in the primary literature suggest that this trend is an ongoing 
process, in keeping with the gradual process of change found in natural 
language anyway. 
 
Quaker Question 2 
 
 What are the criteria on which these forms of Quaker language, 
especially the multi-theəlogy remarks, might be judged and how 
does this depend on the position of the person judging? How do 
ethical, pragmatic, coherence, and truth considerations figure in the 
construction of these criteria? 
In asking this question, we move a step beyond description, although I do 
not intend to make a normative claim about what Quakers should or should 
not say – not least because I have argued throughout this thesis that the 
relevant judgements will be highly contextual. We might also want to ask, 
for that reason, who is usefully able to judge these remarks – in the end, the 
only judgements which change practice will come from inside the 
community. However, because some key points about the remarks need to 
be heard from perspectives outside the speakers' community, judgements 
from outside may also be made and expressed even if they do not have any 
direct influence on the community's practices – this will happen when 
Quakers engage in outreach work, for example, or otherwise come to the 
attention of non-Quakers. 
 
A pragmatic criterion which has emerged in the course of this thesis relates 
to fear of offending others. Within a community which is in some ways 
small and very close, but which also contains considerable theəlogical 
variety (enough that I needed to invent the term 'theəlogical' in order to 
capture it) and which thinks of itself as, and wishes to be seen as, a 
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community which promotes peace and does not engage in conflict,
636
 the 
fear of upsetting or offending other members of the community is strong. It 
is not entirely an unfounded fear – cases of Friends upset by the religious 
language favoured by other Friends are not uncommon, although specific 
examples are usually not discussed in the literature (probably to protect the 
identities of the Friends involved). It can sometimes be seen in action in 
Quaker business meetings, however; for example, the wording and 
especially the inclusion of the word 'God' in the 2013 Britain Yearly 
Meeting epistle was questioned, with some speakers preferring to omit the 
word or to try and make it ambiguous. One suggestion was that the phrase 
"through God's eyes" should be printed as "through Gods eyes", thereby 
leaving it open to interpretation as a plural (gods), possessive (God's), or 
plural possessive (gods'); the Yearly Meeting did not accept this suggestion. 
 
It is not clear, however, whether offence is more often caused by the action 
of a particular Friend in using a word or whether Friends are actually upset 
by being reminded of the other contexts in which a word is used – or a little 
of both. In cases known to me personally, it seems that the latter is at least a 
strong element of the problem – for example, someone who has come to 
Quakerism in later life having been badly hurt by a(nother) Christian church 
in their youth might find words like 'Lord' and 'Father' difficult, but this is 
not the fault of a Friend who chooses to use them. The body of literature as 
it stands is not capable of providing much evidence for or against this 
theory, which fits well with other arguments I have made in this thesis about 
the ways in which language carries connotations between contexts, but it 
seems plausible and would bear further investigation. 
 
I have argued in this thesis that multi-theəlogy remarks are essentially 
coherent within the pluralist worldview which many British Quakers accept. 
I have not had the space to consider whether, historically speaking, this is a 
'traditional' Quaker view, but within the methodology of this thesis this is 
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not a big question. It would be interesting to know for how long this has 
been a widespread view, but the chronological development of the position 
does not affect my argument here, which is concerned with the details and 
uses of a now-widespread perspective. 
 
There are of course still Quakers who do not support the 
pluralist/universalist perspective. Because the Religious Society of Friends 
is so theəlogically diverse, there are likely to be representatives of a wide 
range of other viewpoints, but these perspectives are not clearly represented 
in the literature. However, I think that the way in which Quakers react to the 
possibility of diversity is instructive: generally speaking, there is an attempt 
(as we have seen in the literature quoted in chapter 1) to accept diverse 
views and incorporate them within the overall perspective of the Society. 
This reaction seems to me to be a pluralist one, even when it is applied to 
distinctly anti-pluralist positions. Pluralism is, then, embodied by the 
common way of working within the Society, even as its philosophical tenets 
are rejected by some of those whom it seeks to include. 
 
Quaker pluralism is not, however, necessarily the monocentric pluralism 
which most of Rose Drew's participants espoused. It is compatible with a 
non-theist position both in that not believing in any deity can be 
encompassed within the pluralist view as a legitimate path, and in that non-
theists can hold pluralist views themselves. Not all of them will, and the 
Quaker non-theist literature is presently relatively small (in part because of 
its relative youth), but it would be consistent with other Quaker perspectives 
and with the behaviour of Quaker non-theists to hold that many traditions 
contain an element of truth, and that non-theism can be seen as another 
tradition to which the same applies. Such a perspective on non-theism is 
supported by the views about Buddhism as an agnostic or atheist religion 
which are common among Quakers and especially Quaker universalists.  
 
Whether the pluralist view is metaphysically correct falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. It is enough for the purpose of this thesis that it is constructed 
and accepted within the Quaker community, and used fairly consistently. In 
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the relevant context, it attains a relatively high degree of coherence and can, 
as I have just described, be used to manage or deflect potential conflict 
within the community. It can also be seen to affect the ways in which 
religious language is approached – the consistent belief that a single reality 
underlies the many and varied religious expressions in the world supports 
the practice of listing possible terms and including words and phrases from 
other religious traditions. 
 
Quaker Question 3 
 
 Do any of the remarks under consideration make truth claims? If so, 
what claims do they make and do they succeed on their own terms? 
This question is difficult to address aside from particular remarks, some of 
which I discussed at length in chapters 4 and 7. However, I conclude that 
many of the specific Quaker multi-theəlogy remarks considered in the 
course of this thesis do indeed make truth claims. Besides the apparent 
claims about the interchangeability of names for God, the remarks also 
imply claims about the epistemic equality of religious paths and the power 
that specific names can hold for people – which in itself is in tension with 
the surface claim of interchangeability, although perhaps both can be held if 
the preference for certain names over others operates only at the individual 
and not at the community level. I have shown that many Quakers view 
language as an inferior means of communicating directly-experienced truth 
or reality, especially where that experience is of the divine.
637
  
 
Although the Quaker view does not account for the extent to which 
language constructs the possible experiences, holding it at the community 
level does help Quakers to set aside some potential problems in the 
community caused by individual preferences for very different language. 
Friends are free to assume that a Quaker speaker is trying to communicate 
through a flawed medium the truth they have experienced, and that if only 
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they can understand the language correctly they would agree with the other 
Friend. This again helps to maintain the general assumption of pluralism 
among Quakers, especially the idea that all religious experiences are of the 
same divine which is then named and described in many ways, and deflects 
– less charitably, we might say ignores – potential conflict around the issue 
of theəlogy. In a context which contains these elements, in particular 
pluralism about truth and a lowered emphasis on specific language, multi-
theəlogy remarks are able to maintain a coherence which would not be 
possible in other settings.  
 
Quaker Question 4 
 
 What sources and practices give Friends confidence in using 
language which is not traditionally Quaker in contexts which are 
distinctly Quaker? 
This question emerged in the course of my research, especially as I read 
more widely in Quaker literature and considered it in relation to the broader 
theological problems of pluralism and multiple belonging. Quakers in 
Britain generally are drawn from a well-educated and well-read 
demographic. They reflect social trends, such as a decreasing familiarity 
with the Bible, but have a tendency towards curiosity about other, non-
Christian, religions. Their curiosity is reflected in their prominence in 
interfaith work, and also partly created by the number of 'seekers' who enter 
the community having been engaged with one or more other religious 
traditions previously. There are also internal trends, such as the creation and 
fluctuating membership of groups such as the Quaker Universalist Group 
and the increasing theəlogical diversity of 20th and early 21st century British 
(liberal) Quakerism. As discussed in chapter 6, many of these seekers retain 
some slight or strong connection with their previous tradition, and some 
become dual-belongers: Quaker-Anglicans, Quaker-Buddhists, Quaker-
Pagans, Quaker-Sufis, and so forth. This situation means that a significant 
proportion of the community has previously used or currently use a non-
Quaker pattern of religious speech. It also helps to sensitise members of the 
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community to speech patterns – both those who move and encounter a new 
language and those who hear newcomers speaking in ways different from 
the Quaker norm are alerted to the fact of difference.  
 
The literature does not reveal many clear trends about shared sources for 
information on other religious traditions. Although some notable Quaker 
dual-belongers have written about their standpoints (Jim Pym's book about 
Quakerism and Buddhism, for example), Friends appear to be drawing on a 
wide variety of sources – many different strands of Buddhism, for 
example.
638
 No single influential book or individual can be found at the root 
of the move towards multi-theəlogy language, or even at the root of the use 
of a particular term within Quakerism. Their confidence with using the 
terms, in as much as it exists, seems to derive from individual experiences 
with other religions, whether those are the experiences of the Friend writing 
or of others in the community. Within the list-format remark, Friends may 
be incorporating and encouraging others to use terms with which original 
and new speakers are not personally confident.  
 
 
Reflections on the philosophical and theological tools used 
 
In the course of this thesis, I have drawn heavily on the work of some key 
scholars, particularly Wittgenstein and Lindbeck, who have informed my 
understandings of language and religion. The tools I have found in their 
work and used in this thesis have not been used on real-life examples in 
their community context, and more specifically never with multi-theəlogy 
remarks, and so it is profitable to review how well they have worked for the 
purpose.  
 
The Wittgensteinian idea that words and phrases are given their meanings 
by being used in specific contexts has served this thesis well. Although not 
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all of the people discussed in the thesis, Quaker authors especially, have 
agreed with this understanding of how language works, I have shown that 
there are cases where the previous uses of a particular word, as encountered 
by an individual, affect their reaction to its further uses very deeply. In the 
case of words used for the divine, some of which are used quite widely (in a 
range of Quaker, other religious, and non-religious settings) and many of 
which are often encountered in emotionally laden contexts (including, 
significantly, worship services, especially those held for seasonal 
celebrations or rites of passage), these connotations or layers of meaning are 
easily acquired and can be something of a minefield for those who wish to 
use such words but are trying to avoid upsetting people. It is this minefield 
into which Quakers are stepping so gingerly when they offer a range of 
alternative terms or suggest that people 'translate' into their preferred 
terminology. The existence of a collection of meanings accrued through use, 
not just for an individual but for enough individuals that they are now part 
of the community's understanding of the words involved, provides positive 
evidence in favour of the idea that language acquires meaning through its 
uses in specific contexts. 
 
In this model, the persistent use of a term by a community in a particular 
context will enable that community to build up a group connotation – an 
extra layer of meaning above that given by the use of the word in various 
other contexts. As new members join the community, they will need to 
encounter the group's use and develop the relevant connotation, or perhaps I 
could say understand through experience this layer of meaning, in order to 
appreciate the way in which the community has a different understanding of 
the word to others which might be found elsewhere. In the Quaker case, 
perhaps reticence about using words which have strong personal and 
emotional resonances can hinder this process, and the attempt to provide all 
members of the community with the intended connotations can lead to the 
production of a list-format remark. 
 
The idea that language cannot be private, that it is necessarily and not 
merely contingently used for communication, has not been so useful, 
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although it has recurred at some points in the thesis. It stands more directly 
in opposition to the viewpoint which I identified in chapter 1 as a widely 
held Quaker perspective on the way language works than does the idea of 
meaning through use. On the model in which one first has an experience and 
then names it, it seems that one could keep that name to oneself. However, 
whether this is the case depends on the previous experience of the 
individual: someone previously immersed in language, who has an 
experience and names it, is in a very different position from someone who, 
without previous exposure to language, is seeking to name everything. The 
former is an addition to a previously public language, while the second is an 
attempt to create a private language – in fact, anything so created would be 
meaningless unless in some way publically accessible.  
 
The model of experience which is then named by an individual has been 
shown to be inadequate as a picture of how language acquires meaning 
because it does not take account of the community and communicative 
aspects of language.  On the one hand, it is an attractive one and seems to 
many to be intuitive. However, it does not address the extent to which 
experiences are changed or made possible by naming or describing them, 
which is a very important consideration in relation to religious experience. 
If applying the linguistic categories (of any natural language) to experience 
is in some sense a part of that experience, something which happens before 
and during an experience as well as afterwards, then the linguistic categories 
which we have available for religious experience will inevitably shape the 
experience itself as well as our understandings of it. If we accept what I 
have argued (in chapter 2) to be the implications of Wittgenstein's private 
language considerations, namely that we must learn language in community, 
even our religious experiences are to that extent shaped by our surroundings 
and relationships, as is, inevitably, the way in which we talk about them. 
 
This is both uncomfortable for Quakers – in that they prefer to think of 
themselves as having direct access to the divine unmediated by human 
forces (with the implicit claims about culture and language which this view 
supplies) – but also taken for granted by many, in that they accept without 
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hesitation that, for example, George Fox used Christian language to describe 
his experiences because that was the language of the time and society in 
which he lived. The latter point is sometimes used to justify the use of non-
Christian language today, on the grounds that we no longer live in a 
generally Christian society, or to reassure Friends who wish to use non-
Christian language that Fox's uses are not necessary for Quakers. The 
argument is something like: of course Fox used Biblical language, since that 
is what he had available, but today we can – perhaps we need to, or even 
should – draw on many other resources, not just because they are new but 
because they are better for the job. This is sometimes expressed as a desire 
to be inclusive or reach more people, especially to communicate with 
members of other religions or those who are put off by the use of traditional 
Christian language. It is also possible, and some of the examples I have 
discussed suggest this, that for some speakers multi-theəlogy language is 
better because it is more accurate or more fully represents their experience. 
For example, people practising multiple religious belonging may well need 
to use language from both/all their religious traditions in order to describe 
their experiences. 
 
Neither extreme account satisfactorily explains the actual situation. An 
account, perhaps inspired by Wittgensteinian considerations but which goes 
beyond the Wittgensteinian position, which takes language to be entirely 
primary and experience almost non-existent becomes behaviourism, 
(roughly speaking) a view in which the markers of experience are taken to 
be so much outward rather than inward that people can judge the 
experiences of others but not their own. The flaws such a view have been 
memorably summed up in the old joke about two behaviourists in bed: "It 
was good for you, how was it for me?"  
 
To apply this to religious experience – to feeling overwhelming joy, for 
example – seems to miss something about the individual, personal, and 
ultimately private part of that emotion, even if it is also expressed and 
public in some ways. Although Wittgensteinian views have sometimes been 
taken to point in the direction of this kind of flawed account, it would be 
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mistaken to attribute a behaviourist view of this kind to Wittgenstein 
himself; it is the concept of an 'inner process', and not the inner process 
itself, which stands in need of outward criteria.
639
 Some kinds of 
experiences can only be had by language-users
640
 and in order for us to 
think or speak about inner processes we must have established criteria 
which can be understood collectively, or we will not be able to assess 
whether the words 'inner process' are being used meaningfully – but the 
concept of an inner process is not required in order to undergo an inner 
process. 
 
On the other hand, an account which denies the effect of public language on 
our interior lives also misses something about the connected and communal 
nature of our conceptions and perceptions. Someone can feel pain and keep 
it secret, but their experience of that pain as well as the way they express it 
when they do so will be shaped by what their community has told them 
about pain and which ways of expressing pain are usual in that 
community.
641
 A full account of the relationship between 'language' and 
'experience' would need to deal with both of these aspects in a nuanced way, 
and the tools which have been available to this thesis have not always 
achieved this. 
 
In the course of the thesis I have also given arguments for and against the 
idea that some language is irreplaceable. I have moved away from talking 
about the 'pictures' which religious language creates, preferring to talk about 
the associations and connotations of language. This has helped me to 
capture the emotional dimension of language, since it has become apparent 
that for many Quakers, word choices are about feelings as well as states of 
affairs. I should note that this is not the same claim as the 'expressivist' 
claim that religious language only expresses emotions  (and other related 
states such as desires and wishes), since that implies that such language can 
                                                 
639
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §580. 
640
 Ibid., §649. 
641
 And, perhaps, on what kind of pain is involved and the conceptual dimension which it 
acquires within a certain community. 
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be rephrased into explicitly emotional rather than religious terms, the 
thought being that the emotional content was present but disguised. As 
discussed in chapter 3, some expressivists such as Hare actually focus more 
on morality than emotion, but this is even more clearly a rephrasing into 
non-religious language. The emotion-expressivist position could be put in 
such a way that in fact it entails irreplaceability in at least some cases, as 
when a poem captures emotion which cannot be conveyed in prose, for 
example. 
 
However, irreplaceability has mostly been seen in action at the individual 
level – relating to the emotional connotations which a word has for a 
particular person, created by their particular history – rather than at the level 
of community. Can we also say that some words are irreplaceable for British 
Quakers as a group? It certainly seems possible that there are some ways of 
expressing the key insights of Quakerism which cannot be discarded 
without also losing something of importance about those insights. I would 
suggest, for example, that the phrase 'that of God in everyone', a quote from 
Fox which is very well-known and well-used among Friends, might be 
irreplaceable in this way.
642
 It captures a key theəlogical claim made by 
Quakers, which underpins other claims we have seen in the course of this 
thesis – in particular, the claim that everyone is equal before and equal in 
access to 'God', howsoever understood.
643
 The incorporation of the term 
'God' in this phrase and others which are similarly valued by Quakers also 
suggests that the term 'God' may not be replaceable, even if some Quakers 
wish to supplement it. Perhaps this idea is supported by the use of 'God' by 
non-theist Friends, as in the title of their anthology Godless for God's 
Sake,
644
 although it should be noted that some Friends do continue to prefer 
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other words. Some prefer to add an 'o', for example, and talk about 'that of 
good in everyone', even though this substitution process is not always 
successful – it is hard to ascribe personal attributes to 'good', for example. 
Bearing in mind the latter point, my contention is that to stop using the word 
'God' would entail a loss of meaning. 
 
In chapter 3, I discussed the work of George Lindbeck and identified two 
concepts which, emerging from his work and refined in discussion with 
other thinkers, were likely to be useful to the thesis: the metaphor of religion 
as language and the idea, easily expressed within that metaphor, of fluent 
speakers of a particular religion. I have used the metaphor in a variety of 
ways, accepting that it usefully extends Wittgenstein's view of 'theology as 
grammar', and that the concept of fluency and even of a fluent elite is a 
fruitful way of considering a religious community. It highlights the way in 
which religious communities foster a learning process and that there will 
always be an informal  hierarchy of those more or less familiar with the 
ways in which things are done, as well as leaving room open for the kinds of 
dual belonging which I discussed in chapter 6.  
 
In wide reading of literature about Wittgenstein and Lindbeck, I did not find 
examples of their work being applied to a specific community in quite the 
way in which I have applied it to the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) 
in Britain today. It is useful, in the wider context of this scholarship, to have 
tested some of these ideas, and to see that they do form helpful tools for 
analysis of particular communities. I have, of course, chosen from the 
beginning those tools most likely to be useful to me and to relate most 
closely to the issues I have encountered in Quaker literature; for another 
community, another toolkit might be required. Some of the tools which I 
have used are, however, central to the bodies of work of the thinkers 
involved – for example, the metaphor of religion as language is key to 
Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine,
 645
 and so my use of it and the ways in 
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which I have adapted it does have implications for the study of Lindbeck's 
work as a whole.  
 
One key problem with applying Lindbeck's notion of a fluent elite to an 
explicitly non-hierarchical community
646
 is that of the distinctions thereby 
created. It is obvious that a living language must have a certain number of 
fluent speakers in order to maintain a community,
647
 and some languages 
have a clear elite control – French, for example – but others, like English, 
are more or less chaotic and multifarious. In this regard, the analogy 
between Christianity as a whole and English seems stronger than other 
languages, although perhaps French or another language would be a more 
apt comparison for some traditions within Christianity, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church. That said, there is still an issue around the drawing of 
boundaries between the fluent and not fluent, the elite and not elite, with 
regard to their quality of speaking or practice. Lindbeck's boundary is only 
implied in any case, and there are several which, in other Christian 
communities, could be taken as lower bounds of fluency. The teaching 
given before Confirmation, in Confirmation Classes, might for example be 
taken to be a basic level of fluency. However, when Lindbeck seems to be 
speaking of experts who spend their time working on the language 
professionally, the priesthood seems to be what he has in mind – perhaps he 
thinks of theological work by lay people as informing the priesthood. In any 
case, I would, with Lindbeck, see fluency as a learned skill. 
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Quakers might be read as making a radical claim about fluency when they 
talk about the priesthood of all believers – this could be understood as a 
claim that all those who come to be convinced Quakers, to worship 
regularly after the manner of Friends, have an equal fluency in the language 
of Quakerism. This is not quite right, though, because as I said above 
fluency must be learned. Rather, the equality claim is that all Quakers have 
equal access to that which is spoken about in the language of Quakerism – 
some will be more fluent than others in spoken language or other forms of 
expression, but all are to determine for themselves which ways of speaking 
they personally will use. The community does accept that people need a 
chance to develop familiarity and fluency with the community's ways of 
speaking when they enter it.  
 
Sometimes it is forgotten that this might require explicit teaching as well as 
the absorbing of ideas and practices by observation and mimicry, but the 
idea that it is a process is well-established even as Friends shy away from 
creating a hierarchy based on it. The only difference which Quakers do 
formally acknowledge is that between attenders – those who are regularly at 
a Meeting for Worship – and members, those who have made a formal 
commitment to the community. It might be said that membership, especially 
when sought by the traditional method, in which two visitors appointed by 
the Area Meeting spend time with the applicant and produce a report about 
the applicant's experience of Quakerism and reasons for applying, 
constitutes a kind of measure of fluency. We would not expect Area 
Meetings to admit into membership anyone not familiar with the basic and 
common Quaker practices – but it should also be said that they do 
frequently admit into membership people not familiar with much Quaker 
history, many Quaker ways of speaking and practising, or the national and 
international Quaker communities. For some, membership can be about 
connection to a particular Local or Area Meeting and does not in that 
respect constitute a measure of fluency.  
 
In my sample of literature, I think it can be taken that all the writers are 
fluent in 'Quaker'; those who are not are unlikely to be writing. Those 
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published by collective Quaker endeavours, such as bodies like the 
Kindlers, the central committees, and the Yearly Meeting itself, might 
reasonably be thought of as part of the fluent elite, because they are not only 
being published but being published as teaching tools of a kind. They will 
not represent the whole, since fluency and the fluent elite need not be 
represented in writing let alone in publication, but they serve as a sample of 
this kind of speech.
648
 By writing and publishing, they distribute their ways 
of speaking about matters such as theəlogy to a wide range of Friends, and 
also preserve them for future generations.  
 
There is also the authority-giving effect of communal writing. Whereas an 
individual who writes may be part of the fluent elite but only represents 
their own speech patterns, a document edited by a more or less officially 
sanctioned committee reflects the agreed usage of a group. If that group is 
representative of the wider community, and/or well aware of the patterns of 
use prevalent within the wider community, they will more fully represent 
those patterns. In the evidence presented in this thesis, it has indeed seemed 
that official and committee written documents do indeed contain examples 
typical of those also found in literature produced by individuals, named or 
anonymous, and so I conclude that the communally produced documents are 
reflecting a wide pattern of use. The inclusion of anonymous authors in the 
sample of individuals, although somewhat offset by editing processes, is 
perhaps important as, knowing that no name will be attached to the piece, 
authors are presumably freer to offer their personal uses even if those would 
not be sanctioned by the community. 
  
Lindbeck's metaphor of religion as language has been central to this project, 
but at this stage it is also worth considering how the project might have been 
different had it taken another metaphor as central. I was led into the 
religion-as-language metaphor because I was already interested in language 
and the role of language in religion – to put it another way, in the non-
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metaphorical relation between religion and language. Lindbeck also 
suggests the metaphor of religion-as-culture, which also prompts us to ask 
questions about the relation between religion and culture outside the 
metaphor. This is less clear cut, since although we can recognise ways in 
which cultures are not tied to religion – for example, Tibetan and Thai 
cultures could both be called Buddhist, but there are many ways in which 
they are not alike, so religion does not account for an entire culture – we 
also see that religion is deeply embedded in cultures. It would be impossible 
to remove Buddhism from Thai culture and expect the culture to remain the 
same. This is complicated by the fact that because culture and history – 
especially in the case of religion, the moment and method by which it 
arrived in a culture – have modifying effects on the religion itself as well as 
on the culture, so that the Buddhism we find in Tibet is of a different kind 
from that which we find in Thailand, and would be even if it been the same 
Buddhism at the time of its arrival in each place. Even in sub-cultures, this 
remains true – the modern-day goth subculture has inherited Christian 
symbolism from the vampire myths and novels on which it draws, and 
would look different if it did not have that background. There is always a 
tendency to interlock discussion of religion-as-metaphorically-x and the-
relation-of-x-and-religion, and this is increased considerably when we 
cannot reliably tell the difference between x and religion in the first place: 
where does the metaphor begin? It may be useful to think of it as also an 
analogy, grounded in a real relation between the things compared. 
 
That being so, it might be constructive to consider other things which 
religion might be said to be. For example, we might consider the metaphors 
of religion as property, which is used in talk about 'borrowing' or 'stealing' 
of religious practices, or of religion as territory, which some have used to 
reframe the discussion of borrowing as one of 'visiting', 'dwelling', or 
'touring'. In chapter 6, we saw some people using a metaphor of religion as 
food or more generally nourishment – and favouring this strongly over other 
possible images, some of which, like nationality or family, might emphasise 
the way in which one belongs to a religion rather than consuming it. 
Theology, taken as a discipline within religion, may lend itself to other 
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metaphors, such as mapping – related to 'religion as territory' – or 
gardening, which (depending whether one thinks first of the vegetable or 
flower garden) might relate to 'religion as nourishment' or suggest an image 
of religion as a beautiful – but perhaps delicate or thorny – flower which 
needs careful tending. Obviously, all these metaphors and more have the 
potential to be as rich and complex as the metaphor of religion as language, 
and require explorations which are excluded from this thesis and may be 
undertaken by other researchers. 
 
 
The thesis considered as part of Quaker Studies 
 
The diverse field of Quaker Studies has featured in this thesis mainly as 
historically and sociologically contextualising material, and direct 
implications of this work for historians and sociologists are limited except in 
so far as I have aimed to capture something about the state and development 
of Quakerism through an analysis of the language which Quakers use. 
However, it is also the case that considerations of Quaker uses of language, 
whether specifically theəlogical language or language which is unique to 
Quakers because their usages arise from their other religious commitments, 
have been somewhat thin on the ground and limited to mainly historical 
settings. Among those which do exist, Richard Bauman's Let Your Words be 
Few comes closest to a Wittgensteinian perspective, although mainly 
influenced by modern work in linguistics, but is focussed on the first 
generation of Friends, whereas I have chosen to examine today's Quakers.
649
 
 
I have also chosen to work mainly from an insider perspective. Although I 
have drawn extensively on material from outside the Quaker tradition within 
which I was raised and still practise, the method which I have chosen 
favours the insider perspective – as discussed in the introduction – and I 
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have embraced this. This does not and has not prevented me from making 
critical points at times; indeed, I suspect that I have been more critical of 
Quakerism than an outsider might be because I hold it in high esteem and 
want it to attain high standards of coherence and lucidity.  
 
Although this thesis has been written mainly for academics who may, but 
often will not, be Quakers, I hope that it also has some things to say which 
will be of use to Quakers. One of these might be the attempt at a clear-
sighted – not objective, but wide-reaching, historically informed and 
carefully contextualised – assessment of some of the current forms of 
Quaker religious language. Only once we know, or have noticed, what we 
are actually saying can we consider whether those ways of speaking best 
convey our truth/Truth/truths. Other parts of this thesis which might prove 
useful include the attention to detail which is enabled by working at such 
length and at this academic level, and the drawing in of material from 
outside the Quaker world. As I noted in chapter 1, other Quakers have 
attempted to use Wittgenstein's ideas and apply them to Quakerism, but 
none have had the time and space to devote to it which is afforded by an 
entire thesis. My outworking of them may not take the project in the 
direction which these other Friends would have chosen, but I think it has 
validated them in thinking that the core project is a useful one.  
 
Perhaps more useful still are the ways in which this thesis has challenged 
accepted Quaker views of language and widespread Quaker ways of 
speaking. In particular, I have challenged the assumptions which many 
Quakers make about the ways in which language relates to experience and 
the interchangeability of particular terms. Although I have shown overall 
that multi-theəlogy list-format remarks do make sense within the British 
Quaker context, some of the issues raised in this thesis point towards a need 
for a reconsideration among Friends of the significance of language to 
individuals and the community. Some of these matters are already being 
raised, because they appear in interfaith and ecumenical work when Quakers 
speak to non-Quakers about the Divine, or because other topics currently 
being discussed by the Quaker community, such as theism and non-theism 
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or universalist/pluralist and Christocentric perspectives,  bring us back to the 
issue of the language we use. 
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Glossary of British Quaker Terms 
 
Advices and Queries 
The first chapter of Quaker Faith and Practice, providing guidance and 
helpful thoughts, published as a separate pamphlet as well. Frequently used 
during worship, read silently and aloud, and referred to by other documents. 
 
Area Meeting (formerly Monthly Meeting) 
A Meeting for Worship for Business held regularly and including 
representatives and other interested members from the Local Meetings in 
the geographical area it covers. The term can be used both for the occasion 
of the meeting itself and for the group of people who are members of it. It is 
responsible, among other things, for maintaining buildings, appointing 
Elders and Overseers, admitting people in membership, and sending one or 
more representatives to Meeting for Sufferings. 
 
Attender 
Someone who attends Meeting for Worship and perhaps participates in the 
community in a number of other ways, but is not presently in membership. 
 
Britain Yearly Meeting (formerly London Yearly Meeting) 
The national annual Meeting for Worship for Business of the Religious 
Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, and the organisation to which Area 
Meetings belong. It employs some staff members to provide administrative 
support and carry out the wishes of the Yearly Meeting, appoints Meeting 
for Sufferings to oversee work done and issues arising while the Yearly 
Meeting is not in session, approves any changes to Quaker Faith and 
Practice, and in session, will consider a range of spiritual and practice 
business. Note that 'Britain' here refers to England, Scotland, and Wales; 
Ireland Yearly Meeting is a separate entity which includes meetings in both 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
 
Business Meeting, business method 
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See Meeting for Worship for Business. 
 
Cradle Quaker 
Someone born into a Quaker family and raised in contact with a Quaker 
community. 
 
Children's Meeting 
A session for children, from birth until such age as they choose to leave or 
join the main Meeting for Worship. As at a Sunday school, there is often 
some teaching or a game or activity, although there is much variation, use of 
discretion, and tailoring to the needs of the children present; usually the 
children join the main Meeting for Worship for a short period – between 
five and fifteen minutes – either at the beginning or at the end. 
 
Elder 
A member appointed to attend to the spiritual health of a Quaker 
community. In fact any Friend can act in this role, but in many meetings it is 
found helpful to appoint some Friends specifically – for limited terms, 
usually no more than two consecutive periods of three years each – to pay 
attention to the issues such the quality of worship and ministry, the 
discipline of the Meeting for Worship for Business, and the spiritual nurture 
of individuals. Sometimes this role is combined with that of an overseer. 
 
Friend 
A Quaker – from the formal name, Religious Society of Friends. The term 
Ffriends (sometimes spelt F/friends or f/Friends) indicates the personal 
friends of the speaker, where some but not all of them are also Friends 
(Quakers).  
 
Friends House 
The building, opposite Euston station in London, which is owned by Britain 
Yearly Meeting and used for central work, such as the holding of Yearly 
Meeting and other central committees and as office space. It includes a 
bookshop, café, and worship space collectively known as the Quaker 
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Centre, a library, a restaurant, and meetings rooms of all sizes which are let 
out when not needed for Quaker purposes. A number of people employed on 
behalf of the Yearly Meeting to either assist with internal Quaker work or to 
undertake externally-facing work commissioned by Quakers have offices 
here, and it is relatively common for Friends to contact someone working at 
Friends House seeking advice or assistance with a particular project. 
 
The Friend 
A national Quaker magazine, published weekly, carrying news, opinion, and 
letters. 
 
Gathered Meeting 
Although Quakers do use the word 'gathering' in the ordinary sense of 'a 
coming-together of people' (e.g. Summer Gathering, or when combined with 
Yearly Meeting, Yearly Meeting Gathering), there is also a more specialised 
use of the term in which 'a feeling of gathering', often of 'a gathered 
Meeting' suggests a collective numinous experience which may also involve 
a felt Presence (of God, Christ, the Spirit, or whatever the Friends present 
prefer to call it). 
 
The Kindlers 
The Kindlers are a project of North West London Area Meeting (which is to 
say: they were formed in London, consist mainly of Friends living in 
London, and are funded and spiritually supported by North West London 
Area Meeting), and have also become a national Listed Informal Group. The 
group was formed in response to Britain Yearly Meeting's five-year plan A 
Framework for Action. They are particularly concerned with the spiritual 
well-being of Meetings, and have engaged with members of Britain Yearly 
Meeting as a whole through a series of publications, the offering of day 
workshops to Meetings, and other events such as conferences. Many of the 
founding members of the Kindlers – such as Alec Davison and Jennifer 
Kavanagh – were previously involved in Quaker Quest, and the experience 
of outreach work of this kind has informed their approach to other matters. 
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Listed Informal Group 
A group of Quakers with a unifying interest, existing outside the formal 
structures of Britain Yearly Meeting but recognised as related to it. Topics 
covered by Listed Informal Groups at present include social concerns (for 
example, homelessness, death and dying, alcohol and drugs), the arts, 
history, international links, politics, and – as discussed in chapter 1 – 
theəlogical positions. Listed Informal Groups mentioned in this thesis 
include the Quaker Universalist Group, the Quaker Women's Group, the 
Kindlers, and the Non-Theist Friends Network. 
 
Local Meeting (formerly Preparative Meeting) 
A local group, holding regular Meetings for Worship. A local meeting may 
vary in size between a few and a hundred Friends, and meet in any 
convenient location. The local meeting is usually the level at which Friends 
socialise; depending on the size of the meeting it may also run study groups 
and other events.  
 
Meeting 
A gathering of people; a group of people who sometimes so gather. As with 
the term 'church', the term 'meeting' can be used to indicate both the event of 
a meeting (a Meeting for Worship, or a Meeting for Worship for Business 
such as an Area or Yearly Meeting), and the people who habitually attend 
such a meeting. It is possible to be a member of a meeting (of an Area 
Meeting, for example) without ever attending the actual gathering of that 
Area Meeting – although one would be expected to be a regular attender or 
at least known at one of the Local Meetings which is a constituent part of 
that Area Meeting. 
 
Meeting for Sufferings  
Originally, a Meeting for Worship for Business held in London with the 
central purpose of recording the sufferings of persecuted Friends in Britain. 
Latterly, principally a representative governing body which includes a 
member of each Area Meeting as well as some staff members employed by 
the Yearly Meeting; Meeting for Sufferings is the national body of Britain 
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Yearly Meeting when the Yearly Meeting itself is not in session. Britain 
Yearly Meeting, as a charitable body under UK law, has specifically 
appointed Trustees who are responsible for many practical issues, while the 
focus of Meeting for Sufferings is, in theory, on vision and policy matters. It 
considers many issues, mainly brought to it in the first instance by minutes 
from Area Meetings or central committees, makes decisions and can issue 
public statements on behalf of the whole Society, but must refer some points 
back to the Yearly Meeting itself for further consideration or final decision. 
 
Meeting for Worship 
In the British Quaker tradition, a period of unprogrammed worship – often 
but not necessarily an hour – during which most present are silent, but 
anyone can speak if they feel led to do so. For a more detailed discussion, 
see Chapter 1. 
 
Meeting for Worship for Business 
A Meeting for Worship, as above, to which items of business are brought, 
often known as 'business meeting'. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Chapter 1. 
 
Member, membership 
Someone who, following a formal process and acceptance by an Area 
Meeting, is in membership of the Religious Society of Friends. 
Memberships are held and administered at the Area Meeting level although 
membership in an Area Meeting which is itself part of Britain Yearly 
Meeting also confers membership of (and therefore, for example, the right 
to attend) the Yearly Meeting.  
 
Outreach 
Publicising the existence of Quakerism, without intending to convince or 
convert anyone to Quaker ways. The word is now in use among Quakers to 
cover a wide range of 'telling people who we are and what we do' activities, 
and seems to be favoured because it avoids the negative connotations of 
terms such as 'mission' and 'evangelism'. 
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Overseer 
A member asked to take particular responsibility for the pastoral care of the 
Quaker community. In fact any Friend can act in this role, but in many 
meetings it is found helpful to appoint some Friends specifically – for 
limited terms, usually no more than two consecutive periods of three years 
each – to attend to those who may need practical or financial support, the 
management of bursaries and similar funds, and the social health of the 
meeting. Sometimes this role is combined with that of an elder. 
 
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain 
The formal name of the body constituting Quakers in Britain, of which 
Yearly Meeting is the national gathering and governing body. The term 
'Britain Yearly Meeting' is often used synonymously with this to indicate all 
the Quakers in Britain, or more accurately, all those in Britain who are 
members of an Area Meeting which is a member of Britain Yearly Meeting. 
 
Quaker (see also Friend) 
A member or attender of a Quaker meeting; someone who is associated with 
the Society of Friends.  
 
Quaker Faith and Practice 
As described by its subtitle, this is "the book of Christian discipline of the 
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain". 
The current edition, approved by Yearly Meeting in 1994, contains in one 
cover three key elements: Advices and Queries, chapters on church 
government, and collections of inspirational or guiding material in the form 
of extracts from other Quaker sources (including previous versions of the 
book of discipline). The book of discipline is revised as a whole 
approximately once a generation, in a process taking about a decade and 
including extensive consultation, and changed in more minor ways by the 
Yearly Meeting almost every year (these minor updates usually affect the 
church government sections and react to changes in the Yearly Meeting's 
policy or British law). There is some debate about how prescriptive various 
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parts of the book are meant to be or should be, but in general the book of 
discipline and the Yearly Meeting (in the broad sense) are interdependent: 
the Yearly Meeting (in the narrow sense) agrees the book which in turn lays 
down how the Yearly Meeting (in both the broad and narrow senses) should 
be run. 
 
Quakerism 
The Quaker way.  
 
Quaker Quest 
A particular format for outreach work, developed in central London by 
many of the same people who later formed The Kindlers, and now in use 
throughout Britain Yearly Meeting (and in some other places, e.g. in the 
US). Quaker Quest events are public meetings, usually held in the evening, 
which aim to offer an introduction to Quakerism. The evening includes six 
presentations from three speakers, who are selected in advance to represent 
a range of Quaker perspectives on the issue at hand – typical themes for a 
Quest event include God, Faith in Action, and Worship. There are also 
opportunities for discussion in small groups, to ask questions of the 
presenters, and to experience a short period of Quaker worship. Usually, the 
events run regularly for a number of weeks and ideally the themes are 
repeated on a cycle – this means that a potential Quester, an interested 
member of the public, has multiple chances to attend, but also that speakers 
become more confident over time. As well as materials giving instructions 
on running the evenings, the Quaker Quest group has published a series of 
pamphlets collecting the sorts of things which are said in presentations – the 
Twelve Quakers and… series, published in a single volume as New Light.  
 
Yearly Meeting 
In the narrow sense, an annual Meeting for Worship for Business – for the 
specific use in the context of England, Scotland, and Wales, see Britain 
Yearly Meeting – but also used in a broad sense to describe the community 
which is formed around the annual meeting, including all the members of all 
the Area Meetings which belong to the Yearly Meeting. On formal internal 
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documents, this community is the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in 
Britain, and on outward-facing documents it is usually called 'Quakers in 
Britain'. The narrow and broad senses are often distinguished by the use of 
the phrase 'in session' – the Yearly Meeting in session is the Meeting for 
Worship for Business. Key decisions are made by the Yearly Meeting in 
session, but others may sometimes be made on behalf of the Yearly Meeting 
by committees of it, such as Meeting for Sufferings.  
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